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Despite the existence of state rules governing attorney conduct, state bar 
ethics committees, similar conduct guides for CPAs and the IRS office of 
Professional Responsibility, the ultimate deterrence to negligence by a tax 
professional is the threat of a lawsuit for damages caused by substandard 
conduct. This lawsuit also represents the only means by which a client may 
obtain redress for the damages caused by the negligence. The principles 
governing malpractice therefore function in a regulatory capacity to assure 
that professionals act with diligence and appropriate due care. If the 
professional does not meet the required standards, she or he must bear the 
consequences and compensate the client for the damages caused by the 
substandard conduct. 
Tax is a very complex and technical area of law. Previously, as a 
practitioner, and now, as a long-time teacher in the area, I was always 
concerned whether the incidence of malpractice liability exposure was 
especially high in this area of legal practice. And, if yes, whether it was 
possible to identify which areas of tax law were most prone to generate tax 
malpractice claims.  In two earlier studies, I allayed my worst fears that tax 
was so dangerous an area to practice in that it would be foolhardy to do so.
1
 
No, there were not reported tax malpractice claims under virtually every 
 
1
Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in Which 
Malpractice Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Malpractice I]; Jacob L. Todres, Tax 
Malpractice: Areas in Which It Occurs and the Measure of Damages—An Update, 78 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1011 (2004) [hereinafter Malpractice II]. 
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section of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). In Malpractice II, which was 
published in 2004, I concluded that the estate planning/estate and gift tax 
area probably generated the most tax malpractice claims during the previous 
half-decade.
2
 Beyond that, the areas generating the most claims involved 
late filing, non-filing, and negligent tax return preparation.
3
 The errors in 
these areas, though, were not so much errors of tax law, but rather were 
general sloppiness and inattentiveness that occurred in a tax context — such 
as missing time deadlines and not following instructions.
4
 
By the mid to late 1990s and probably continuing until around 2004 or 
2005, the tax landscape had become overrun with tax shelter promoters 
aggressively marketing tax shelters to very wealthy individuals.
5
 The 
shelters were very aggressive and highly technical structured transactions 
that purportedly could eliminate millions, tens, and even hundreds of 
millions of dollars of taxes on demand. These shelters were mass marketed 
to many taxpayers. The shelters, which, at best, were of doubtful validity, 
were really of the too-good-to-be-true variety. Probably starting in the late 
1990s, and certainly by the early 2000s, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) was actively and vigorously cracking down on the investors and 
purveyors of these flawed tax shelters.
6
 Ultimately, many of the purchasers 
of these tax shelters conceded the invalidity of the shelters and availed 
themselves of IRS amnesty and settlement initiatives.
7
 As a result, there 
were numerous predictions that a wave of malpractice suits against the tax 
 
2
Malpractice II, supra note 1, at 1089. 
3
Id. at 1090. 
4
Id. 
5
For excellent overviews of tax shelters see, e.g., Eric Solomon, A Short History of Tax 
Shelters, in 1 The Partnership Tax Practice Series: Planning for Domestic and Foreign 
Partnerships, LLCs, Joint Ventures & Other Strategic Alliances chap. 238, (Louis S. Freeman ed., 
2014); and Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today’s 
Thoughtful U.S.Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No”, in The Corporate Tax 
Practice Series chap. 442 (Philip B. Wright et al. eds., 2014). 
6
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gary, Year In Review: Tax Shelter Crackdown Efforts Steer 
Government Policy, 102 TAX NOTES 35, 35 (2004); see also, generally I.R.S. News Release IR-
2003-51 (Apr. 15, 2003). 
7
2,000 taxpayers were reported to have participated in one IRS global settlement initiative. 
Stephen Joyce, About 2,000 Taxpayers to Pay $2 billion in Global Settlement Initiative, Everson 
Says, 59 DAILY TAX REP.  (Mar. 28, 2006). In response to a different program for “Son of BOSS” 
tax shelters over 1,200 taxpayers participated. I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-87 (July 1, 2004) 
(over 1500 taxpayers filed Notices of Election to participate); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-72 
(July 11, 2005) (Over 1200 electing taxpayers qualified to participate in the settlement). 
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advisors involved with the invalid shelters would result.
8
 After all, the 
shelters, which were very expensive, were invalid and worse than 
worthless. In addition to unwelcome and unwanted IRS scrutiny, the shelter 
investors incurred significant costs as a consequence of their shelter 
investments. These included interest expense, often penalties, and 
professional fees to correct erroneous tax returns and for representation in 
connection with IRS (and state) audits and claims. In addition, the basic tax 
the shelter purchasers were seeking to avoid also had to be paid. 
The purpose of this article is to review the developments in the tax 
malpractice area during roughly the last decade. The goal is to determine 
how the substantive law in this area has evolved, what damages may be 
recovered when malpractice has occurred, and whether it is possible to 
identify particular areas of tax law or practice that are more likely than 
others to result in tax malpractice claims. Initially it was expected and 
hoped that the predicted wave of tax malpractice litigation against the 
sellers of the bad tax shelters during this period would be a fertile source of 
substantive developments in this area. Paradoxically, this has not occurred. 
While there are many cases arising from the bad tax shelters, to date very 
few have focused on substantive tax malpractice issues and only one, 
decided in late 2013, has gone to judgment on the merits.
9
 Most of the 
reported cases have focused on procedural issues such as whether the 
disputes must be arbitrated,
10
 statute of limitations,
11
 jurisdiction in federal 
 
8
See, e.g., Allen Kenney & Lee A. Sheppard, Korb Predicts Shelter Malpractice Suits, 2005 
TAX NOTES TODAY 216–2 (Nov. 9, 2005); David Cay Johnston, Wealthy Sue Accountants Over 
Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003 at C1. See generally Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice 
Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267 (2008). 
9
Soled, supra note 8, at 274–75 (reporting that “there is not a single reported decision 
determining whether a particular defendant committed malpractice.”). The one reported case that 
reached judgment on the substantive tax malpractice issue is Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 
07-CI-2647 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/ Publications/ 
Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf. 
10
See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 625 (2009); Chew, Jr. v. KPMG, 
LLP, 407 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792–93 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, 
L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 925 A.2d 22, 
24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Conwill v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 820 N.Y.S. 2d 842, *1 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 
11
See, e.g., Malone v. Ahrens & DeAngeli, PLLC., 445 Fed. App’x 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Soward v. Deutsche Bank AG, 814 F. Supp. 2d 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Moorehead v. 
Deutsche Bank AG, No. 11 C 106, 2011 WL 4496221, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2011); Corporex 
Cos. v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 713 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (E.D. Ky. 2010); Hutton v. Deutsche 
Bank AG, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Kan. 2008). 
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versus state court,
12
 and various other non-substantive tax malpractice 
issues.
13
 In addition, since many of the tax shelters were mass marketed to 
many purchasers, several class action suits resolved what otherwise could 
have resulted in many hundreds of individual cases.
14
 These class action 
cases were all settled, so they do not add much to substantive tax 
malpractice law, aside from confirming that normal class action principles 
apply, and a class action suit may be maintained where the same defective 
tax shelter is sold to many purchasers in the same way.
15
 Presumably, many 
of the invalid tax shelter controversies were also resolved by arbitration, 
settlement, or in non-reported litigations. 
Despite the dearth of tax shelter cases focusing on substantive tax 
malpractice issues, it is safe to conclude that tax professionals who render 
incorrect opinions that an invalid tax shelter is likely valid will most 
assuredly be the target of a tax malpractice suit brought by the disappointed 
purchaser of the tax shelter. When the tax professional’s involvement with 
the marketing and sale of the tax shelter is as extensive as occurred in many 
of the “generic tax shelters,” investigated by Congress, liability seems 
reasonably certain.
16
 Where the tax professional’s involvement is limited to 
 
12
See, e.g., Affco Invs., LLC v. KPMG, LLP, Civ. A. No. H-07-3379, 2009 WL 3248052, *2 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009); The Hoehn Family, LLC v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, No. 07-
0069-CV-W-DW, 2007 WL 1028768, *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2007); King v. Lincoln Fin. 
Advisors Corp.,  Civ. A. No. 3:05-CV-1626-G ECF, 2006 WL 2067835, *1 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 
2006) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 
13
See, e.g., Conwill, IV v. Greenberg Traurig, L.L.P., Civ. A. No. 09-4365, 2009 WL 
5178310, *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2009) (personal jurisdiction); Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. 
Supp. 2d 710, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (personal jurisdiction and arbitration); RA Invs. I, LLC v. 
Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446, *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 
2005) (RICO) (mem op., not designated for publication); Ling v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 04 CV 
4566(HB), 2005 WL 1244689, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2005); Malone v. Nuber, No. C07-
2046RSL, 2009 WL 1044586, *1–6 (W.D. Wash. April 16, 2009) (miscellaneous); Shalam v. 
KPMG LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (miscellaneous). 
14
See, e.g., Simon v. KPMG LLP, Civ. A. No. 05-CV-3189, 2006 WL 1541048, at *5 (D.N.J. 
June 2, 2006) (250 class members); Ling v. Cantley & Sedacca, L.L.P., No. 04 Civ. 4566(HB), 
2006 WL 290477, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006) (complaint alleges 175 transactions, Complaint,  
2004 WL 1735243 at ¶ 49 (6/16/04)); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 230 F.R.D. 317, 330 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (1100 clients). 
15
See, e.g., Simon, 2006 WL 1541048 at, *5; Ling, 2006 WL 290477, at *1; Denney, 230 
F.R.D. at 330. 
16 The term “generic tax shelters” follows terminology in two reports on the invalid tax 
shelters that were widely sold during the decade starting roughly around the mid-1990s that are 
focused upon herein. In describing the abusive tax shelters under investigation, both reports used 
very similar language and referred to generic tax products or generic tax shelters. These shelters 
2014] BAD TAX SHELTERS 607 
rendering an opinion on a transaction with which he or she has no personal 
interest, the likelihood of liability is probably lower. 
Apart from the tax shelter situations, a number of cases have arisen 
during this past decade in the benefit plan area. Although treated separately 
from the tax shelter area, a number of these cases could reasonably be 
considered part of the same general tax shelter phenomenon as the generic 
tax shelters. Here too, many overly aggressive benefit plans were sold as 
valid, though they went beyond the limits of what was permissible. 
However, since these cases involved violations of specific statutory 
sections, they are treated separately from the generic tax shelters. 
Besides the generic tax shelters and the benefit plan areas, no single area 
stands out prominently as being especially likely to generate tax malpractice 
claims. As was the situation previously, a number of cases arose in the 
scope of engagement area (i.e., what exactly did the tax professional 
undertake), non-filing and late filing, and the estate and gift areas. 
This study focuses solely on reported cases. It examines instances of 
claimed malpractice involving federal income, estate and gift taxation. No 
situations involving federal generation skipping taxes were discovered. 
While other taxes were not intended to be focused on, a number of the cases 
discussed involve federal payroll taxes and state and local taxes. While I 
believe I have located most of the significant cases, I do not delude myself 
into believing I discovered all the cases. I have intentionally omitted many 
of the tax shelter cases that do not focus on the substantive tax malpractice 
 
were described as complex transactions used to obtain tax benefits in a manner never intended. 
The transactions have neither economic substance nor any business purpose other than tax 
savings. These shelters, rather than being custom-designed for a single user were “prepared as a 
generic ‘tax product’ available for sale to multiple clients.” Minority Staff of the Perm. Subcomm. 
On Investigations of the Comm. On Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate, U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: 
The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, 
OPIS, BLIPS and SC2, S. Rep. No. 108–34, at 2 (2003); Perm. Subcomm. On Investigations of 
the Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate: The Role of 
Professional Firms In The U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, S. Rep. No. 109–54, at 1 (2005). 
These shelters have also been referred to as “technical” tax shelters.  Del Wright Jr., Financial 
Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil The IRS (And How The 
IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 614–15 (2013). These shelters “were structured to 
exploit, yet purportedly stay within the bounds of, the tax laws.” Id. at 614. A practical definition 
of these shelters attributed to former Treasury Assistant Secretary Eric Solomon is that they are a 
“tax-engineered transaction normally with little business purpose except to save taxes with 
minimal risk or profit potential often designed to create a tax loss without an economic loss or in 
some cases to make income nontaxable.” Id. at 615. 
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issues, though they do assert malpractice or professional negligence claims, 
since to do so would be unproductive. 
Both attorneys and accountants are focused on in this study. While it 
might be theoretically desirable to focus on these professions separately, 
pragmatically this is not possible. The dividing line between the work of the 
tax attorney and tax accountant has always been murky.
17
 In extending the 
traditional attorney-client privilege to accountants and other tax 
practitioners in 1998, Congress likely made the dividing line even 
murkier.
18
 In many situations, the defendant tax practitioner could just as 
easily be from one profession as from the other. 
As a framework for the ensuing discussion, Part I of this article will 
briefly review the general background principles governing tax malpractice, 
such as the elements of the cause of action and the damages recoverable. 
Part II will focus on the generic tax shelter cases of the past decade. Part III 
will then review the other tax malpractice developments of roughly the past 
decade. Part IV will offer concluding observations. 
I.  BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES 
A. Elements of a Malpractice Cause of Action19 
Civil actions for tax malpractice are usually based on either traditional 
tort or traditional contract theories.
20
 Under traditional tort principles, a 
professional has a duty “to exercise the level of skill, care and diligence. . . . 
normally exercised by other members of the profession under similar 
circumstances,” whereas traditional contract principles impose the 
obligation to perform the task undertaken diligently and competently.
21
 In 
practice, these two standards, though emanating from different areas of the 
law, are virtually identical.
22
 The professional, therefore, must exercise 
reasonable competence and diligence to avoid malpractice exposure.
23
 
 
17
See generally, e.g., National Conference of Lawyers and CPAs, Lawyers and Certified 
Public Accountants: A Study of Interprofessional Relations, 36 TAX. LAW. 26, 27, 30–31 (1982). 
18
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–206 
§ 3411(a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (adding IRC § 7525). 
19
This section is adapted from Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 552–53, though certain 
footnotes have been updated. 
20
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 601.1 (6th ed. 2004). 
21
Id. 
22
Id. 
23
Id. 
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While the basic standard of care is almost identical under tort and 
contract theories, other aspects of the causes of action and/or defenses 
thereto may differ depending on which theory is utilized.
24
 Differences are 
usually encountered in the statute of limitations (both how long and when it 
commences), the measure of damages, to whom liability extends (i.e., 
privity), and evidentiary matters, such as the need for expert testimony.
25
 
Normally, the malpractice tort asserted against an attorney is a specific 
application of the ordinary tort of negligence.
26
 The attorney must act as a 
reasonably competent and careful professional would act under similar 
circumstances.
27
 Since tax law generally is perceived as a specialty, the 
standard of care may be higher than in other attorney malpractice 
situations.
28
 To establish a prima facie cause of action, a plaintiff must 
show: “(1) a duty owed by the attorney to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that 
duty; (3) injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) a proximate cause between 
the injury suffered and the attorney’s breach of duty.”29 
The standards for accountants are similar to those for attorneys. 
Accounting is a learned profession and practitioners must act as would a 
reasonably competent and careful member of the same profession under the 
same circumstances. The elements of the prima facie cause of action against 
the accountant are the same as those listed above against an attorney.
30
 
Many cases simply equate the elements of the causes of action and the 
standard of care in accountant and attorney situations.
31
 Nevertheless, there 
are differences between the two professions that must be kept in mind. For 
 
24
Id. 
25
Id. 
26
Id. 
27
Id. § 601.2.1. 
28
See id. § 603.3; see also 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH WITH ALLISON D. 
RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 35:3 (2014 ed.); Malpractice I, supra note 1, at 553–54. 
29
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 601.2.1 (citations omitted). The essence of the cause of 
action is comprised of the four elements listed despite the fact that some courts sometimes list 
only three elements. See, e.g., Montes v. Asher & Co., C.P.A., 182 F. Supp. 2d 637, 638 (N.D. 
Ohio 2002) (listing the elements as duty, breach, and injury or damages); Boardman v. Stark, No. 
20911, 2002 WL 1625617, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 24, 2002) (duty, breach and causal 
connection between the conduct and the damages); Jones v. Bresset, 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 60, 70 (Pa. 
Ct. Com. Pl. 2000) (duty, breach and proximate cause). Similarly, in other contexts, a fifth 
element (causation in fact) is added. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2000). 
30
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 601.2.2. 
31
See Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 551 n.13; see also Hnath v. Vecchitto, No. 
X03CV930502910, 2003 WL 1995440, at *8 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2003) (adopting same 
accrual of cause of action date for accountant as for attorney). 
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instance, there might be different statutes of limitations
32
 and, since the 
precise nature of the work each professional is called upon to do may differ, 
a suit against an attorney and an accountant stemming from the same set of 
facts might have different outcomes.
33
 
While the normal malpractice cause of action involves the tort of 
negligence, other torts are also encountered. Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc. is 
a good illustration containing, in addition to negligence and breach of 
contract claims, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, professional 
malpractice, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation, and false and deceptive trade practices under state law.
34
 
Alleged violations of federal securities laws
35
 and RICO violations
36
 may 
also arise, especially with generic tax shelters. 
Since the tort of negligence is normally encountered in tax malpractice 
cases, unless specifically indicated otherwise, it will be assumed herein that 
this is the tort alleged. 
B. Measure of Damages 
The general tort measure of damages, which also applies in tax 
malpractice situations, allows a plaintiff to recover for all injuries 
proximately caused by a defendant’s negligent conduct. The plaintiff may 
recover the difference between his or her present economic position and the 
position he or she would have been in absent the negligence.
37
 The most 
direct type of damages encountered in tax malpractice situations consist of 
additional taxes resulting from the malpractice, interest and penalties 
imposed on the additional taxes and corrective costs in attempting to 
 
32
See, e.g., Inphoto Surveillance, Inc. v. Crowe, Chizek & Co., 788 N.E.2d 216, 218 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003) (interpreting Illinois’ “statute of repose” applicable to accountants: 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/13-214.2 (West 2002)). 
33
Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 468, 472 (Haw. 2001) (The cause of action against the attorney 
was permitted to proceed (no privity/lack of standing defense rejected) while the cause of action 
against the accountant was not permitted to proceed (no-privity defense accepted).). 
34
Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 
*3–4 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2002). There was also an allegation of loss of consortium. Id. 
35
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.3; Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 634. 
36
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.3. 
37
Id.§ 605.1.1; Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 643–45. 
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eliminate or mitigate all or some of the foregoing damages.
38
 As the 
determination of recoverable damages is a matter of state law, differences 
among the states exist.
39
 While penalties and corrective costs seem to be 
generally recoverable, the situation concerning taxes and interest is 
different.
40
 As to taxes, it seems that most states allow the recovery of any 
additional taxes caused by the malpractice,
41
 though not in New York.
42
 
With regard to interest imposed on a tax underpayment, there are three 
approaches. One approach, which is the traditional and majority view, 
permits the recovery of such interest.
43
 The second approach, which is a 
distinct minority view, denies the recovery of any such interest.
44
 The third 
approach, which is in-between the other two and represents the most recent 
and growing view, permits the recovery of interest but only to the extent the 
interest paid the government exceeds the interest earned by the plaintiff on 
the underpaid taxes.
45
 
All damages caused are recoverable, even indirect or consequential 
damages, as long as they are the proximate result of the defendant’s 
negligence.
46
 However, most courts do not award damages for emotional 
pain and suffering where, such as in the tax malpractice area, the basic 
injury suffered is only an economic one.
47
 To be recoverable, the damages 
must be actually incurred, not merely speculative ones that may arise in the 
 
38
This paragraph is adapted from Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A 
Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 TAX LAW. 705, 712 (2007) [hereinafter 
Tax Malpractice Damages]. 
39
Id. 
40
Id. 
41
Id. It should be emphasized that only additional taxes are addressed, not the basic taxes that 
are inevitably due. For instance, if the correct taxes due are $100,000 and, due to an error by the 
tax return preparer, taxes of $110,000 were paid and can no longer be recovered by simply filing 
an amended tax return, it is the recovery of the additional $10,000 that is addressed. 
42
Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
My view is that Alpert is incorrect when applied to recoveries for negligence causes of action.  See 
Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 714–15; Jacob L. Todres, New York’s Law of Tax 
Malpractice Damages: Balanced or Biased? 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 143, 160 (2012) [hereinafter 
NY: Balanced or Biased]. 
43
Jacob L. Todres, Recovery of Interest on a Tax Underpayment Caused by a Tax Advisor’s 
Negligence, 26 AKRON TAX J. 1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter Recovery of Interest] (tally of states 
following each view, id. at 30). 
44
Id. at 3–4. 
45
Id. at 4. 
46
Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 771. 
47
Id. at 743; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 971 P.2d 414, 422 (Or. Ct. App. 
1998). 
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future.
48
 Additionally, under appropriate circumstances, a plaintiff may be 
entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
49
 The normal duty 
generally imposed upon a plaintiff, to mitigate damages resulting from a 
defendant’s negligence, is also applicable.50 Similarly, under the so called 
“American Rule,” attorney’s fees incurred to bring the malpractice action 
are not generally recoverable.
51
 Such non-recoverable litigation costs should 
be distinguished from normally recoverable damages, such as attorney or 
accountant fees and other costs incurred to correct, or attempt to correct, the 
effects of the defendant’s negligence.52 
II. GENERIC TAX SHELTERS 
A. Introductory 
This part of the article focuses on the generic or technical tax shelters. 
No reported cases were located that addressed other types of shelters during 
the decade under review, except, perhaps, several arising in the employee 
benefit area that are discussed subsequently.
53
 Although many thousands of 
such invalid shelters were sold,
54
 paradoxically, there are only a handful of 
reported cases that address any issue that can even charitably be 
characterized as substantive to tax malpractice jurisprudence. Except for 
Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP,
55
 decided in November, 2013, which reached 
a judgment on the merits, the statement made by a commentator in an 
article in 2008 that with respect to these cases there then was “not a single 
reported decision determining whether a particular defendant committed 
malpractice” is by and large still true today.56 
 
48
See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.1.1. 
49
Id. § 605.1.3; see also Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, 201 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf. ($80 
million punitive damages). 
50
See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 605.2.2. 
51
Id. § 605.1.1. 
52
Id.; see also Malpractice I, supra note 2, at 644. 
53
See infra Part III.E.1. 
54
S. Rep. No. 108–34 at 20 (2003) (IRS data from October 2003 identified 6400 individuals 
and corporations that had purchased abusive tax shelters); See Joyce, supra note 7 (Two thousand 
taxpayers reportedly participated in an IRS global settlement initiative and twelve hundred in a 
Son of Boss settlement initiative. The extent of overlap of these numbers is unknown.). 
55
Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, 201 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at 
http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf. 
56
Soled, supra note 8, at 275. 
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While the principles governing other types of tax malpractice would be 
expected to apply in this area as well—and the few cases that have 
addressed tax malpractice issues seem to have done so—I believe the matter 
is more complicated.
57
 As described in the 2003 Senate Shelter Report, in 
the generic tax shelter area the tax professionals were not acting simply in 
their customary role as independent advisors but were often really the 
creators and purveyors of the shelters.
58
 While in form they rendered 
opinion letters, they were really either the sellers of, or among a small 
group involved in the sale of, a bad product who created an elaborate 
scheme to defraud the purchasers.
59
 Essentially, the opinions were used as 
marketing tools. The Senate report views the tax professionals involved as 
principals.
60
 As such, the causes of action asserted in these situations 
focused more on allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary obligations 
than normally encountered in other tax malpractice contexts.
61
 Also, in light 
of the off-the-shelf, multiple sales of the same type of scheme to many 
purchasers, apart from any possible class action status, the primary focus 
for recovery was really the federal RICO statute with its allure of the 
possible recovery of treble damages plus legal fees incurred in bringing the 
damage suit.
62
 Concomitant with the asserted RICO cause of action, it was 
also necessary to determine whether the underlying claim could be brought 
as a federal securities law violation, for if it could, the RICO claim was 
precluded.
63
 These cases therefore involve a mix of causes of action that is 
different from what is usually encountered in other tax malpractice 
contexts. 
To simplify the ensuing discussion, cases arising from generic tax 
shelters but involving primarily non-tax malpractice issues will be ignored, 
even though they may contain some tangential reference to tax 
 
57
See, e.g., Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 948 N.E.2d 132, 165–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); 
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 760–65 (9th Cir. 2007); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 
P.C., 341 F .Supp. 2d 363, 374–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-
RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *9 (S.D. Fla. December 10, 2002). 
58
See S. Rep. No. 108–34 at 11–12 (2003). 
59
Id. at 11–12, 20. 
60
See id. 
61
See S.E.C. v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (The S.E.C. alleged 
KPMG partners engaged in accounting fraud at Xerox Corporation.); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 88 
So.3d 327, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (Plaintiffs alleged negligent misrepresentation, violation 
of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, professional malpractice, and aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.). 
62
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012). 
63
See id. § 1964(c). 
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malpractice.
64
 Also, since the underlying fact patterns in most of the cases 
are very similar, even when the specific tax shelter product was different, 
there will not be any attempt to focus on the specific facts of each case 
discussed. Instead, a prototype generic tax shelter situation will be assumed 
based on two cases that are quite representative of this genre of cases. The 
pattern in these cases is remarkably similar to the situations described in the 
2003 Senate Shelter Report as well as in the 2005 Senate Shelter Report. 
To avoid a lengthy and distracting foray into complex and esoteric 
technical tax matters, there will be no attempt to delve into the underlying 
technical aspects of any of the generic tax shelters, though an exception is 
later made with respect to the recent Yung case.
65
 Instead, it will be assumed 
herein that a patently ineffective product was sold as a supposedly viable 
and valid shelter. Evidence that these tax shelters were patently invalid 
abounds. First and foremost, after extensive investigation, the 2003 and 
2005 Senate Reports on the generic shelters so concluded.
66
 Also, when 
KPMG and Ernst & Young entered into criminal settlements for their 
involvement with these shelters, in addition to agreeing to pay very 
substantial amounts to the government, they admitted these shelters were 
fraudulent.
67
 In addition, when the IRS started to pursue the shelter 
investors, most participated in various IRS settlement initiatives rather than 
litigating.
68
 If there was a reasonable possibility the shelters were valid, 
many more of the purchasers, who by definition were quite wealthy, 
successful business people, could have been expected to litigate. 
Furthermore, if the tax shelters were even plausibly valid, it seems unlikely 
 
64
See, e.g., supra notes 10-12. 
65
See generally Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07-CI-2647, (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) 
available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf; See infra Part 2.D. 
66
S. Rep. No. 108–34 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54 (2005). The gist of both reports is that the 
bulk of the generic tax shelters or products are invalid. 
67
See I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-83 (Aug. 29, 2005) (KPMG agreed to pay $456 million 
and “admitted that it engaged in a fraud that generated at least $11 billion dollars in phony tax 
losses.”); Dept. of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Agreement With Ernst & Young 
LLP to Pay $123 million to Resolve Federal Tax Shelter Fraud Investigation (March 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March13/EYNPAPR.php?print=1. It 
also should be noted that the seventh-largest U.S. accounting firm in 2011, BDO USA, admitted 
criminal wrongdoing in connection with its sales of tax shelters, agreed to pay $50 million, and 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government. Dena Aubin, BDO to Pay $50 
Million in Tax Shelter Case, REUTERS (Jun. 13, 2012) http://www.reuters.com/assets/ 
print?aid=USL1E8HDHHV20120613. See also Sheryl Stratton, Nine Tax Professionals Indicted; 
KPMG Admits Shelters Were Fraudulent, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 30, 2005 at 167-1. 
68
See Joyce, supra note 7. 
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that any of the promoters would have faced anything other than some sort 
of civil penalty for their roles in the creation and/or sale of these shelters. 
Instead, a number pled guilty to criminal offenses
69
 and others were found 
guilty after trial.
70
 Finally, and very pragmatically, there were too many 
such products and permutations of products to even begin to attempt such 
an analysis.  The 2003 Senate Shelter Report indicated that at one point the 
accounting firm of KPMG alone had almost 500 of such tax shelter 
products in various stages of development.
71
 
B. General Background 
These new shelters had very exotic sounding names such as FLIP, 
OPIS, BLIPS, COBRA, BOSS, Son-of-BOSS, etc.
72
 They ultimately ended 
up costing the government billions of dollars in lost tax revenues.
73
 The 
new shelters were different from the previous types of shelters. The Senate 
Shelter Reports focus on two such differences. First, the prior shelters 
involved instances in which advantage was taken of “specific tax benefits 
explicitly enacted by Congress to advance a legitimate endeavor, such as 
the low income housing tax credit.”74 Also, the Reports suggest that the 
 
69
See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Tax Attorney Pleads Guilty on Charges Linked to Fraudulent 
Tax Shelter Activities, BNA Daily Tax Rep. No. 202 at p. K-1 (Oct. 21, 2010) (referring to guilty 
pleas by Erwin Mayer (former Jenkens & Gilchrist partner), Charles W. Bee Jr. (former BDO 
Seidman vice chairman) Michael Kerekes (former BDO Seidman principal), Adrian Dicker 
(former BDO Seidman vice chairman), Robert Greisman (firmer BDO Seidman partner) and Mark 
Bloom (former BDO Seidman partner).); Andrew Velarde & Kristen A. Parillo, Daugerdas 
Convicted of Tax Shelter Charges, Tax Notes 574 (Nov. 11, 2013) (Donna Guerin (former 
Jenkens & Gilchrist partner) pled guilty after having a prior conviction overturned due to juror 
misconduct.). 
70
See Velarde & Parillo, supra note 69, at 574 (among those convicted are Paul M. 
Daugerdas,former Jenkens & Gilchrist partner); see also Second Circuit Affirms Convictions of 
Former KPMG Executives, Finds Error Regarding Fine, BNA Daily Tax Rep. No. 166 at p. K-3 
(Aug. 30, 2010) (refers to convictions of Robert Pfaff (former KPMG tax partner), John Larson 
(former KPMG senior tax manager) and Raymond J. Ruble (former Brown & Wood partner)). 
71
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 3 (2003). 
72
The acronyms stood for: Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP), Offshore Portfolio 
Investment Strategy (OPIS), Bond Linked Issue Premium Structure (BLIPS), Bond and Options 
Sales Strategy (BOSS), Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives (COBRA). S. Rep. No. 108-
34, at 3 (2003) (FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 78 (2005) (COBRA), 88 (BOSS). 
73
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee the U.S. General Accounting Office 
estimated the potential tax loss as of September 30, 2003 at $85 billion. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-104T, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CHALLENGES REMAIN 
IN COMBATING ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS 11 (2003). 
74
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003). 
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prior shelters involved a response by a tax professional to an inquiry by a 
single client.
75
 In contrast, according to the Reports, the new shelters were 
complex transactions with no economic substance or business purpose other 
than the reduction of taxes.
76
 Also, the new shelters involved “generic tax 
products” affirmatively developed by a firm and marketed to numerous 
potential buyers.
77
 The 2003 Report further bemoaned the fact that 
“[d]ubious tax shelter sales . . . [were] no longer the province of shady, fly-
by-night companies” but instead became big business involving top 
professionals from the country’s largest accounting and law firms, 
investment advisory firms, and banks.
78
 
To somewhat concretize how the generic tax shelters worked, assume a 
taxpayer sold his business and realized a very large gain. If the taxpayer did 
not seek out a tax shelter on his own, an accountant,
79
 banker,
80
 or someone 
else aware of the large impending gain might introduce the taxpayer to a 
seller of shelters who was often an accounting firm,
81
 banker
82
 or financial 
advisor.
83
 After being repeatedly assured that the shelter was completely 
legal and valid and that opinions to this effect would later be available from 
either a CPA firm and prominent law firm or from several prominent law 
firms, the taxpayer would agree to purchase the shelter at a very significant 
cost. The legal opinion(s) often required additional fees. After purchasing 
the shelter and signing the documentation presented to him or her, a series 
of transactions would be orchestrated by the shelter seller with the aid of 
one or more banks (to make loans) and certain other intermediaries/
facilitators to take whatever steps were to be performed. The taxpayer was 
passive and had no real understanding or involvement in what was 
happening. While some taxpayers might have been told there was a chance 
 
75
Id. See also S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 9 (2005). This seems to ignore the fact that previously 
there were syndicators who sold shelters to a number of customers. 
76
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005). 
77
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 2 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005). 
78
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 5 (2003). 
79
See, e.g., Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) amended on reconsideration, 03 CIV. 6942 (SAS), 2004 WL 2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 
2004). 
80
See, e.g., Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2002). 
81
See, e.g., Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 363; Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *4. 
82
See, e.g., RA Inves. I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. Civ. A. 3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 
1356446, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005). 
83
See, e.g., Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP, 623 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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of actually earning real money from the shelters, most were only interested 
in obtaining the large losses that had been promised to offset the income 
that was sought to be sheltered. These losses were then reported on the 
appropriate tax returns. While the transactions may or may not have 
actually been effectuated, there was no real business purpose for them, they 
involved no real risk of loss nor possibility of gain, and they did not have 
any real economic consequences to the taxpayer apart from generating the 
promised tax losses. 
Many different promoters sold a number of different types of tax 
shelters. While there were differences in precisely how each promoter 
structured and effectuated the transactions, essentially most of the technical 
generic tax shelters were fundamentally very similar. The Senate 
Committee’s detailed description of what occurred in one type of 
transaction is therefore quite informative of how most of the shelters 
operated at the basic level. 
The 2003 Senate Shelter Report focused on four shelters developed and 
marketed by the big four accounting firm of KPMG, which was probably 
the largest purveyor of the generic shelters.
84
 In analyzing the circumstances 
surrounding the development and sale of these tax shelter products, the 
Report indicated that KPMG’s involvement with the product did not end 
with the sale of the product.
85
 Complex financial steps and investment 
activities needed to be performed to effectuate the shelter transactions and 
KPMG enlisted the intermediaries and helped orchestrate all the necessary 
steps.
86
 With respect to the tax opinion letters, the Report noted that KPMG 
worked closely with the law firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, which 
issued over 600 opinion letters supporting 13 questionable shelter 
products.
87
 KPMG initially prepared a prototype tax opinion for each of the 
products, which then became the template for the opinion letters it issued to 
its clients.
88
 It collaborated with the law firm before selling any product to 
 
84
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 3 (2003). It was indicated that at one point KPMG had over 500 of 
such tax products in inventory. Id. 
85
Id. at 9. 
86
Id. 
87
Id. at 10–11. Actually the Brown & Wood law firm was involved with the shelters. S. Rep. 
No. 109-54, at 96 (2005). It later merged with the Sidley Austin firm with the surviving firm 
called Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. Apparently the Sidley Austin firm was not involved with 
these shelters, though, after the merger, some work of this type was still engaged in by certain of 
the old Brown & Wood attorneys (R.J. Ruble) contrary to the policy of the new firm to no longer 
engage in such work. Id. at 100. 
88
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 11 (2003). 
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assure the law firm would supply a favorable opinion letter.
89
 KPMG and 
Sidley actually exchanged copies of their draft opinions, and their opinions 
ended up having numerous identical paragraphs.
90
 KPMG directed its 
shelter clients to Sidley, which provided nearly identical opinions to the 
clients that included no individualized legal advice.
91
 In many cases Sidley 
issued the opinion without ever having spoken to the client.
92
 Also, the 
factual representations underlying the opinions, which purportedly were 
made by the client, KPMG, the intermediary financial advisors/facilitators 
and the banks, were actually drafted by KPMG.
93
 Many of the important 
representations made by the clients, such as that they independently 
investigated the transactions and believed there was a reasonable 
opportunity to earn a profit, were drafted by KPMG and were false.
94
 In 
addition, there was evidence that with respect to one of the four shelter 
products focused on by the Senate Report, Sidley was paid a fee whenever a 
client was simply informed that a second opinion letter endorsing the 
validity of the product was available from Sidley, even if the client never 
purchased the opinion letter.
95
 In light of the relationship between KPMG 
and Sidley, the Senate Report’s conclusion in this portion of the Report 
seems somewhat understated: “This type of close, ongoing, and lucrative 
collaboration raises serious questions about the independence of both 
parties and the value of their opinion letters in light of the financial stake 
that both firms had in the sale of the tax product being analyzed.”96 
Once the IRS realized the extent and nature of the generic tax shelter 
epidemic, it proceeded with a carrot and stick approach. For the stick, as it 
became aware of the different types of shelters being marketed, it issued 
announcements designating them as listed transactions, thereby imposing 
requirements on taxpayers utilizing such shelters to report on their tax 
returns their participation in such tax shelters
97—thereby pretty much 
 
89
Id. 
90
Id. at 11–12. 
91
Id. at 12. 
92
Id. 
93
Id. 
94
Id. 
95
Id. 
96
Id. 
97
I.R.C. § 6011 (2012). The early Notices issued by the IRS that are mentioned in a number 
of the cases are I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761 (Tax Avoidance Using Distributions of 
Encumbered Property) (“BOSS Notice”); and I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (Tax 
Avoidance Using Artificially High Basis) (“Son of BOSS” Notice). Examples of other Notices are 
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assuring an audit. The designation also imposed record-keeping 
requirements on the promoters and sellers.
98
 The IRS also announced 
repeatedly it would vigorously pursue shelter participants.
99
 In tandem with 
these steps, the IRS periodically issued disclosure or settlement initiatives 
whereby those taxpayers who would either voluntarily come forth and 
disclose their participation in certain shelters or who would agree to settle 
based on the terms of the initiative would obtain favorable settlement 
terms.
100
 These initiatives required full payment of any tax underpayments 
together with interest, but typically would waive all or some portion of the 
full forty-percent penalty.
101
 Many taxpayers took advantage of these 
initiatives.
102
 Thus, when a tax shelter product was designated by the IRS as 
a reportable transaction, or when it was the subject of an IRS disclosure or 
settlement initiative, another issue or set of issues arose. The issues concern 
whether the tax professionals and /or the others involved in selling the tax 
shelters were obligated to inform the purchasers of the IRS designation or 
initiative, whether they did or did not inform the tax purchasers about these 
designations or initiatives, and whether any advice they rendered in this 
regard was proper.
103
 
 
I.R.S. Notice 2004-30, 2004-1 C.B. 828 (S Corporation Tax Shelter); I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 
2002-2 C.B. 690 (Passthrough Entity Straddle Tax Shelter); and I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 
C.B. 129 (Basis Shifting Tax Shelter). 
98
I.R.C. §§ 6111–6112 (2012). 
99
See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release, Tax Day Reminder: Treasury & IRS Continue Crackdown 
on Abusive Tax Shelters, IR-2003-51 (Apr. 15, 2003); I.R.S. News Release, Strong Response to 
“Son of Boss” Settlement Initiative, IR-2004-87 (Jul. 1, 2004) (“‘We will vigorously pursue all 
those who participated in Son of Boss deals but did not take advantage of the settlement 
initiative.’” (quoting Commissioner Everson)) (“‘For those who haven’t come forward and intend 
to take the IRS to court, we plan an aggressive litigation strategy.’” (quoting IRS Chief Counsel 
Don Korb)); I.R.S. Announcement 2002-96, 2002-2 C.B. 756 (“The Service will vigorously 
defend or prosecute all future COLI [corporate owned life insurance] litigation.”). 
100
See, e.g., IRS Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304 (disclosure initiative – section 
6662(b) (1)–(4) penalties waived for taxpayers who disclose participation in tax shelters); IRS 
Announcement 2005-80, 2005-2 C.B. 967 (settlement initiative for a number of shelters); IRS 
Announcement 2002-97, 2002-2 C.B. 757 (settlement initiative for basis-shifting transactions). 
101
See, e.g., IRS Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304; IRS Announcement 2005-80, 
2005-2 C.B. 967; IRS Announcement 2002-97, 2002-2 C.B. 757. 
102
See Joyce, supra note 7. 
103
See, e.g., Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 948 N.E.2d 132, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
(accountant advised plaintiff not to participate in amnesty program); Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 
F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (accountant and attorney advised plaintiff to participate in amnesty 
program); Olson v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 461 F. Supp. 2d 710, 716 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (defendants 
advised plaintiffs not to participate in amnesty program); RA Invs. I, LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
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C. Prototype Generic Tax Shelter Scenario 
Loftin v. KPMG LLP
104
 is a good illustration of the operation of a 
generic tax shelter. In Loftin, the plaintiff sold stock in 1997 and 1999 and 
netted capital gains of $30 million and $65 million, respectively.
105
 On 
depositing the proceeds from the 1997 sale, the plaintiff’s banker 
encouraged him to retain the accounting firm of KPMG for tax planning 
purposes regarding the $30 million capital gains.
106
 The plaintiff met with 
KPMG and was presented with the FLIP (Foreign Leveraged Investment 
Program) tax planning strategy.
107
 If effective, the FLIP strategy would 
generate large capital losses to offset the capital gains, thereby saving 
Loftin the tax on the capital gains.
108
 KPMG assured the plaintiff that the 
FLIP strategy complied with IRS rules and regulations and would withstand 
an IRS audit.
109
 The plaintiff decided to use the FLIP strategy.
110
 He then 
retained KPMG as well as another firm knowledgeable about the strategy to 
act as intermediary.
111
 KPMG required him to retain this intermediary to 
implement the strategy.
112
 KPMG was also retained to prepare his 1997 tax 
return.
113
 The FLIP strategy was implemented in a number of steps taken 
from September 16, 1997 to December 22, 1997.
114
 In June of 1998, the 
plaintiff received opinions from KPMG and the law firm of Brown & Wood 
that the FLIP strategy was “more likely than not” to be considered 
 
No. Civ.A.3:04-CV-1565-G, 2005 WL 1356446, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2005 (some plaintiffs 
not informed of amnesty program, others advised not to participate); Stechler v. Sidley, Austin 
Brown & Wood, L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)(attorneys advised plaintiff of 
amnesty program and advised them to consult with their accountants who advised against 
participation). 
104
See generally Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2002). The discussion of Loftin is adapted from Jacob 
L. Todres, Investment In A Bad Tax Shelter: Malpractice Recovery From The Tax Advisor Is No 
Slam-Dunk, Tax Notes, April 11, 2005 p. 217, 219, 225–26. 
105
Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 at *4,*7. 
106
Id. at *4. 
107
Id. *4–5. It should be noted that Loftin also referred to a BLIP shelter strategy for 1999, 
but never discussed nor described the BLIP strategy. Id. at *7–8. 
108
Id. at *5. 
109
Id. at *5. 
110
Id. 
111
Id. at *4–5. 
112
Id. at *7. 
113
Id. at *4–5. 
114
Id. at *5–6. 
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proper.
115
 A similar scenario occurred in 1999 regarding the plaintiff’s 1999 
capital gains.
116
 
The FLIP strategy proved ineffective. The IRS commenced an audit of 
the plaintiff’s 1997 tax return in October 2000117 and later issued an 
announcement challenging the efficacy of all such types of transactions.
118
 
KPMG encouraged the plaintiff to settle with the IRS.
119
 
Loftin later filed suit again KPMG, Brown & Wood, and the other 
participants in the FLIP strategy.
120
 The complaint included allegations of 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, malpractice 
against KPMG and Brown & Wood, and a RICO claim.
121
 Most of the 
court’s opinion in Loftin addressed whether the RICO claim was barred by 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and ultimately held 
that it was.
122
 Insofar as the other causes of action were concerned, the court 
held all of them were premature because Loftin had not yet settled with the 
IRS and therefore there were no damages, the presence of which was an 
essential element for all the other causes of action.
123
 
Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. is similar to Loftin and illustrates 
both the typical generic tax shelter scenario and also many of the legal 
issues raised in this area.
124
 In Seippel, William Seippel was a senior 
executive at a Virginia company.
125
 In 1999, Mr. Seippel was planning to 
change jobs.
126
 In connection with the change, he exercised stock options 
and sold the resulting stock for a gain of at least $12 million.
127
 Ernst & 
Young was his employer’s auditor and had provided tax advice and 
financial services to the senior executives of his employer, including Mr. 
 
115
Id. at *7. 
116
See id. at *7–8. 
117
Id. at *8. 
118
I.R.S. Notice 2001-45, 2001-2 C.B. 129. 
119
Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909, at *8. 
120
See id. 
121
Id. at *8–9. 
122
Id. at *10–21. 
123
Id. at *21–25 (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); *25–27 (breach of fiduciary duty); 
*27–29 (malpractice). 
124
See generally Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
amended on reconsideration, 03 CIV. 6942 (SAS), 2004 WL 2403911 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004). 
125
Id. at 368. 
126
Id. 
127
Id. at 368–69. 
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Seippel.
128
 Ernst & Young therefore knew of Mr. Seippel’s plans and of his 
substantial taxable gain.
129
 
Late in 1999, Ernst & Young convinced Mr. Seippel to engage in a 
COBRA (“Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives”) tax shelter 
transaction involving the purchase and sale of options on foreign currency 
to shield his $12 million gain from taxation.
130
 According to the complaint, 
Ernst & Young convinced Mr. Seippel that the COBRA shelter was 
completely legal and even conservative.
131
 He was informed by Ernst & 
Young that it had developed the COBRA shelter and that two blue-chip law 
firms, Jenkens & Gilchrist
132
 and Brown & Wood, would provide opinion 
letters as to the propriety of the COBRA shelter.
133
 
From the opinion it appears that the various steps of the COBRA 
transaction (really a number of transactions) were effectuated during 
December 1999.
134
 Defendant Deutsche Bank was used to effectuate some 
of the transactions.
135
 In February 2000, Mr. Seippel received an opinion 
letter from Jenkens & Gilchrist stating that the $12 million of losses 
generated by the COBRA transactions were legally deductible.
136
 A similar 
opinion was received from Brown & Wood in March 2000 that also 
indicated that the IRS should not be able to successfully assert any penalties 
as a result of the tax positions taken by Mr. Seippel in the COBRA 
transactions.
137
 Ernst & Young prepared the 1999 and 2000 tax returns for 
Mr. and Mrs. Seippel reporting the COBRA transactions.
138
 
On December 27, 1999, the IRS issued Notice 1999-59 informing the 
public that “certain types of transactions . . . being marketed to taxpayers 
for the purpose of generating . . . artificial losses are not allowable for 
 
128
Id. at 368. 
129
Id. at 368-69. 
130
Id. at 369. 
131
Id. 
132
As part of its settlement with the government for its role in the proliferation of fraudulent 
generic tax shelters, in addition to agreeing to pay a fine of $76 million, Jenkens & Gilchrist 
agreed to disband. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007); Press Release, U.S. 
Attorneys Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Attorney Enters Non-prosecution Agreement with Jenkins 
& Gilchrist in Connection with its Fraudulent Tax Shelter Activity (Mar. 28, 2007). 
133
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 369. 
134
Id. 
135
Id. 
136
Id. 
137
Id. 
138
Id. at 370. 
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federal income tax purposes.”139 The plaintiff alleged that Notice 1999-59 
likely applied to the COBRA transaction.
140
 The plaintiff further alleged 
that Notice 2000-44, released on September 5, 2000, specified that the 
precise transaction marketed as the COBRA transaction was not properly 
allowable for tax purposes.
141
 In all the communications Mr. Seippel 
received from the defendants the only mention of either of these Notices 
was contained in the Jenkens & Gilchrist opinion letter, which stated only 
that Notice 1999-59 did not apply to the COBRA transactions.
142
 
In March 2002 Ernst & Young informed Mr. Seippel that it had received 
subpoenas in connection with an IRS investigation of COBRA.
143
 Mr. 
Seippel retained new tax and legal advisers in July 2002 and then 
discovered the alleged fraud.
144
 The present suit was commenced on 
September 10, 2003.
145
 
The allegations against the defendants in Seippel are representative of 
the generic shelter area. According to the complaint, the attorney 
defendants, Jenkens & Gilchrist
146
 and Brown & Wood, actually developed 
and promoted the COBRA shelter as well as many other tax shelters.
147
 To 
operate, market and promote these shelters they entered into an alliance 
with a number of accounting and financial services firms.
148
 They had the 
accountant, here Ernst & Young, assert that it had developed the shelter to 
give the impression that the attorneys were exercising independent 
judgment in rendering their opinions.
149
 That also enabled both attorneys to 
charge substantial fees for what were essentially “canned” opinions 
requiring little, if any, additional work.
150
 The opinion letters would attest to 
 
139
I.R.S. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761. 
140
Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 368. 
141
Id. 
142
Id. at 369–70. 
143
Id. at 370. 
144
Id. 
145
Id. at 366. 
146
Although the Jenkens & Gilchrist defendants were important participants in the events in 
issue, all claims against them were stayed because of the class action litigation then in progress 
against them and only the other defendants participated in those proceedings. Id., n.2. 
147
Id. at 367. 
148
Id. 
149
Id. at 367. 
150
Id. at 367–68. Allegedly, the lawyer defendants agreed that on some transactions one of 
the firms would receive very substantial fees while the other would receive relatively nominal fees 
and that in other transactions the lawyers’ roles would be reversed. Id. at 368. In Seippel, the fees 
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the legitimacy of the shelter and if the shelters were found to be invalid, 
protect the participants from the imposition of penalties by the tax 
authorities. In what seems like a very macabre twist that could only protect 
the attorneys from liability while undercutting the value of the opinion 
letters, the defendants would receive the opinion letters only after they had 
engaged in the shelter transactions.
151
 Also, the accountant, here Ernst & 
Young, or other firm soliciting prospective shelter participants, allegedly 
was to over-represent the positives of the shelter (i.e., it was “100 percent 
legitimate”) while understating risks, such as by failing to disclose authority 
to the contrary.
152
 Finally, the defendants allegedly agreed among 
themselves that the accounting firm would assert to potential participants 
that the proposed shelter transaction was proprietary and confidential and 
could not be taken to the potential participant’s attorney or accountant for 
independent review.
153
 
In Seippel, the plaintiff sought to recover the following types of 
damages: (1) cost of retaining tax and legal advisors to discover the fraud 
and to rectify the problems created by their participation in the shelter; (2) 
additional federal and Virginia taxes they were promised they would not 
have to pay; (3) interest and/or penalties on the underpaid taxes; (4) losses 
incurred when they had to liquidate assets at fire sale prices to meet their 
tax obligations; and (5) loss of alternative legitimate tax saving 
opportunities.
154
 He also sought rescission of his fee agreement with the 
defendants and recovery of the fees paid.
155
 
The causes of action asserted in Seippel are typical of those asserted in 
the generic shelter cases. They include assertion of RICO act violations and 
recoveries for breach of fiduciary duties, inducing breach of fiduciary 
duties, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, malpractice, 
unethical, excessive illegal and unreasonable fees and unjust enrichment.
156
 
The complaint brought in federal district court involved both federal and 
state law questions.
157
 
 
paid to the lawyers were $338,880 to Jenkens & Gilchrist and $21,180 to Brown & Wood. Id. at 
370. 
151
Id. at 367–68. 
152
Id. at 368. 
153
Id. 
154
Id. at 370. 
155
Id. at 380. 
156
Id. at 366. 
157
Id. 
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D. Cases 
In focusing on the professional malpractice causes of action in the 
generic tax shelter area, a threshold issue immediately arises. While the 
rendition of incorrect tax advice could certainly be the basis for a 
malpractice suit against an attorney or accountant, could it be the basis for a 
suit against another type of professional? The issue arises because in a 
number of instances the sellers of the shelters were financial advisors, 
banks or other non-accountants and non-attorneys. Similarly, banks and 
other intermediaries were involved in virtually all of these transactions.  If 
for some reason they could not be held liable under another cause of action, 
could they be held liable under the malpractice cause of action? This issue 
depends on state law and differences among the states are likely. In a non-
generic tax shelter case involving incorrect tax advice given by an insurance 
agent/financial planner, a federal district court specifically sidestepped the 
issue of whether New York law recognized a professional malpractice cause 
of action against financial advisors.
158
 
This issue arose in Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, and the court held such 
a suit against another professional was permissible.
159
 In Khan, the 
plaintiffs purchased tax shelters in 1999 and 2000 from its auditors, 
defendant BDO Seidman.
160
 The present case involved only Deutsche Bank, 
which acted as an investment bank that entered into certain option 
transactions with the plaintiffs, and the accounting firm of Grant Thornton, 
LLP, which had reported certain of the shelter losses on the tax return of 
one of the plaintiffs’ corporations, which losses then flowed through to the 
plaintiffs’ tax returns.161 At the trial court, the causes of action against these 
two defendants were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
162
  On this 
appeal, the appellate court reversed the dismissal on statute of limitations 
grounds.
163
 The Deutsche Bank defendants argued that the Illinois 
malpractice rules did not apply to them because they were not 
accountants.
164
 They argued that “tax advice, even if given negligently, 
cannot rise to a malpractice claim unless given by a professional tax 
 
158
Solin v. Domino, No. 08 Civ. 2837(SCR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *11–12 n.7 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
159
948 N.E.2d 132, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 978 N.E.2d 1020 (2012). 
160
Id. at 136. 
161
Id. 
162
Id. at 136–37. 
163
Id. at 137. 
164
Id. at 164. 
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advisor.”165 The court gave short shrift to this argument and held that “[o]ne 
does not have to be an accountant to incur liability for giving negligent tax 
advice.”166 The court adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts that liability is incurred if six conditions are met: 
(1) the defendants gave the tax advice in the course of their 
business or in a transaction in which they had a pecuniary 
interest; 
(2) the defendants gave the tax advice for the plaintiff’s 
guidance in  his business transactions; 
(3) the tax advice was false; 
(4) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining the tax information or in 
communicating it to the plaintiff; 
(5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the tax advice; and 
(6) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss as a consequence.
167
 
Other fundamental issues that must be carefully delineated in the 
malpractice context are the role of the tax professional and exactly when the 
tax professional became involved in the transaction. While the Senate 
Shelter Reports investigating the generic tax shelter phenomenon seemed to 
focus on instances in which the accountant or the attorney was really in the 
group creating and marketing the shelters and was not acting as an 
independent professional, this is not how all such situations occurred.
168
 It is 
certainly possible, and even likely, that a potential purchaser of a shelter 
would retain an independent professional to review the proposed transaction 
and advise whether it was effective. In Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Green & 
MacRae, L.L.P., after deciding to participate in a tax shelter for 2001, the 
plaintiffs engaged an accountant to review the shelter, provide independent 
and objective advice of the tax risks, advise on proper tax treatment, and 
prepare the plaintiffs’ personal federal and New Jersey tax returns for 2001 
and 2002.
169
 The individual accountant was retained in November 2001 
and, in the first half of 2002, became affiliated with an accounting firm that 
 
165
Id. at 164–65. 
166
Id. at 165. 
167
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1) (1977)). 
168
See generally S. Rep. No. 108-34 (2003); S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 1 (2005). 
169
392 F. Supp. 2d 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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was one of the defendants in this litigation.
170
 In denying the defendant 
accounting firm’s motion to dismiss the complaint against it, the court did 
hold that there was no basis to hold the defendant accounting firm liable for 
the two investments in the shelter scheme made before the defendant came 
onto the scene in the first half of 2002.
171
 They could, however, face 
potential liability for the plaintiffs’ later investment that was made after 
they were advising the plaintiffs.
172
 
In Williams v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., the court also took 
careful note of when the attorney-client relationship arose.
173
 The court held 
this occurred on March 8, 2002, after the plaintiff purchased the shelter in 
late 2001, but before the tax return for 2001 was filed.
174
 The court granted 
defendant Sidley Austin’s motion to dismiss a fraud and fraud-related 
causes of action that predated the attorney-client relationship.
175
 However, it 
refused to dismiss a malpractice cause of action against Sidley Austin based 
on actions occurring after the attorney-client relationship arose, since the 
relationship imposed duties and responsibilities on the attorney that did not 
previously exist.
176
 Quite properly, in this portion of the opinion when the 
court referred to potential damages that might be recoverable, it included 
only damages arising from claiming improper deductions on a tax return, 
but none relating to the cost of purchasing the invalid tax shelter.
177
 
In Affco Investments, LLC v. KPMG, LLP, after investing in a tax 
shelter, but before reporting the losses on their tax return, the plaintiffs 
became concerned that under two notices recently issued by the IRS they 
would need to report their participation in the shelter on their tax return.
178
 
After the first notice was issued they obtained an opinion from the New 
York law firm of Proskauer Rose LLP that the plaintiffs’ transactions were 
not substantially similar to any transactions prohibited by the IRS and that it 
was therefore unnecessary to report the shelter transaction on their tax 
return.
179
 After the second IRS notice, the plaintiffs obtained a supplemental 
opinion from Proskauer reaffirming the continued validity of the original 
 
170
Id. 
171
Id. at 627. 
172
Id. at 627–28. 
173
No. 600808/05, 2006 WL 684599, at *5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Mar. 13, 2006). 
174
Id. at *3. 
175
Id. at *7. 
176
Id. 
177
Id. at *7–8. 
178
No. H-07-3379, 2009 WL 3248052, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009). 
179
Id. 
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opinion.
180
 The plaintiffs followed this advice, which was consistent with 
the advice they received from the seller of the shelter, KPMG, and the 
Sidley law firm, and claimed the shelter losses on their tax returns but did 
not report their participation in the shelter on their tax returns.
181
 As a 
consequence, they eventually ended up paying additional taxes, interest and 
penalties.
182
 Because they did not report their participation in the tax shelter 
on their tax returns, they were ineligible to participate in the IRS amnesty 
program for this type of shelter.
183
 The opinion did not address the 
substance of this claim, since the court dismissed all federal causes of 
action asserted against Proskauer and declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims.
184
 
As noted previously, at various times the IRS made amnesty and 
settlement offers to taxpayers who utilized various types of generic tax 
shelters.
185
 A number of cases mentioned whether the tax advisor did or did 
not inform the plaintiffs of these programs and whether they advised them 
to participate in these programs.
186
 However, none of the cases reached the 
stage of focusing on the substantive repercussions of the tax advisor’s 
conduct in this regard. The issue did arise but in a rather unusual posture in 
Rosenbach v. The Diversified Group, Inc.
187
 In Rosenbach, the plaintiffs 
were successful in an arbitration proceeding against the sellers of a bad tax 
shelter.
188
 The defendants then brought a third party claim for contribution 
against the plaintiffs’ tax counsel and plaintiffs’ accounting firm that filed 
the tax return on which the shelter loss was reported.
189
 The claim against 
the tax counsel was that it failed to disclose material information to the 
plaintiffs in advising the plaintiffs whether to apply for amnesty.
190
 The 
claim against the accounting firm was that it lacked a reasonable basis for 
 
180
Id. 
181
Id. 
182
Id. 
183
Id. 
184
Id. at *6. 
185
See supra text accompanying notes 97–103. 
186
See supra cases cited at note 103. See also Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle 
LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 599 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 
U.S. 624 (2009). 
187
926 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
188
Id. at 50. 
189
Id. 50–51. 
190
Id. at 52 (The alleged material omission was asserted to remove the issue from the ambit of 
the “error in judgment” rule). 
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believing the tax shelter loss was valid and would be accepted by the 
IRS.
191
 While it seems ludicrous and the height of “chutzpah” for the seller 
of a bad tax shelter who repeatedly vouched for the efficacy of the shelter to 
be able to claim the purchasers’ tax return preparer should have known 
better than to believe him, the New York intermediate appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the third party defendants’ motion to 
dismiss this claim for contribution.
192
 
One aspect of Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, LLP is 
worthy of note.
193
 Carroll involved the final stage in a litigation by the 
purchasers of a bad tax shelter.
194
 The action was resolved against all 
defendants other than the promoter (and two related corporations) who sold 
the shelter to the plaintiffs.
195
 It did not involve any tax professionals. The 
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the 
complaint because the plaintiffs did not establish their fraud claim against 
the defendant.
196
 In discussing the viability of the fraud cause of action, the 
court held the plaintiffs had not proven any injury.
197
 Although the plaintiffs 
reported the tax shelter losses on their 2001 tax return, they later filed an 
amended return eliminating the shelter losses and paid the additional taxes 
and interest.
198
 By voluntarily taking a less risky approach, the plaintiffs 
were held to be unable to demonstrate that they suffered any injury caused 
by the defendants.
199
 While this type of holding might make sense under 
appropriate circumstances, it seems incorrect here. Throughout 2001 to 
2003 the IRS was vigorously pursuing tax shelter investors. Many of the 
shelters were determined by the IRS to be illegal, or potentially so, and 
many were designated as listed transactions. To force a taxpayer to file a tax 
return claiming invalid losses in order to be able to recover the damages 
caused by the invalid shelter seems wrong. If anything, by amending their 
tax return the plaintiffs were reducing their potential damages. Mitigation of 
damages is a longstanding and almost universal requirement of tort law.
200
 
 
191
Id. 
192
Id. at 51. 
193
623 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
194
Id. 
195
Id. at 506. There was also an arbitration proceeding, though it is not described in any 
detail. Id. at 509. 
196
Id. at 513. 
197
Id. 
198
Id. 
199
Id. 
200
See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 733–34. 
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Sound policy would seem to require rewarding the plaintiffs for their 
conduct limiting potential damages rather than penalizing them. 
Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP raises several 
fascinating issues, though the case is purely procedural, addressing the 
production of documents in the face of claims of attorney client privilege.
201
 
In Christenbury, in October 2002 a Texas attorney advised the plaintiff of 
the Nevis Asset Protection Trust, an insurance-related product offered 
through Fidelity Insurance Co. Ltd. and another company.
202
 The product 
was recommended in response to the plaintiff’s inquiry about obtaining a 
tax-favorable insurance and financial product.
203
 On the plaintiff’s behalf, 
the Texas attorney obtained an opinion from the defendant law firm that the 
proposed transaction would qualify for an income tax deduction and did not 
constitute a tax shelter.
204
 The opinion was dated December 18, 2002 and 
was based on a number of factual representations, most of which were 
supplied by Fidelity.
205
 As Fidelity was also a client of the defendant law 
firm, the defendant obtained a conflict waiver, after it represented that its 
representation of Fidelity was on unrelated insurance matters.
206
 The 
plaintiff subsequently purchased the financial product from Fidelity.
207
 
In September 2003 the plaintiff received a letter from the defendant 
informing him that certain material facts concerning the product were not as 
originally represented and that they were retroactively withdrawing their 
earlier opinion.
208
 Upon receiving this letter the plaintiff attempted to 
terminate his Nevis Trust and recover his $2.5 million investment.
209
 
Fidelity offered to refund the investment less a contractually provided 
redemption or termination fee of $370,000 and in exchange for an 
agreement releasing Fidelity from any liability.
210
 The plaintiff refused and 
instituted a suit in the Nevis courts against Fidelity that was still pending at 
 
201
285 F.R.D. 675, 679 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
202
Id. at 678. 
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the time of trial.
211
 The plaintiff sued the Texas attorney, and that suit was 
resolved pursuant to a confidential agreement.
212
 
The plaintiff subsequently instituted this action against the defendant, 
seeking $2.5 million in damages.
213
 Among the causes of action asserted are 
breach of contract to perform legal services for the plaintiff, professional 
negligence in performing the legal work for the plaintiff and negligent 
misrepresentation in that false information was supplied in the tax opinion 
and in the conflict waiver.
214
 Among the defenses asserted by the defendant 
is plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages by rejecting Fidelity’s redemption 
offer.
215
 
While the substantive issues concerning the effect of the withdrawal of 
an opinion and mitigation seem most intriguing, the opinion focuses solely 
on legal privilege and its waiver. The defendant sought to obtain documents 
relating to the plaintiff’s investment decision, including communications 
with the Texas attorney, and also post-transaction documents relating to tax 
filings and the plaintiff’s decision to reject Fidelity’s redemption offer.216 
The court ordered the production of documents related to the plaintiff’s 
decision to invest but not of any post-transaction documents.
217
 The plaintiff 
sought discovery of the defendant’s entire client files relating to Fidelity 
and the other company,
218
 but the court denied this.
219
 
At present,
220
 Yung v. Grant Thornton LLP seems to be the only 
reported generic tax shelter type case that has gone to judgment on the 
merits.
221
 Yung is especially significant not just for being the first, but for 
the magnitude of the total damages awarded ($100 million),
222
 the fact that 
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Id. at 679. 
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Id. 
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Id. 
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December 2013. 
221
No. 07-CI-2647 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www.woodllp.com/ 
Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf. 
222
Id. at 191–92. (The actual damages are a bit below $100 million since the compensatory 
damages were only $19.3 million ($18.4 million for taxes, interest and penalties and .9 million, 
return of fee paid for the shelter) rather than $20 million. For ease of reference they are rounded 
up to $20 million.). 
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punitive damages of $80 million were awarded as part of the damages, and 
the egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct.223 The judge found the 
defendant’s conduct to be not only grossly negligent but also fraudulent by 
both commission and omission.
224
 
At a vastly oversimplified level, Yung can be summarized as being 
pretty much a predictable generic tax shelter litigation. Between June, 2000, 
when first approached by its accounting firm, defendant Grant Thornton, 
and December 29, 2000, when the first two steps of the shelter transaction 
were effectuated, the plaintiff Yung
225
 was convinced to purchase a tax 
shelter from the defendant that would enable Yung to repatriate $30 million 
from two of his controlled foreign corporations without incurring any 
income tax.
226
 Yung and his advisors were repeatedly assured the plan was 
legally valid and risk-free and that Grant Thornton would give him its 
more-likely-than-not opinion to this effect.
227
 The first two steps of the 
transaction were effectuated on December 29, 2000.
228
 The third and final 
step was effectuated on September 28, 2001.
229
 Timely tax returns for 2000 
and 2001 were filed by Yung after they were either prepared and/or 
reviewed by Grant Thornton.
230
 In 2004 the IRS commenced an audit of the 
shelter transaction.
231
 The audit was settled on June 7, 2007 and resulted in 
Yung paying additional taxes, interest and substantial penalties.
232
 Grant 
 
223
Id. at 201. 
224
Id. at 166–81. 
225 The main focus of the opinion and the defendant’s shelter scheme was William Yung. He 
was a very successful hotelier and entrepreneur who owned many businesses and partnerships. 
The shelters were actually bought by two of his controlled foreign corporations that were owned 
by him, his wife and a trust for him and his wife (the “‘94 Trust”). The ultimate goal of the shelter 
was to enable Mr. Yung to get a dividend from the two controlled foreign corporations tax free. 
Many of the contacts and communications between the defendant, Grant Thornton, and Mr. Yung 
were actually with Mr. Yung’s advisors who were technically employed by one of his 
corporations. Id. at 1–4.  To simplify the presentation, Mr. Yung will be referred to as the plaintiff 
and taxpayer. Though its interests are aligned with the plaintiffs, the ‘94 Trust was designated a 
defendant. Id. at 9. The only real defendant though is Grant Thornton. 
226
Id. at 12; see I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2012). (Normally, the receipt of a dividend is gross 
income.). 
227
See, e.g., Yung, No. 07-CI-2647 at 28–29. 
228
Id. at 57. 
229
Id. at 88. 
230
Id. at 95, 97. 
231
Id. at 101. 
232
Id. at 104. 
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Thornton was involved in the audit. This action was commenced shortly 
thereafter, on August 29, 2007.
233
 
As is suggested by the award of any punitive damages, and certainly by 
the magnitude of this award, Yung involved egregious wrongdoing by the 
defendant—much more than simply selling a tax shelter that ended up being 
disallowed. Mr. Yung was very conservative when it came to tax matters.
234
 
He had previously refused to purchase tax shelters offered to him.
235
 He was 
so meticulous in meeting his tax obligations that he was actually 
complimented by the IRS for his consistent approach to paying taxes.
236
 In 
addition, Mr. Yung was involved in the gaming industry.
237
 The state 
regulators of the gaming industry take a very dim view of any applicant 
who participated in a tax shelter.
238
 In fact, Mr. Yung’s participation in the 
shelter sold him by the defendant branded him as someone who failed to 
report income, which later resulted in the inability of one of his 
corporations to obtain a gaming license, and which in turn resulted in 
payment of over $20 million in damages for breach of contract.
239
 Due to its 
longstanding close relationship with Mr. Yung and his entities, the 
defendant, Grant Thornton, was aware of Mr. Yung’s predilections and 
gaming industry interests.
240
 
In Yung, the defendant, Grant Thornton, was eager to enter the tax 
shelter business to meet the competition from the larger accounting firms.
241
 
But, the firm did not seem to have the required expertise in this area. It was 
unable to properly analyze the proposed shelter transaction, or to satisfy the 
technical requirements adequately to attain a high enough confidence level 
in the product to enable it to give the promised more-likely-than-not 
opinion that the shelter was valid. During the entire time period from when 
the shelter was first offered to the plaintiff until well after the plaintiff had 
purchased and effectuated the shelter, the defendant was still in the process 
of developing and refining the tax shelter. It was premature of them to sell it 
to anyone, much less to a very conservative taxpayer who eschewed risky 
tax products. The early version of the shelter that was sold to the plaintiff 
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634 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3 
was actually technically flawed and could never have generated the 
purported tax benefits, even assuming such tax shelter transactions might be 
viable.
242
 Grant Thornton later revamped the product to eliminate these 
technical problems, but never informed the plaintiff.
243
 In addition, the court 
found that Grant Thornton had numerous opportunities to inform the 
plaintiff of the flaws in the shelter while there was still time to take 
corrective actions that would have obviated the plaintiff’s damages.244 The 
court held that if informed of the problems with the shelter, the plaintiff 
would have rescinded or reversed the transaction, filed amended returns, or 
otherwise ameliorated the situation.
245
 Instead, the court found that Grant 
Thornton never made any of the disclosures it should have because it did 
not want to lose the $900,000 fee it received on the sale of the shelter.
246
 
Being desperate to complete a sale of its new shelter product, the court 
found Grant Thornton utilized its position of trust with the plaintiff to 
convince him and his advisors the product was legal, and not even 
questionable. The court held the defendant affirmatively and fraudulently 
misrepresented the product and fraudulently failed to disclose material 
information in order to effectuate the sale of the shelter.
247
 There were also 
many other instances of unconscionable behavior. Taken together, all of 
these resulted in the imposition of the large punitive damages award. 
Before focusing on the numerous instances of fraud and egregious 
conduct by the defendant, a brief review of the shelter scheme and the 
background regulatory environment is helpful to fully appreciate the 
situation. The shelter was called a Leveraged 301 Distribution or simply a 
Lev 301.
248
 Section 301 of the I.R.C. governs the taxability of dividends 
received by a shareholder from a corporation, hence the 301 reference. 
When a dividend is received by a shareholder it is normally included in the 
shareholder’s gross income.249 The amount of the dividend is the cash 
received or the fair market value of any property received.
250
 If property 
received is subject to a liability, the amount of the dividend is reduced by 
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the liability.
251
 A constructive or deemed dividend occurs whenever a 
corporation confers a monetary benefit on a shareholder even if the 
corporation did not go through the formalities of declaring and paying a 
dividend.
252
 
In the Leveraged 301 transaction, as applied to the plaintiff’s situation, 
his controlled foreign corporations would borrow $30 million and use the 
funds to purchase U.S. Treasury Notes.
253
 The Treasury Notes would be 
security for the loan.
254
 The corporations would then declare and pay a 
dividend of the Treasury Notes, subject to the loan.
255
 Since the securities 
and the liability to which they were subject were of equal value, the amount 
of the dividend would be the net value received, or zero, and not subject to 
any tax.
256
 The plan contemplated that the controlled foreign corporations 
would wait six months to a year and then pay off the loan, leaving Mr. 
Yung with $30 million of tax-free Treasury Notes.
257
 
Apart from the potential applicability to this plan of several judicially 
created anti-tax avoidance doctrines,
258
 the product description itself seems 
to have an internal inconsistency that should have eliminated any prospect 
for its viability. In arguing that the repayment of the debt by the controlled 
foreign corporations did not create a constructive or deemed dividend to the 
shareholders, the description noted that since the controlled foreign 
corporations were the primary obligors on the debt, they were simply 
repaying their obligation, and any indirect benefit to their shareholders 
should not be a constructive dividend.
259
 Initially, this argument for the 
absence of a constructive dividend seems facially incorrect since the 
payment of the loan by the foreign corporations conferred a monetary 
benefit on the shareholders by eliminating the debt to which the Treasury 
Notes were subject. Additionally, the description acknowledged that the 
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controlled foreign corporations were the primary obligors on the loan.
260
 
This in turn would make the initial dividend of the Treasury Notes taxable. 
As subsequent Treasury Regulations made explicit, if the primary obligor 
on the debt was expected to, and later did, pay the debt, the Treasury Notes 
when distributed were not really subject to the debt, so the full value of the 
Treasury Notes was a taxable dividend.
261
 To be even facially viable, the 
Lev 301 required the original borrowing to be on a nonrecourse basis with 
no one having personal responsibility for the debt.
262
 
When initially contacted in June 2000 by Grant Thornton about 
investing in the Lev 301 shelter, the climate for investing in such tax 
shelters was very dangerous.
263
 In the early 1990s the government learned 
of the shelters and addressed them primarily through the IRS’s audit 
function. By 1999 the Treasury and IRS had become more fully aware of 
the scope and seriousness of the shelter situation. They decided to address 
the situation by exposing the shelters and the promoters—“sunshine is the 
best disinfectant.” They attacked the shelter problem systemically and 
systematically. In addition to continuing its audit program, new initiatives 
and requirements were imposed by regulation and otherwise to curb the 
spate of tax shelter activities.
264
 The active and vigorous crackdown was 
ultimately successful in shutting down abusive shelters. The defendant was 
aware of these changes.
265
 In Yung, the judge took particular note of the 
following relevant anti-shelter developments:
266
 
December, 1999: The Boss Notice, IRS Notice 99-59.
267
 In this Notice, 
the IRS described a tax shelter product being sold by accounting firms 
called The Bond and Option Sales Strategy (“BOSS”).268 After describing 
the steps of the strategy, the Notice warned that the tax loss claimed in 
BOSS transactions was not valid and the IRS may impose penalties on 
participants, promoters and those who report such transactions.
269
 Notably, 
the BOSS transactions also involved a foreign corporation borrowing 
money to purchase securities, giving the bank a security interest in the 
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securities, distributing the encumbered securities to a shareholder and the 
corporation later paying the debt from other assets.
270
 
February 28, 2000: 
1. Listed Transactions Notice. Notice 2000-15
271
 introduced the term 
“listed transactions” which were transactions identified in written guidance 
or regulations by the Treasury as unlawful tax avoidance schemes. This 
included transactions the same as, or substantially similar to, BOSS 
transactions.
272
 
2. List Maintenance Requirement. Regulations were issued requiring 
any promoter or seller of any interest in a potentially abusive tax shelter to 
maintain a list of purchasers and to make the list available to the IRS upon 
request.
273
 
3. Tax Shelter Registration Requirement. Regulations were issued 
imposing an obligation on organizers and promoters of certain corporate tax 
shelters to register them with the Treasury.
274
 
4. Reportable Transaction Obligation. Regulations were issued 
requiring corporate taxpayers to disclose on their tax returns any 
participation in “reportable transactions.”275 These were transactions the 
same or substantially similar to listed transactions that were expected to 
reduce federal income tax liability by more than $1 million in any year or 
by more than $2 million for any combination of taxable years.
276
 
August 11, 2000: Son of BOSS Notice. Notice 2000-44 addressed a 
transaction that was a derivative of BOSS and indicated it was not valid.
277
 
It also indicated that such arrangements were listed transactions and subject 
to tax shelter registration and list maintenance requirements.
278
 
The court also took note of an article published on April 14, 2000 by 
Lee Sheppard, a “well-known and respected commentator of federal income 
tax issues.”279 In the article, under the heading of “Bossy,” she described a 
 
270
Id. at 14. 
271
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1 (2011). 
272
Yung, No. 07-CI-2647 at 15. 
273
Treas. Reg. § 301. 6112-2 (2003). 
274
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (2010). 
275
Yung, No. 07-CI-2647 at 16. 
276
Id. 
277
I.R.S. Notice 2000–44, 2002-2 C.B. 255. 
278
Id. 
279
Yung, No. 07-CI-2647 at 16. See also Lee Sheppard, Corporate Tax Shelters: More Plain 
Brown Wrappers, 87 Tax Notes 321, 322 (Apr. 17, 2000). 
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variant of the BOSS shelter marketed by Arthur Andersen, but which was 
very similar to, if not identical with, the Lev 301 product.
280
 She predicted 
the government could combat the shelter by retroactively importing into the 
section 301 regulations a definition of assumed liability that was added to 
I.R.C. § 357.
281
 This later occurred in January, 2001.
282
 
In Yung, the court found that the defendant’s conduct towards the 
plaintiff was rife with fraudulent misrepresentations, fraudulent omissions 
of material information and professional conduct that was grossly 
negligent.
283
 Such conduct occurred both in connection with the sale of the 
Lev 301 to the plaintiff, the defendant’s failure to recognize that the Lev 
301 was not legally supportable and on its failure to so advise the plaintiff 
when the transaction still could be undone or when the tax returns still 
could be amended.
284
 
In Yung, the court presented the underlying facts in excruciatingly 
complete detail. This was likely done for two reasons: first, to support the 
court’s finding of the many instances of unprofessional conduct and fraud 
which served as the basis for the court’s imposition of the large punitive 
damages award; and second, because of the rather detailed evidence trail 
available in e-mail records. The following summary of the events is 
therefore somewhat extended to relay the facts and to illustrate some of the 
egregious conduct that was the basis for the punitive damages award. 
Based on its close relationship with the plaintiff since 1996, and 
knowing of his careful, conservative approach to complying with the tax 
laws, the defendant initially approached the plaintiff about engaging a Lev 
301 transaction in June, 2000.
285
 There were meetings on July 5th and 
24th.
286
 In both of these meetings the defendant presented the product as a 
lawful strategy by which to transfer the money from the controlled foreign 
corporations to the United States.
287
 The court found that at the original 
presentation at the July 5th meeting, the defendant’s partners did not 
disclose that the Lev 301 was similar to the abusive BOSS transaction, that 
the recently issued February regulations imposed disclosure requirements 
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on corporations utilizing such transactions, and that sellers were required to 
maintain a list of participants in such transactions.
288
 They also did not 
inform the plaintiff of the Lee Sheppard article that predicted that a product 
equivalent to Lev 301 likely would be retroactively declared unlawful.
289
 
Finally, the court found that the defendant then believed there was a ninety 
percent chance the IRS would disallow the Lev 301 tax benefits on audit.
290
 
The court also found that if the likelihood that Lev 301 would be viewed as 
an unlawful shelter was disclosed at the July 5th meeting, the plaintiff’s 
officers would have immediately terminated discussions about Lev 301.
291
 
Mr. Yung was present at the July 24th meeting at which the steps of the 
transaction were outlined.
292
 Based on notes of this meeting, the court found 
that the defendant never mentioned the requirement that the borrowing of 
funds from a bank in the first step of the Lev 301 transaction must be 
nonrecourse.
293
 The court further found that while there was mention by the 
defendant of the need for a non-tax related business purpose for the Lev 
301, it was never indicated that this purpose must be the primary motivation 
for the transaction, and that a clear understanding of this would have had an 
impact on Mr. Yung’s decision whether to proceed with the transaction.294 
At this meeting the defendant’s partners also represented that in a worst-
case scenario, if the Lev 301 was ineffective, the Grant Thornton opinion 
would prevent the IRS from assessing any penalties.
295
 The court found this 
representation was a blatant lie made to close the sale and that if Mr. Yung 
had understood there was a risk of incurring penalties he would not have 
proceeded with the transaction.
296
 
At the July 24th meeting, one of Mr. Yung’s advisors told the 
defendant’s partner that Mr. Yung did not want to be the guinea pig by 
being the first one to do a Lev 301 transaction.
297
 At some point following 
this meeting, the defendant’s partner intimated to one of Mr. Yung’s 
advisors that two local, large businesses had successfully utilized Lev 301 
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transactions to transfer foreign wealth to the United States.
298
 The advisor 
surmised that these two businesses were General Electric and Proctor & 
Gamble.
299
 The court found this representation was a lie made to complete 
the sale and that if Mr. Yung had realized that he in fact was the guinea pig 
for the Lev 301 he would not have engaged in the transaction.
300
 
On August 11, 2000 the IRS issued the Son of BOSS Notice
301
 and 
modified certain of the February 28th regulations.
302
 These developments 
caused some of those at Grant Thornton involved with developing and 
selling the Lev 301 concern about whether Lev 301 remained viable.
303
 On 
August 21st the Wall Street Journal published an article about the BOSS 
transaction and Price Waterhouse Cooper’s decision to stop selling it.304 In 
response to this article the defendant stopped selling Lev 301.
305
 Also in 
response to the article, one of Mr. Yung’s advisors called the defendant 
expressing concerns about the legality of Lev 301.
306
 He was reassured that 
there was no cause for concern and that Lev 301 was distinguishable from 
BOSS transactions.
307
 He was not notified, however, that the defendant had 
stopped selling Lev 301 or that a list maintenance was required.
308
 
A final engagement letter was sent by the defendant to the plaintiff 
around September 15, 2000.
309
 Before the letter was finalized, J. Michel, the 
defendant’s primary relationship contact with the plaintiff and his 
companies, was informed that the defendant could not back up the 
representation it made that a Grant Thornton opinion would prevent the IRS 
from assessing penalties in the event there was an audit of the Lev 301 
transaction.
310
 Instead of dropping the representation, the wording was 
changed to “soften” what was promised.311 Mr. Yung was not informed of 
this since he would not have proceeded with the transaction without this 
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representation.
312
 In addition, although Mr. Michel was advised by his 
superiors to inform the plaintiff that Grant Thornton would be required to 
maintain a list of customers to whom it sold Lev 301 shelters, he failed to 
do so because he knew that this disclosure would kill the sale to Mr. 
Yung.
313
 This failure to disclose was found by the court to be a gross 
deviation from the standard of care applicable to tax professionals, and this 
was particularly so in light of Mr. Yung’s involvement in the gaming 
industry.
314
 Likewise the engagement letter did not contain any disclosure 
that Lev 301 was substantially similar to BOSS and was likely to be 
deemed an abusive tax shelter.
315
 
Although Grant Thornton had signed an engagement letter with the 
plaintiff in mid-September 2000 and had promised a more-likely-than-not 
opinion letter, they were having internal difficulty concluding Lev 301 was 
more-likely-than-not valid. Ultimately, they could not attain the more-
likely-than-not level of certainty until around the time they issued the final 
opinions to the plaintiff in August of 2001—and this occurred only after 
they revised some aspects of the transaction.
316
 As part of this ongoing 
process to satisfy themselves of the legality of the Lev 301 shelter, Grant 
Thornton engaged the law firm of Baker & McKenzie to review their draft 
opinion letter.
317
 The two Baker & McKenzie tax attorneys who reviewed 
the opinion had concerns over whether the transaction complied with the 
judicial doctrines of business purpose, economic substance and step 
transaction.
318
 Neither of the reviewing attorneys was willing to opine that 
Grant Thornton had reached the more-likely-than-not confidence level it 
was seeking.
319
 
Despite receiving the negative feedback from the law firm, Grant 
Thornton decided to proceed with the Lev 301 shelter and to attempt to 
achieve more-likely-than-not status by trying to inject more business 
purpose into the transaction.
320
 The plaintiffs were not informed of the 
outside legal review nor of the adverse feedback.
321
 Rather shockingly, in 
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mid-October the defendant’s managing partner of tax services informed 
other partners that a reputable law firm reviewed Lev 301 and gave a 
“thumbs up.”322 This was an obvious lie to his partners, who passed it on to 
clients, and it resulted in fraud upon both the clients’ and defendant’s sales 
force.
323
 
The plaintiff was intending to do the Lev 301 transaction before the end 
of 2000.
324
 Financing had been arranged.
325
 Pursuant to the terms of the 
final engagement letter, before entering into the transaction Grant Thornton 
had to provide at least its preliminary conclusions that it would be able to 
issue its promised more-likely-than-not opinion in support of the 
transaction.
326
 Without these assurances the transaction would not occur.
327
 
The loan was scheduled to close on December 29, 2000.
328
  In a letter dated 
December 28th, Grant Thornton issued a “short-form” or “model” opinion, 
in order for the transaction to proceed.
329
 While not containing all the 
elements of a complete opinion, it did assert that it was the firm’s more-
likely-than-not opinion that the transaction would be upheld and that the 
final opinion letter would contain the same opinion.
330
 The letter did not 
disclose the list maintenance requirement nor the risk stemming from the 
transaction’s similarity to BOSS.331 The plaintiff was also never informed 
that the transaction might have to be reported on the tax return, or that 
Grant Thornton had not yet reached a more-likely-than-not confidence level 
for the transaction.
332
 Relying on this letter, the first two steps of the Lev 
301 transaction were completed on December 29th.
333
 The $30 million loan 
was closed, Treasury Notes were purchased with the proceeds, and 
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dividends of the Treasury Notes subject to the loan were declared and 
paid.
334
 
On January 3, 2001, temporary and proposed regulations were issued 
under I.R.C. section 301 that invalidated the Lev 301 transaction 
prospectively and were retroactive for any transactions similar to BOSS 
shelters described in Notice 99-59.
335
 These regulations were essentially 
what the Lee Sheppard article predicted. The regulations set off internal 
discussions in Grant Thornton as to whether the Lev 301 was totally 
dead.
336
 On January 8th, Grant Thornton ended sales of Lev 301 until 
further notice.
337
 There was some indication that Grant Thornton directed its 
personnel to notify all clients of the regulations and that their impact was 
being evaluated.
338
 Despite this, Mr. Yung was not notified nor was he 
informed that Grant Thornton had ceased marketing Lev 301.
339
 The court 
found that had Mr. Yung been notified he and his advisors would most 
likely have unwound the December 29th transaction and avoided any 
negative tax consequences.
340
 This would also have prevented Grant 
Thornton from receiving its $900,000 fee for the transaction.
341
 Quite the 
contrary, on January 10th, J. Michel e-mailed an employee of the plaintiff 
and indicated the January 3rd regulations did not adversely affect the 
plaintiff’s transactions since they predated the effective date of the 
regulations.
342
 He also indicated that the regulations might even favorably 
impact the transaction.
343
 This was a lie because at this point in time Grant 
Thornton had not reached a conclusion on either of these issues.
344
 He also 
failed to disclose that in response to the new regulations Grant Thornton 
was no longer selling Lev 301.
345
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During the ensuing weeks Grant Thornton concluded the new 
regulations were retroactive to the plaintiff’s December 29th transaction, 
but failed to advise Mr. Yung to unwind the transaction.
346
 In response to an 
inquiry by one of Mr. Yung’s employees as to whether the December 29th 
loans should be paid to stop the interest expense or whether Grant Thornton 
would pay the interest if the Lev 301 never finalized as planned, on 
February 6th Grant Thornton sent an incomplete draft of an opinion letter to 
the plaintiff.
347
 On this day Grant Thornton had still not determined if Lev 
301 had any ongoing viability.
348
 Despite the uncertainty, in April 2001 
Grant Thornton decided to start selling the product again.
349
 However, it 
continued to omit crucial details about the products’ risks and the weakness 
of Grant Thornton’s legal arguments.350 
In late May 2001, an attorney unrelated to Grant Thornton reviewed the 
Lev 301 transaction for one of his clients to whom the Lev 301 was 
offered.
351
 The attorney concluded that Lev 301 did not work under the 
January 2001 regulations because of the initial loan’s recourse nature.352 
Going forward, Grant Thornton modified the Lev 301 to require only 
nonrecourse borrowing and a representation from the client to this effect.
353
 
This, of course, meant that the plaintiff’s Lev 301 was invalid under the 
January regulations that applied to it retroactively. 
Eventually, on August 8th and 13th, Grant Thornton delivered final 
opinion letters to the plaintiff.
354
 While the ultimate conclusions in the 
letters were the same as the earlier draft and opined that the Lev 301 was 
more-likely-than-not valid, the analysis within the letters was changed.
355
  
More business purpose was inserted, as was the requirement that the initial 
loan to purchase the securities was nonrecourse.
356
 There was also 
discussion of how the transaction survived under the judicial anti-tax 
avoidance doctrines.
357
 Although the defendant knew the loans obtained by 
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Mr. Yung’s controlled foreign corporations were recourse, they simply 
opined that the loans were nonrecourse and treated them as such.
358
 
Similarly, while they characterized the loans as what one would normally 
expect when a company finances the distribution of an asset, they knew this 
to be untrue since they marketed Lev 301 as a tax-avoidance product.
359
 The 
court held that no reasonably competent tax practitioner would have issued 
this more-likely-than-not opinion for the Lev 301.
360
 
Yung’s controlled foreign corporations paid off the loans on September 
28, 2001, a few days before filing his federal tax forms for 2000.
361
 In 
connection with his 2000 tax forms, it should be noted that on several 
occasions Grant Thornton had advised that no disclosure of any income 
from the Lev 301 should appear on the tax returns and insisted on reviewing 
the forms before they were filed.
362
 Despite preparing one of Mr. Yung’s 
tax returns and reviewing another, the defendant did not advise Mr. Yung to 
report the transactions to minimize or eliminate the risk of penalties.
363
 
Similarly, in September 2002 Grant Thornton prepared the plaintiff’s tax 
returns for 2001.
364
 The returns did not disclose the repayment of the loans 
by the plaintiff’s controlled foreign corporation in September of 2001.365 
This latter decision was especially egregious since Grant Thornton 
previously had received a request from the IRS in February 2002 requesting 
it to disclose all of its potentially abusive transactions, and, on June 25, 
2002, it was served with a summons requesting all of its list maintenance 
transactions.
366
 The court found that Grant Thornton’s intentional failure to 
report or disclose the Lev 301 “was in furtherance of its efforts to conceal 
its prior negligent and fraudulent behavior . . . ”367 
Without getting into any of the details, there were a number of instances 
in 2001 and 2002 when Grant Thornton was either reminded of the 
invalidity of the Lev 301 sold to the plaintiff,
368
 forced to reappraise the 
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validity of Lev 301 in light of new regulations or new articles in the 
press,
369
 or forced to suspend sales of Lev 301.
370
 However, it never 
informed the plaintiff of any of these—never giving him the opportunity to 
either attempt to unwind the transaction or to fairly determine how to 
proceed.
371
 Grant Thornton also did not inform the plaintiff that in 
December of 2002 it received a summons from the IRS specifically for 
documents relating to Lev 301.
372
 
In November of 2002 the IRS initiated an audit of one of plaintiff’s 
corporations, CSC, an S-corporation.
373
 The audit was not related to Lev 
301.
374
 In connection with the audit CSC received a standard Information 
Document Request (“IDR”) inquiring whether CSC had directly or 
indirectly participated in any transactions that were the same or similar to a 
listed transaction.
375
 Because CSC was an S-corporation, the inquiry 
effectively asked whether Mr. Yung had individually participated in such a 
transaction.
376
 Mr. Yung’s advisors became concerned about whether the 
Lev 301 should be disclosed since it was similar to BOSS.
377
 Mr. Michel of 
Grant Thornton advised that the transaction was not similar to BOSS, 
despite the fact the Grant Thornton had previously concluded it was 
substantially similar.
378
 Mr. Michel then responded to the IDR question in 
the negative.
379
 The court concluded this was done to conceal Mr. Yung’s 
involvement in the Lev 301 and to conceal Grant Thornton’s prior fraud.380 
On September 12, 2003 the Department of Justice, on behalf of the IRS, 
initiated an action to enforce its Lev 301 summons previously served on 
Grant Thornton.
381
 Grant Thornton turned over various documents that 
identified Mr. Yung as a Lev 301 participant.
382
 The CSC audit was 
subsequently expanded to include audits of Mr. Yung’s 2000 and 2001 tax 
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returns.
383
 Grant Thornton was involved with the audits, which commenced 
in May 2004.
384
 After an extended process, the audits were settled in 2007, 
with Mr. Yung paying additional taxes, interest and penalties but with the 
penalties reduced from twenty percent of the tax initially demanded to 
thirteen percent.
385
 
Before awarding damages the court needed to deal with two threshold 
issues: a limited liability clause
386
 and the statute of limitations.
387
 The final 
engagement letter signed by the parties contained a provision that the 
maximum liability of the defendant to the plaintiff “arising for any reason 
relating to the Opinion shall be limited to the amount of fees paid for this 
engagement.”388 The fees were $900,000.389 In holding that the provision 
did not limit the defendant’s liability, the court relied on Kentucky 
precedent that a person cannot contract against fraud.
390
 The court then held 
that the defendant committed fraud, primarily by not informing the plaintiff 
of the listing requirement.
391
 As to contracting against negligence or gross 
negligence, the court held that in Kentucky such agreements are “‘generally 
disfavored and are strictly construed against the parties relying on 
them.’”392 The court then held that the agreement did not specifically 
mention negligence or gross negligence and was otherwise not precise 
enough to cover the type of errors that occurred here.
393
 While perhaps 
morally satisfying in light of the egregious fraudulent conduct of the 
defendant, this might turn out to be the Achilles heel of the opinion on 
appeal. 
As to statute of limitation concerns, the court held that the statute was 
tolled until the settlement with the IRS on June 7, 2007 because the 
defendant was continuously representing the plaintiff in connection with 
 
383
Id. 
384
Id. at 101–02. 
385
Id. at 104. 
386
Id. at 163–65. 
387
Id. at 181–83. 
388
Id. at 163. 
389
Id. 
390
Id. at 164. 
391
Id. at 163. 
392
Id. at 164 (quoting Peoples Bank of N. Ky., Inc. v. Crowe Chizek & Co., LLC, 277 S.W.3d 
255, 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008)). 
393
Id. at 164–65. 
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Lev 301 matters, and because of the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of 
their misconduct.
394
 
The compensatory damages awarded the plaintiff consisted of the 
additional taxes ($11,837,860), interest ($5,021,494) and penalties 
($1,555,873) incurred and a refund of the $900,000 fee paid for the Lev 
301.
395
 The court’s analysis of these damages was relatively 
straightforward. The court first noted the law that the measure of damages 
in a tax malpractice case against an accountant is the difference between 
what the taxpayer paid and what the taxpayer would have owed absent the 
negligence.
396
 The court found that here absent the negligence, the plaintiff 
would not have repatriated any money in 2000 and therefore would not 
have incurred any taxes, interest or penalties.
397
 Interestingly, concerning 
the interest, the court was concerned with whether the underlying amount 
was adequately liquidated so interest could be awarded under Kentucky 
law.
398
 The court apparently was not aware of the current three approaches 
to the recovery of interest.
399
 Similarly, with respect to the fees paid to the 
defendant, the court held that but for the defendant’s false representations 
about the Lev 301 product, the plaintiff would never have incurred this fee 
and was entitled to its return.
400
 
The most interesting aspect of the court’s damage award was its holding 
that injury to the plaintiff’s reputation as a shareholder and key person in a 
casino corporation could be considered by the court in its assessment of 
damages.
401
 However, unless this statement is understood to mean that such 
reputational harm could be considered in awarding punitive damages, the 
import of this statement is unclear since the court directed a verdict for the 
defendant regarding such damages. 
Late in 2004 one of the plaintiff’s corporations acquired a casino for $60 
million in a bankruptcy auction.
402
 To complete the acquisition, as sole 
shareholder of the corporation, Mr. Yung had to obtain a key person license 
 
394
Id. at 183. 
395
Id. at 191–92. 
396
Id. at 175 (interestingly the court cited Lien v. McGladrey & Pullen, 509 N.W.2d 421, 426 
(S.D. 1993), a South Dakota case, for this proposition.). 
397
Id. 
398
Id. at 176–77. 
399
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 41. See generally, Recovery of Interest, supra, 
note 43. 
400
Yung 07-CI-2647 at 176. 
401
Id. at 192. 
402
Id. 
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from the Missouri Gaming Commission.
403
 As part of this process Mr. 
Yung disclosed the IRS audit of his Lev 301 transaction.
404
 In September 
2005 he was informed that the Gaming Commission would deny his license 
primarily because of his participation in the Lev 301 transaction.
405
 As a 
result, he withdrew his license application, fearing that a license denial 
would adversely impact his other existing casino licenses.
406
 The court held 
that his decision to withdraw the application was commercially 
reasonable.
407
 As a result of withdrawing the license application, he could 
not complete the purchase of the casino from the bankruptcy auction.
408
 The 
seller of the casino brought a breach of contract suit that was ultimately 
settled by the payment of $20.5 million by Mr. Yung’s corporation.409 
The damages of $20.5 million could not be recovered by Mr. Yung from 
Grant Thornton since the damages were incurred by Mr. Yung’s 
corporation, not by him personally.
410
 However, the court held that Mr. 
Yung suffered personal reputational damages from this episode.
411
 
As noted previously, the court also awarded the plaintiff punitive 
damages of $80 million because of the many egregious, fraudulent 
commissions and omissions by the defendant and because of the many 
instances of gross negligence of the defendant.
412
 The court was very 
careful to explain the reasons for its award of the damages and to justify 
their magnitude as roughly four times the compensatory damages.
413
 
E. Analysis 
In attempting to focus on the potential tax malpractice liability of the 
attorney and accountant participants in the generic tax shelters, the 
immediate difficulty that arises is that often the tax professionals were not 
acting simply in their customary roles as tax advisors but were really the 
creators and/or purveyors of the shelters. As the two Senate Reports 
 
403
Id. at 193. 
404
Id. 
405
Id. 
406
Id. 
407
Id. 
408
Id. 
409
Id. at 193. 
410
Id. at 194. 
411
Id. 
412
Id. at 194–209. 
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Id. 
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indicate, while in form they rendered opinion letters, the tax advisors often 
were part of the group selling the shelters and their opinion letters were a 
marketing tool to make the product appear efficacious and to make the 
sale.
414
 As such, the automatic reaction is that they ought to be responsible 
under some actual or implied warranty as sellers or under principles of 
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or the like. It seems very difficult, if not 
impossible, to disentangle their roles as principals from their roles as tax 
advisors and focus only on the latter. 
To attempt to separate out the tax malpractice issues from the other 
issues lurking in the generic tax shelter scenario, let us assume a potential 
purchaser of a tax shelter consults with an independent attorney or 
accountant concerning the viability of the shelter. The tax advisor 
ultimately determines the shelter is viable and renders an opinion letter that 
the transaction is more-likely-than-not viable and valid. The client then 
purchases the shelter, faithfully effectuates all the steps prescribed by the 
shelter, and claims the deductions on the tax return. It later turns out the 
shelter is ineffective and the client incurs back taxes, interest, penalties and 
corrective costs. 
The initial issue would seem to be that the tax advice given that the tax 
shelter was efficacious was wrong and that, perhaps, liability should be 
imposed on the tax professional for this reason alone. However, under the 
error in judgment rule, being wrong does not automatically subject a tax 
professional to liability. 
[Professionals are not infallible] and the law does not 
impose on them an implied guaranty of result. As long as 
their opinion is based on adequate research and careful 
consideration of the matter, the fact that their judgment on 
a doubtful or unsettled area of law turns out to be incorrect 
will not give rise to malpractice liability.
415
 
As I stated previously, based upon the leading treatise on attorney 
malpractice: 
Professionals, especially attorneys, are frequently called on 
to exercise judgment to resolve issues that are uncertain 
and subject to disagreement. To subject an attorney to 
malpractice liability simply because a judge ultimately 
 
414
S. Rep. No. 108-34, at 5 (2003); see, e.g., supra text accompanying footnotes 91–103; see 
S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 5 (2005). 
415
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at § 603.5. 
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disagrees with a judgment call would be unfair and place 
too great a burden on the legal profession. Because of those 
concerns, under the mere error in judgment rule it is 
universally recognized that an attorney is not liable for an 
error of judgment on an unsettled proposition of law.
416
 
A caveat is necessary at this point to differentiate between attorney and 
accountant tax advisors. While it is clear that the error in judgment rule 
applies to attorneys and its application is said to be universal, the 
application of this rule to accountants is more problematic.
417
 The source of 
the problem is that I am unable to locate any case law that applies the rule 
to accountants.  Several leading commentators do equate accountants and 
lawyers and indicate the error in judgment rule applies to both 
professions.
418
 The logic underlying the rule would seem to apply equally to 
both—at least where the accountant is functioning as a tax advisor—and 
there are cases that hold the elements of a tax malpractice action are 
substantially identical regardless of whether the defendant is an accountant 
or attorney.
419
 Nevertheless, the absence of case law applying the rule to 
accountants is of concern. 
Another reason why liability might not be imposed on the tax 
professional, though the advice was incorrect, is inherent in the type of 
opinion rendered. The opinion posited in our example is the type of opinion 
normally encountered in the tax shelter area, the “more-likely-than-not” 
opinion. This opinion asserts only that the professional rendering it believes 
there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood that the transaction under 
review will be held to be valid.
420
 The more certain opinions that a 
 
416
Todres, supra note 104, at 222. 
417
2 MALLIN AND SMITH, supra note 28 § 19:1. 
418
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 20, § 603.5. 
419
See, e.g., Hnath v. Vecchitto, No. X03CV930502910, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1063, at 
*22 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2003); Gantt v. Boone, Wellford, Clark, Langschmidt & 
Pemberton, 559 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (M.D. La. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Bancroft v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 203 F. Supp. 49, 53 (W.D. La. 1962), aff’d, 309 F.2d 959 
(5th Cir. 1962); Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, MO v. Boatman’s Nat’l Bank of Belleville, 633 N.E.2d 
1267, 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Jerry Clark Equip., Inc. v. Hibbits, 612 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1993); Vernon J. Rockler & Co., Inc. v. Glickman, Isenberg, Lurie & Co., 273 N.W.2d 647, 
650 (Minn. 1978). 
420
See, e.g., LINDA GALLER & MICHAEL B. LANG, REGULATION OF TAX PRACTICE, 100 
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2010). The opinions in both Loftin and Seippel were “more- likely-than-
not” opinions. Loftin v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-81166-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26909, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept 10, 2003); Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C, 341 F. Supp. 
2d 363, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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transaction “should” or “will” be valid are never encountered.421 Exactly 
how much reliance is a layman entitled to place on an opinion that is so 
weak? A fair translation of this opinion is that in 100 transactions of this 
type, 51 will be held to be valid and 49 will be held to be invalid. This 
certainly seems to be very little reassurance of validity and a weak basis for 
imposing liability. 
Militating the other way, though, is the fact that if the transaction really 
has no chance for success, or only a very minimal chance for success, the 
opinion has still vastly overstated the likelihood for success and perhaps 
“caused” the plaintiff damages that ought to be recoverable. In any event, in 
many of the reported generic tax shelter cases there were oral 
representations that indicated a much higher probability of validity for the 
transaction. The oral representations might serve as an independent basis 
for recovery, apart from the written opinion. 
While not an issue in the posited hypothetical example, a factor possibly 
undercutting the utility of the tax advisor’s opinion as a basis for liability in 
most of the reported generic tax shelter cases is the fact that those opinions 
were normally given after the transactions had already been effectuated.
422
 
As such, they were opining on something that had already occurred. It 
would be a stretch to argue that they “caused” the taxpayer to purchase the 
shelter. If anything, it seems that the cause, or, at least, one of the several 
causes, of the damages for purchasing the shelter would rather be the 
promise that an opinion letter would be forthcoming, (or a short form or 
draft of the opinion letter to come). This, of course, makes it more difficult 
for a plaintiff to establish the cause of action, since there is no written 
documentary evidence to establish what was promised to induce the shelter 
purchase. Now, what was said also needs to be proven, and there is a great 
likelihood that each side of the conversation would remember it differently. 
In addition to the tax malpractice issues relative to the issuance of the 
incorrect opinion that the proposed shelter transaction was valid, there are 
 
421 The “should” opinion expresses a stronger likelihood of success than the “more-likely-
than-not” opinion and is generally considered to mean a probability of success of more than 
seventy percent. GALLER & LANG, supra note 420, at 100. The “will” opinion is the strongest 
opinion, suggesting a probability of success of between 95 and 100 percent. Id. at 101. 
422
See, e.g., Loftin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 at *6–7 (transactions occurred in 
September to December, 1997, opinions were received in June, 1998); Seippel, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 
369. (transactions occurred in late 1999, opinions were received in February and March, 2000). 
Was this done to protect the attorney from potential malpractice exposure or, perhaps, to enable 
the opinion to be based on the facts as they occurred rather than on how they were projected to 
occur? 
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also tax malpractice issues concerning the tax return preparer who reported 
the tax shelter deductions on the tax return. To avoid underpayment 
penalties, there must be a reasonable basis for claiming deductions or losses 
on the tax return.
423
 If the shelter deductions were not reported on the tax 
return, there would not have been any subsequent interest, penalty, or 
corrective cost damages from underreporting the taxpayer’s tax liability. 
Thus, the return preparer may face potential liability for causing some, or 
all, of the taxpayer’s damages. Very relevant to the return preparer’s 
potential liability in this regard is the existence, and the return preparer’s 
knowledge, of any opinions that opined that the shelter was valid. These 
opinions, especially one from a source independent of the seller of the 
shelter might, itself, be enough to exonerate the return preparer from any 
liability. 
Although perhaps very obvious, it should be noted that if the particular 
tax shelter involved was a listed transaction, or was otherwise designated as 
an abusive shelter that must be reported on the tax return, the return 
preparer must be aware of the requirement and comply with it. Any failure 
may lead to malpractice liability exposure. 
Although not directly relevant as a technical matter, a prediction of who 
is likely to be successful in a tax malpractice litigation often depends on the 
intangible of which side is more sympathy evoking, or stated more 
colloquially, who is the good guy and who is the bad guy. By this measure, 
both parties seem to have problems, though, ultimately, the plaintiff 
taxpayer seems to be somewhat better than the defendant tax advisor. The 
plaintiff taxpayer in these situations does not evoke much sympathy. 
Ultimately, she or he is a very rich person who received a great deal of 
money and who attempted to avoid paying her or his fair share of taxes due 
by spending a lot of money on some high-cost, esoteric tax gimmick 
promising results too good to be true that an average taxpayer could not 
even imagine. In short, she or he is a really rich, selfish, tax avoider, at best, 
or tax evader, at worst. 
The defendant tax advisor is not much better. Even if we address only 
the type of advisor posited herein i.e., one who is honest and 
straightforward and who is not engaging in the fraudulent and deceitful 
conduct often present in the reported generic tax shelter situations, the 
advisor still does not fare too well. After all, the tax advisor is a fancy 
professional who studies tax esoteric and who develops, or opines upon, the 
type of schemes that enable the very rich, like the plaintiff, to avoid paying 
 
423
See I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6664 (2012). 
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millions of dollars of taxes. At best, she or he charges outrageous fees to 
facilitate and enable the opprobrious conduct of people like the plaintiff. 
And, to make it worse, the advice given was wrong! A fortiori where the tax 
advisor is more like the typical advisor highlighted in the Senate Reports, 
who was either the seller of, or one of the group selling, the shelter. 
While both sides have likeability problems, I believe the plaintiff shelter 
investor comes off a little better than the tax advisor. Here, once the 
plaintiff concedes she or he is wealthy and was trying to avoid paying taxes, 
the argument presented is that they were trying to avoid paying taxes in a 
legally permissible and lawful manner. As such they did everything 
appropriately.  They consulted with a tax professional who appeared to be 
respected and knowledgeable. They did exactly what the tax professional 
advised, and they proceeded only because they were advised they could 
legally do so. What else is a layman supposed to do when dealing with a 
very intricate and labyrinthine statute such as the tax law? 
III. OTHER TAX MALPRACTICE DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Preliminary 
1. Scope of Engagement 
The basic relationship between a client and an attorney, accountant or 
other professional is defined by the scope of engagement. Why was the 
attorney or other professional hired? Accordingly, before issues of 
malpractice may be addressed, it is necessary to ascertain the scope of the 
engagement. Ideally, the nature of the representation should be specified in 
writing and in enough detail so that there is no room for any 
misunderstanding between the parties. 180 E. 88th St. Apt. Corp. v. Law 
Office of Robert Jay Gumenick, P.C. illustrates the benefit of doing it 
right.
424
 In this case the plaintiff was a housing cooperative corporation and 
the defendant was the law firm retained to draft the contract of sale for the 
plaintiff’s building.425 This litigation involved the claim by the plaintiff that 
the defendant “failed to structure the contract of sale with tax implications 
considered, or to have at least advised them to look into the tax issues 
 
424
923 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
425
Id. at 475. 
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underlying the sale.”426 Because the underlying retainer agreement provided 
that the defendant would not provide tax advice in connection with the 
transaction but would be available to discuss such issue with plaintiff’s tax 
advisor or accountant, the First Department had no problem affirming the 
lower court’s dismissal of the complaint on a motion for summary 
judgment.
427
 The defendant attorney therefore was able to expeditiously end 
the litigation. 
The danger of not having a written agreement specifying the scope of 
engagement is illustrated by Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern.
428
 Wo Yee 
also involves a suit between the seller of a building and the seller’s attorney 
concerning a missed tax opportunity upon the sale of the building.
429
 Here, 
the defendant attorney testified that at the inception of the representation 
and on a number of subsequent occasions he informed the plaintiff’s officer 
that he had no expertise or experience with structuring a section 1031 like-
kind exchange and that the responsibility for doing so would remain with 
the officer.
430
 The defendant further testified that the officer stated that he 
would take care of the section 1031 part of the transaction and that he had 
done these in the past.
431
 This agreement, however, was never reflected in 
writing.
432
 The plaintiff’s officer testified to the contrary—that the 
defendant had agreed to take care of the section 1031 exchange 
requirements and that the officer was unfamiliar with how a section 1031 
exchange worked.
433
 The stakes were quite high, since $5.1 million of 
additional taxes were alleged to have been incurred due to the unavailability 
of a section 1031 exchange.
434
 
Here, unlike in 180 E. 88th St.,
435
 there was no written retainer 
agreement or other written evidence to establish who had agreed to be 
 
426
Id. The precise nature of the tax benefit lost is not clearly specified. The court later refers 
to an argument by plaintiff that defendant caused it to suffer “a capital gains tax loss.” Id. at 475-
76. Perhaps the loss of capital gains tax rates is involved. 
427
Id. at 475–76. 
428
No. 115517/07, 2011 WL 892757 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
429
Id. at *1. 
430
Id. 
431
Id. 
432
Id. 
433
Id. at *2, *3. 
434
Id. *3. See infra part III. E.3. on page 2. 
435
180 E. 88th St. Apt. Corp. v. Law Office of Robert Jay Gumenick, P.C., 923 N.Y.S. 2d 
474 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); supra text accompanying note 424–427. 
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responsible for meeting the section 1031 exchange requirements.
436 
Even if 
the defendant attorney was correct and the plaintiff’s officer had agreed to 
be responsible, a relatively expeditious disposition of the suit by a motion to 
dismiss was unavailable.
437
 The defendant attorney, however, was 
successful in obtaining summary judgment dismissing the case, but because 
of a substantive defect in the plaintiff’s cause of action—the plaintiff failed 
to prove that the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
damages.
438
 
In Wo Yee, at the closing of the sale of the old property, the plaintiff 
actually received the sales proceeds, making section 1031 treatment 
unavailable.
439
 The court, however, held the plaintiff never offered any 
satisfactory proof that it met all of the other requirements for a section 1031 
exchange.
440
 The type of section 1031 exchange possibly applicable in Wo 
Yee required evidence establishing that the plaintiff could have identified 
the replacement property within 45 days of the sale of the old property and 
would have actually received it within 180 days of the closing of the sale of 
the old property.
441
 Accordingly, the court held that even if, arguendo, the 
defendant attorney was negligent in allowing the plaintiff to obtain the sales 
proceeds for the old property, there was no proximate causation of damages 
to the plaintiff, since the other requirements for section 1031 treatment were 
not present.
442
 The plaintiffs never proved that but for the defendant’s 
malpractice, section 1031 treatment would have been available.
443
 
In Ambase Corp. v. Davis Polk & Wardwell, the plaintiff corporation 
became an independent entity in 1985 upon the liquidation of its parent 
company.
444
 As part of the liquidation, the plaintiff agreed to assume 
primary liability for its parent’s federal income taxes and secondary liability 
for certain other liabilities of its parent.
445
 Shortly thereafter, the IRS 
determined that the parent failed to withhold taxes on the payment of 
 
 
436
See 2011 WL 892757, at *1. 
 
437
See generally id.  
 
438
Id. at *4–5. 
439
Id. at *2. 
440
Id. at *5. 
441
Id. at *4. 
442
Id. at *3, *5. 
443
Id. at *5. 
444
866 N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (N.Y. 2007). 
445
Id. 
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interest to a related foreign entity from 1979 through 1985.
446
 Attempts to 
settle the matter failed, and in 1992 the defendant law firm was retained to 
settle the tax matter.
447
 In May, 1995 the IRS issued a notice of deficiency 
for almost $21 million for the withholding taxes alleged to be due.
448
 
Defendant, Davis Polk, then successfully litigated the matter in tax court 
and won a complete victory in 2001.
449
 Following the victory, the plaintiff 
refused to pay the outstanding legal fees of over $1.4 million.
450
 Plaintiff 
then commenced this action against Davis Polk for legal malpractice, 
alleging that Davis Polk failed to advise the plaintiff that it was only 
secondarily liable for the payment of the withholding taxes.
451
 The plaintiff 
also requested a declaration that it did not owe the legal fees.
452
 The 
damages claimed, apart from the legal fees, are very interesting and 
novel.
453
 Plaintiff claimed that but for Davis Polk’s negligence, it would not 
have had to maintain a large loss reserve on its books, which created the 
appearance that it had a negative net worth, which in turn caused it to lose 
business opportunities.
454
 
The trial court granted Davis Polk’s motion to dismiss the complaint 
and awarded it a money judgment for the unpaid legal fees.
455
 The 
Appellate Division affirmed.
456
 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial 
court’s decision primarily because the retainer agreement provided that 
Davis Polk was retained to litigate the amount of tax liability.
457
 It was 
never required to address the issue of whether the plaintiff was primarily or 
secondarily liable.
458
 The court also noted some factual problems with the 
plaintiff’s cause of action, such as that the plaintiff had privately and 
 
446
Id. Under I.R.C. § 881(a)(1), a withholding tax of thirty percent is imposed on the payment 
of interest to a foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 881(a)(1) (2012). 
447
Ambase Corp., 866 N.E.2d at 1035. 
448
Id. 
449
Id. 
450
Id. 
451
Id. 
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Id. 
453
See id. at 1036. 
454
Id. 
455
Id. at 1035–36. A secondary issue was also involved as to whether the monetary award of 
legal fees to the defendant was proper since it never explicitly demanded, nor counterclaimed for 
this amount. Id. at 1034–35. This award was also upheld by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1038. 
456
Id. at 1036. 
457
Id. at 1037–38. 
458
Id. at 1037. 
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publicly acknowledged that it was responsible for the subject taxes 
approximately seven years before Davis Polk was retained.
459
 Also, the 
plaintiff and its accountants had decided to maintain the loss reserve on its 
books despite the fact that Davis Polk advised them, soon after it was 
initially retained, that in its attorneys’ opinion the plaintiff had a very strong 
case and was probably not liable for the taxes.
460
 
An interesting aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion is that it went out 
of its way to reaffirm New York’s judgmental immunity rule.461 Although 
not necessary for its holding, the court noted that the retainer agreement 
between the parties was never construed by any court or arbitrator as to the 
issue of whether the plaintiff undertook primary liability for the 
withholding taxes involved in this litigation.
462
 The court then quoted its 
earlier observation that “‘[a] legal malpractice action is unlikely to succeed 
when the attorney erred because an issue of law was unsettled or 
debatable.’”463 
Cohen v. Weitzner is somewhat similar to Ambase, since here too the 
defendant attorney was hired for one task but liability for another issue was 
sought to be imposed.
464
 It also illustrates the need to avoid mundane, non-
legal errors.
465
 In Cohen, the plaintiffs had filed their 1997 through 2002 
income tax returns in 2003.
466
 The IRS accepted the tax liability as reported 
on the returns but also assessed penalties for late filing and late payment 
and interest.
467
 The defendant attorney was retained to seek an abatement of 
the penalties due to the plaintiff husband’s medical condition.468 The 
defendant was successful, reaching an agreement with the IRS to abate all 
penalties for 1997 and 1998 and for plaintiffs to have one year to pay the 
remaining amounts due.
469
 The problem asserted by the plaintiff was that 
there was a typographical error on one of the spreadsheets prepared by the 
 
459
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460
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Id. (quoting Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 739 N.E.2d 744, 748 (N.Y. 2000)). 
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850 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
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See id. 
466
Id. 
467
Id. 
468
Id. 
469
Id. 
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defendant that understated their tax for 2000 and that they were damaged in 
this amount.
470
 
The claim asserted seems frivolous since the basic tax liability was 
never an issue in the representation, and the plaintiffs failed to allege how 
they were damaged.
471
 The First Department affirmed the trial court’s 
dismissal of the complaint.
472
 
In Offshore Express, Inc. v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP, 
the defendant attorneys had represented the owner of the plaintiff in a 1998 
reorganization transaction in which an existing corporation was split into 
two corporations, one of which was the plaintiff.
473
 As part of that 
transaction a tax-sharing agreement was also signed.
474
 Subsequently, 
disputes arose over the allocation of the old corporation’s income taxes for 
1997 and 1998.
475
 These disputes ended in arbitrations in which the 
defendant represented the plaintiff.
476
 The plaintiff lost the arbitrations and 
subsequently brought this action one day short of the three-year limitations 
period.
477
 
In this litigation the defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss 
the malpractice claims arising from the reorganization transaction as barred 
by the statute of limitations.
478
 While the parties had executed an 
engagement letter for the reorganization representation, no agreement was 
signed concerning representation at the arbitrations.
479
 The issue before the 
court was whether the reorganization and the arbitrations were one 
continuous matter or two distinct matters for statute of limitations 
purposes.
480
 The court held they were two matters and that the statute of 
limitations had expired vis-à-vis the reorganization transaction.
481
 While 
ultimately successful, the existence of a separate engagement letter for the 
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arbitrations likely would have been helpful in disposing of the claim more 
expeditiously.
482
 
In re Mirabilis Ventures, Inc. v. Saxon, Gilmore, Carraway, Gibbons, 
Lash & Wilcox, P.A. is really an unusual case to be included in this section 
of the article, but its ultimate resolution really comes down to a scope of 
engagement analysis.
483
 In Mirabilis, the person who controlled the 
plaintiff, Frank Amodeo, used the plaintiff and “a web of subsidiaries and 
related companies as vehicles for an enormous tax fraud and money 
laundering scheme.”484 Essentially, companies were established to provide 
human resources services to various clients.
485
 These companies would 
calculate the payroll taxes owed by the clients and collect the amounts from 
them.
486
 However, these taxes were never paid to the IRS, but were diverted 
to Amodeo’s and his co-conspirators’ personal uses.487 Amodeo eventually 
pled guilty to a number of felonies and was sentenced to over twenty-two 
years in jail and ordered to pay restitution of over $181 million.
488
 Plaintiff 
was also under criminal indictment and had agreed to plead nolo 
contendere.
489
 This suit was instituted against the defendant attorney and his 
law firm seeking damages for various negligence and related claims.
490
 The 
court characterized all of plaintiff’s claims as boiling down to an allegation 
that the defendant attorney “either advised the people running Mirabilis that 
diverting payroll tax funds to other uses was acceptable, or at least learned 
of the plans to do so and failed to warn anyone.”491 The only problem was 
that the defendant attorney was employed by an affiliate of Mirabilis in a 
capacity not involving legal advice regarding tax matters.
492
 The defendant 
testified that the first time he heard about plans to divert payroll taxes was 
when he was sued in this case.
493
 Not having any evidence connecting the 
defendant with the fraud, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
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judgment.
494
 Again, establishing the defendant attorney’s scope of 
engagement was key to vindicating him—and doing so by summary 
judgment.
495
 
A variation of the scope of engagement issue arises in connection with 
tax return preparation. As such it will normally pertain to accountants, but 
can also affect other professionals. The issue can be placed in focus by the 
question, “whose tax return is it?” If the taxpayer gives the return preparer 
an amount of charitable contributions, medical expenses, or some other 
deduction, then who is responsible for the accuracy of this number? The 
simple answer is the taxpayer. Freeman v. Usoroh hit the nail on the head: 
By signing her tax return, plaintiff acknowledged the 
veracity of its contents and became responsible for 
providing proof of the items deducted upon request of the 
IRS. Even had defendant tax preparer been negligent in his 
advice to plaintiff, he cannot be held responsible for 
plaintiff’s inability to provide proof of her entitlement to 
the refund . . . .
496
 
In Freeman, the court reversed damages awarded the plaintiff in a small 
claims proceeding on the reasoning stated above.
497
 It is the taxpayer’s 
return, and the preparer is not responsible for the taxpayer’s inability to 
prove amounts claimed on the return.
498
 
Although not involving allegations of negligence or malpractice, the 
underlying situation in Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc. is a most informative 
counterpoint to the simple principle presented in Freeman that it is the 
taxpayer’s tax return.499 In Wooley, the plaintiff taxpayer alleged that the 
Jackson Hewitt franchise office that prepared his tax return simply made up 
false charitable and other deductions on his tax return that he did not 
authorize.
500
 Relying on defendant’s purported competency and accuracy, 
the plaintiff simply signed and filed the return.
501
 These deductions were 
disallowed upon audit and additional taxes, penalties, and interest were 
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incurred.
502
 The dispute between the plaintiff and Jackson Hewitt arose 
when Jackson Hewitt refused to honor either its basic guarantee that it 
would pay any penalty or interest incurred as a result of any error by 
Jackson Hewitt or its Gold Guarantee, for which the plaintiff paid extra, 
that Jackson Hewitt would pay additional taxes up to $5,000 if caused by 
their error.
503
 Since the same scenario occurred to two of plaintiff’s postal 
co-workers, this suit was brought as a class action.
504
 
Ultimately Wooley became a simple breach of contract case as to 
whether Jackson Hewitt was justified in not fulfilling its basic guarantee.
505
 
One of Jackson Hewitt’s arguments was that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
reimbursement under its basic warranty because if the plaintiff would have 
properly reviewed his income tax return he would have discovered the 
unauthorized deductions.
506
 In response, the court noted that although a 
taxpayer is legally responsible for his return and cannot escape liability by 
blaming the return preparer, this does not prevent the taxpayer from 
asserting a breach of contract claim against the preparer for an erroneous or 
inaccurate return.
507
 
In Daunno v. Crincoli, the plaintiff’s husband failed to file federal and 
New Jersey income tax returns for the couple from 1991 through 1996.
508
 
After receiving summonses from the IRS and New Jersey in 1997, the 
defendant CPA was retained by the plaintiff’s husband to file the delinquent 
returns.
509
 Consistent with their practice that plaintiff’s husband handled all 
of the couple’s tax and financial matters, only he met and spoke with the 
defendant.
510
 The husband gave the defendant all necessary financial 
information to complete the tax returns.
511
 Also, the husband informed the 
defendant that the marital house was jointly owned, though it was actually 
owned solely by the plaintiff.
512
 Based on the data supplied, the defendant 
determined that the husband would save about $55,000 if he and the 
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plaintiff filed jointly rather than separately.
513
 The plaintiff had little or no 
income during this time period, and, if filing separately, would have had to 
file only for 1995 with income of less than $10,000.
514
 
When asked by the defendant about how he would pay the delinquent 
taxes of approximately $270,000, the plaintiff’s husband responded that he 
was to obtain a large inheritance soon, that he expected to imminently settle 
several large cases in his law practice, and that the marital home could be 
refinanced.
515
 Pursuant to instructions from the plaintiff’s husband, the 
defendant prepared joint returns, which were duly signed by the plaintiff 
and her husband and filed.
516
 Despite the receipt of the inheritance and the 
sale of plaintiff’s husband’s successful law practice, the taxes were never 
paid.
517
 
In 2001 when the plaintiff’s husband became ill, the plaintiff first 
learned of her tax problems when she tried to sell the marital home and 
learned that there was about $900,000 in tax liens on the house.
518
 The 
plaintiff subsequently filed in bankruptcy and retained only a small portion 
of the home’s equity.519 She also incurred about $57,000 in legal fees.520 
The plaintiff then instituted this malpractice action against the defendant 
accountant and his accounting firm, asserting that he had a duty to inform 
her of the personal liability she was undertaking for all taxes, interest, and 
penalties by filing jointly instead of separately.
521
 The plaintiff apparently 
also alleged that the defendant should have ascertained that the marital 
home was owned solely by her.
522
 
After trial, the court held that, as a tax return preparer, the defendant had 
no duty to speak with both spouses to independently verify information 
provided him, or to inform the plaintiff about the additional liability she 
was exposing herself to by filing jointly rather than separately.
523
 In short, 
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the court held that these matters were beyond the scope of engagement to 
prepare tax returns.
524
 
The court also held that even if the defendant did have a duty to inform 
plaintiff of the risks of filing jointly, his breach still was not actionable 
since there was no evidence of proximate causation.
525
 The plaintiff never 
introduced any evidence to indicate that if she had received the warning not 
to file jointly she would have changed her longstanding practice of filing 
joint returns and following her husband’s instructions on financial 
matters.
526
 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and granted 
judgment to the defendant on his counterclaim for his fees.
527
 The New 
Jersey Appellate Division affirmed.
528
 
In Miller v. Volk, at trial the plaintiff recovered from the defendant 
accountant an amount equal to additional taxes and interest assessed by the 
IRS against his personal service corporation (“PSC”) for 1996.529 The 
defendant was a CPA who was engaged to prepare the plaintiff’s personal 
income tax return for 1995 and the PSC’s 1996 income tax return.530 The 
error at issue was that the accountant deducted the full amount of salary the 
PSC paid the plaintiff in 1996, notwithstanding a limit contained in the 
Internal Revenue Code on such deductions when a PSC has a fiscal tax year 
obtained under I.R.C. section 444.
531
 On appeal the trial court’s decision in 
favor of the plaintiff was reversed.
532
 The primary reason for the reversal 
was that the alleged negligence was never proven, since the plaintiff never 
established that the PSC was subject to the salary deduction limitation.
533
 
Also, the defendant had never given the plaintiff any tax planning advice, 
nor did he ever assume any responsibility for the PSC’s payroll.534 He had 
only agreed to prepare the tax return based on the facts as they existed for 
1996.
535
 In addition, the court held that there were no actionable damages 
since penalties were not imposed by the IRS, there was no proof that the 
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interest paid the IRS on the deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiff of 
having use of the money, and the tax assessed by the IRS was simply what 
the taxpayer owed and nothing in excess of that amount.
536
 
With respect to the court’s analysis of damages, it is noteworthy that the 
court seems to have followed the more modern, intermediate view 
concerning the recovery of interest, but without expressly focusing on the 
current three-way split on this issue.
537
 
One aspect of the lower court’s decision concerning damages is also 
noteworthy. While the lower court permitted the recovery of the additional 
tax assessed by the IRS, and presumably paid, it denied any recovery for a 
corresponding state tax deficiency that had not yet been asserted by the 
state.
538
 
In Parsons & Whittemore Corp. v. Schwartz, one of the many issues in 
contention between the parties was whether the defendant, who originally 
was the plaintiff corporation’s tax counsel and subsequently became its 
president and chief operating officer, had agreed to file personal tax returns 
for certain members of the family controlling the plaintiff.
539
 The court 
denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on this issue, since further 
evidence was necessary.
540
 
2. Conflict of Interest 
In Price v. Ragland, the transactions facially at issue were a redemption 
of stock and representation in an estate/gift tax dispute.
541
 However, the 
underlying legal issues really concerned the conflicts of interest by the 
defendant attorney.
542
 TBC was a corporation that had 5,000 shares of stock 
outstanding at the beginning of the relevant time period.
543
 The shares were 
owned by Tully Turner (3,300), his son Buddy (612), and a trust for Tully’s 
other three children (1,088).
544
 Tully was the trustee of the Children’s 
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Trust.
545
 The attorney for TBC was the defendant, Price, a friend of the 
Turner family.
546
 
In 1983 Tully suffered a brain aneurism.
547
 Immediately before surgery 
he signed a power of attorney giving his son, Buddy, authority to handle his 
business and personal affairs.
548
 Following surgery, Tully suffered two 
massive strokes and became severely incapacitated and unable to work or 
handle any of his personal affairs.
549
 In 1986, Buddy, who had become the 
president of TBC, consulted defendant Price and TBC’s accountant about a 
tax efficient way to generate the income needed to pay for Tully’s medical 
care.
550
 Based on the advice, it was decided that TBC would redeem a large 
percentage of its outstanding stock.
551
 TBC ended up purchasing the shares 
owned by Tully and the Children’s Trust, leaving Buddy as the sole 
shareholder.
552
 Since TBC was not publicly traded, a large accounting firm 
was retained to value the shares for the redemption.
553
 Based on a draft 
report valuing each share at $496, the redemption occurred in 1986 using a 
value of $500 per share.
554
 In the redemption transactions Buddy, as 
president of TBC, acted on behalf of TBC, and he also acted on behalf of 
Tully as his attorney-in-fact.
555
 Although never appointed as a successor 
trustee for the Children’s Trust, he effected the transaction on behalf of the 
Children’s Trust in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for Tully, who was the 
named trustee of the trust.
556
 In these transactions Price was the only 
attorney involved and he represented TBC and Tully.
557
 There was disputed 
evidence at trial as to whether he also represented the trust.
558
 
Tully died testate in 1991.
559
 The beneficiaries of his will were a marital 
trust for his wife and a trust for Tully’s four children (Buddy and his three 
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siblings).
560
 Defendant Price represented the estate in connection with 
probate of the estate.
561
 
In 1994, in connection with the estate’s tax return, the IRS contested the 
$500 per share value used for the 1986 stock redemptions.
562
 The IRS 
preliminarily decided the shares were then worth $1,422.
563
 As a result, 
when Tully sold his shares for an understated price, the IRS asserted he was 
making a gift of approximately $3 million, thereby resulting in additional 
gift tax liability of over $1 million.
564
 Price represented the estate in its 
dispute with the IRS from its inception until the spring of 1996, which was 
shortly before the dispute was settled in September 1996.
565
 Although Price 
did associate with another attorney experienced in handling similar disputes 
with the IRS, he often communicated with the entire Turner family 
concerning the IRS dispute.
566
 He advised the executors of Tully’s estate, 
Buddy as president of TBC, and Buddy as trustee of the Children’s Trust 
about the dispute, about their fiduciary obligations and about possible 
courses of action if the IRS’s valuation should ultimately prevail.567 He 
advised the executors whether there might be a cause of action by the estate 
and the beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust against Buddy in connection 
with the redemption.
568
 He also advised Buddy and TBC about the 
consequences to them if the IRS’s valuation prevailed.569 During the entire 
time that Price was communicating with and representing multiple parties 
with conflicting interests, he never disclosed the conflict nor attempted to 
obtain waivers from any of the parties.
570
 
The dispute with the IRS was settled in September 1996 on the basis 
that the shares were worth $665 per share.
571
 In November 1996, the 
executors and beneficiaries of Tully’s estate and the trustee and 
beneficiaries of the Children’s Trust sued Buddy, TBC, the accountant, and 
defendant Price in connection with the redemption, asserting a number of 
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causes of action, ultimately seeking rescission and reimbursement for all 
distributions made with respect to the shares between 1986 and 1996.
572
 
They also asserted claims against Price for fraud and negligence in 
connection with the conflict of interests from 1986 to 1996 in the 
redemption and the subsequent representations through settlement of the 
IRS dispute.
573
 Subsequently, the plaintiffs settled with Buddy and TBC but 
retained the right to proceed against Price.
574
 At trial against only Price, the 
plaintiffs received a judgment of $400,000 in compensatory damages and 
$700,000 in punitive damages.
575
 The punitive damages later were remitted 
as excessive due to Price’s dire financial condition.576 
On appeal, the compensatory damages awarded were reversed.
577
 
Initially, though the court held the statute of limitations did not bar this 
action, it held that damages relating to the 1986 stock redemption were not 
recoverable since that wrong occurred outside the open statute of limitations 
period.
578
 The damages allegedly resulting from defendant Price’s conflict 
of interest on the IRS dispute representation consisted of an assertion that, 
instead of contesting the IRS’s value of the shares in 1986, the parties could 
have sought rescission of the redemption transactions, thereby resolving the 
matter differently, and presumably, more favorably.
579
 The court found, 
however, that the plaintiffs had not proven they would have pursued the 
alternative strategy.
580
 To rescind would have required paying back all 
amounts received from the redemption, and there was no evidence the 
parties had the wherewithal to do this.
581
 Also, the amount of estate tax and 
other savings if the alternative courses were pursued were not established 
by the plaintiffs.
582
 Accordingly, the court held these asserted damages were 
speculative and not recoverable.
583
 
Although not involving a scope of engagement issue, Graham v. Welch, 
Roberts and Amburn, LLP illustrates a miscommunication between a 
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taxpayer and his accountant that could have easily have been avoided.
584
 In 
Graham, the plaintiff received a notice that he owed $4,296.49 of taxes to 
New York State.
585
 He issued a check for this amount and sent it to the 
defendant accountant, intending for the accountant to pay the tax bill.
586
 
There was evidence that the defendant accountant in the past had paid 
certain expenses for the plaintiff.
587
 The accountant applied the check 
toward his fees.
588
 Subsequently, the plaintiff’s bank account was levied 
upon by New York State for the unpaid taxes.
589
 The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant 
accountant on statute of limitations grounds.
590
 The court agreed that the 
plaintiff should have realized the error when he received a bill from his 
accountant with a credit in the precise amount of his payment.
591
 
B. Tax Filing and Tax Preparation 
1. Late Filing and Non-Filing 
To file a client’s tax return late, or not to file it at all, seems to be one of 
the most obvious types of professional negligence one could imagine in the 
tax area. A prominent commentator noted that “[t]he vast majority of 
malpractice cases arising in the return preparation context involve the 
practitioner’s failure to file the client’s tax return on a timely basis.”592 It is 
therefore a bit puzzling that in 2007 a lower court in New York needed to 
look to cases in other states as authority for this type of cause of action.
593
 
In Blumberg v. Altman, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant accountant 
filed his federal, New York State, and New York City income tax returns 
late for 2004 and 2005 and that the defendant failed to obtain an extension 
for filing in 2005.
594
 As a result, the plaintiff incurred penalties, interest and 
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late fees, which he was seeking to recover in this action.
595
 Although 
upholding the cause of action, the court stated: 
Although New York courts are familiar with accounting 
malpractice based on late filings, it appears that they have 
not had occasion to reach the issue of whether an 
accountant’s failure to file returns on time and file the 
appropriate extensions states a valid cause of action for 
accounting malpractice. However, courts in other 
jurisdictions have expressly recognized these allegations as 
a valid cause of action.
596
 
In upholding the pro se plaintiff’s malpractice cause of action from the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court did note that in New York interest 
paid the IRS is not recoverable as damages because it is viewed simply as 
an appropriate charge for the use of money the plaintiff had during a period 
of time he was not entitled to it.
597
 The court, rather perceptively, added that 
penalties incurred by a plaintiff are different and are recoverable.
598
 
Bryant v. Golden also involved a suit by a taxpayer against his 
accountant for the interest and penalties incurred when the accountant failed 
to file his 2000 federal income tax return.
599
 The case, however, dealt solely 
with statute of limitations issues and affirmed the lower court’s holding that 
the suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
600
 
Pair v. Queen revolved around the late filing of federal and District of 
Columbia estate tax returns.
601
 Penalties and interest of more than $1 
million were incurred as a result and were sought to be recovered by the 
plaintiffs from the defendants.
602
 The primary defendant, Queen, was an 
attorney who was both a co-representative of the estate and the estate’s 
attorney with respect to preparing and filing its tax returns.
603
 The other 
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defendants were an attorney and accountant who allegedly assisted Queen 
in preparing the estate’s tax returns.604 The plaintiffs were beneficiaries 
under the decedent’s will and also co-representatives of the estate.605 This 
case, however, did not address the substance of the malpractice issue.
606
 It 
focused solely on reversing the lower court’s incorrect dismissal of the 
malpractice claims on non-substantive grounds.
607
 The lower court had also 
ignored the fact that the plaintiffs were also heirs under the will, not merely 
co-personal representatives with defendant Queen.
608
 In addition, the lower 
court also misconstrued United States v. Boyle as preventing this 
malpractice action.
609
 
Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP involves the alleged failure 
to file a refund claim for overpaid federal estate taxes.
610
 Hillbroom 
involves the sizeable estate of one of the co-founders of DHL, the 
international express delivery business.
611
 As part of the settlement of 
litigation involving the heirs and beneficiaries of the estate, the defendant 
accounting firm and one of its tax attorney employees, Gregory Jenner, 
were retained to represent the estate to pursue estate tax refund claims.
612
 
Allegedly, when the previous tax counsel met with Jenner they informed 
him of the need to pursue a refund claim because additional administrative 
expenses and other deductible amounts were incurred after the tax return 
was filed.
613
 Jenner apparently acknowledged the need to file the refund 
claim for these amounts but did not want to do so until a previous refund 
claim that was then pending was received.
614
 Ultimately, the second refund 
claim was not timely filed and this suit for over $6 million was brought.
615
 
The lower court dismissed the suit on statute of limitations grounds, and the 
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court of appeals reversed and remanded for further fact finding concerning 
several statute of limitations issues.
616
 
Goodman v. Hanson involves interesting procedural issues arising from 
several tax malpractice disputes.
617
 In Goodman, the defendant was the 
attorney for an estate of which the plaintiff was the executor and the 
principal beneficiary, as well as the trustee of a related trust.
618
 In 2005, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for the damages resulting from the failure to 
timely file an Illinois estate and generation skipping tax return.
619
 This suit 
was settled in December 2005 with the defendant paying the plaintiff 
$35,000 and releasing any claims for unpaid legal fees.
620
 The parties 
signed a general release that was approved by the probate court.
621
 In 
January 2007, the plaintiff filed a second suit against the defendant arising 
out of the same facts, but this time alleging malpractice based on the 
defendant’s failure to take certain deductions on the federal estate tax 
return.
622
 It seems that most of the deductions were taken on the trust’s 
income tax return rather than on the estate tax return even though the 
estate’s marginal tax rate was higher than the trust’s.623 The issue before the 
Illinois intermediate appellate court was whether the second suit was barred 
by either the general release or res judicata.
624
 The court held the general 
release barred the second suit.
625
 
Several other cases arising from late filing or non-filing should be noted. 
Ballreich Bros. v. Criblez involved errors on a payroll tax return and the 
untimely filing of an amended payroll tax return.
626
 In Ballreich, the 
taxpayer sued the accountant and his firm, seeking damages for 
malpractice.
627
 The case revolved around the accountant’s third-party 
complaint against the attorney who had provided the incorrect advice that 
caused the problem.
628
 The court held that the trial court should not have 
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dismissed the third party complaint with prejudice because it was 
inadequately pled, since the cause of action could have been revised to cure 
the pleading defect.
629
 The problem with the pleading was that it simply 
claimed the advice given by the attorney was incorrect.
630
 There was no 
allegation that the advice was negligent, that it fell below applicable 
standards or that the attorney breached any duty owed the client.
631
 
In Murphey v. Grass, the plaintiff had retained the defendant accounting 
firm to manage all bookkeeping and accounting services for his two 
businesses and to prepare all payroll and other tax returns.
632
 The 
defendant’s accountant was negligent in performing the work.633 It turned 
out the IRS had filed liens and that the plaintiff owed approximately 
$100,000 in employment taxes and interest.
634
 Subsequently, the State of 
Washington determined that over $185,000 was owed for additional 
retailing, sales and use taxes plus interest and penalties.
635
 Only the 
additional state amounts were the subject of this litigation.
636
 The 
Washington Court of Appeals held that for statute of limitations purposes 
the liability for these amounts accrued under Washington law only after all 
administrative appeals were finally concluded and that this action was 
timely.
637
 
At the heart of the dispute in A. Morrison Trucking, Inc. v. Bonfiglio 
was the fact that the plaintiff incurred almost $79,000 in penalties and 
interest for approximately three years, beginning March 31, 1999, because 
his accountant failed to make payroll tax deposits, file tax returns or 
respond to IRS tax due notices in a timely fashion.
638
 The defendant, 
Bonfiglio, owned the tax service that was to provide these various 
accounting services to the plaintiff.
639
 The person who actually performed 
the services was Allan Keizer.
640
 Keizer initially was an employee of 
 
629
Id. at *3. 
630
Id. 
631
Id. 
632
267 P.3d 376, 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
633
Id. at 378. 
634
Id. at 377. 
635
Id. at 377–78. 
636
See id. at 378 n.10. 
637
Id. at 381–82. 
638
No. 25917/05, slip op. at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006). 
639
Id. 
640
Id. 
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defendant’s accounting service.641 At some point during the relevant time 
period Keizer formed his own company and continued to perform the 
accounting services for the plaintiff.
642
 It is unclear when the transition 
occurred and, therefore, who was responsible for what damages.
643
 These 
causes of action were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
644
 
Morgan v. Fennimore involved a suit for damages by a taxpayer against 
his CPA tax return preparer for failing to file a state income tax return.
645
 
The defendant accountant annually prepared the plaintiff’s federal and 
Indiana income tax returns from 1990 until 2007.
646
 Prior to 1990, the 
plaintiff had won $25 million from the Ohio State Lottery.
647
 From 1990 
until 2003, the plaintiff was receiving annual payments from the lottery.
648
 
Although each year Ohio sent a Form W-2G for the lottery payments, the 
defendant CPA never prepared or filed an Ohio income tax return for the 
plaintiff.
649
 In 2008, a notice was received from Ohio demanding almost 
$1.8 million in tax liabilities, fees and interest.
650
 This suit ensued.
651
 The 
court never reached the substance, since it granted summary judgment to 
the defendant on statute of limitation grounds.
652
 
 
641
Id. 
642
Id. 
643
See id. 
644
Id. at *5. The causes of action were framed as breach of contract and negligence causes of 
action. Id. A fraud cause of action asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant, who was also an 
attorney, was permitted to proceed. Id. at *7–8. In mid-2002, the plaintiff learned that his tax 
situation was mishandled and demanded payment from Keizer and Bonfiglio. Id. at *3. He 
claimed that Bonfiglio assured him the fault was entirely Keizer’s and that Keizer possessed the 
means to repay the plaintiff. Id. Subsequently, Bonfiglio prepared a promissory note and affidavit 
of confession of judgment signed by Keizer in favor of the plaintiff and a release agreement that 
apparently also released any claims by the plaintiff against Bonfiglio. Id. The promissory note and 
the confession of judgment contained misspellings of Keizer’s name and were legally invalid. Id. 
at *4. The plaintiff alleged this was done intentionally by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff 
from successfully proceeding against the defendant because the defendant still owed Bonfiglio 
money for the accounts he had purchased from him. Id. at *6. In addition, Bonfiglio acted as 
attorney for the plaintiff in 2001 and his failure to advise the plaintiff that Bonfiglio might be 
responsible for the damages as Keizer’s employer may also have been improper. Id. at *3, *6. 
645
No. 1:09–cv–399–SEB–TAB, 2010 WL 5057418, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 3, 2010). 
646
Id. at *1. 
647
Id. 
648
Id. 
649
Id. 
650
Id. at *2. 
651
Id. 
652
Id. at *6. 
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Although not addressed in the case, another lapse by the defendant 
occurred which, perhaps, could be the basis for a malpractice suit.
653
 In 
early 2003, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he had moved to 
Washington state.
654
 Nevertheless, the defendant prepared a full-year 
Indiana tax return for the plaintiff.
655
 
Several cases involve an error by an accountant as to which state was 
the taxpayer’s state of residence.656 However, neither of the cases focused 
on the substance of the allegation.
657
 In Choina v. Albanese, the plaintiff 
was a New York resident who lived in New Jersey.
658
 For 2005 and 2006, 
the defendant accountant prepared New York state tax returns for her.
659
 
The plaintiff later learned she should have filed in New Jersey and owed 
approximately $225,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties.
660
 The statute of 
limitations had run on amending the New Jersey returns for amounts paid in 
New York.
661
 The claim was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
662
 
In Rakoff v. St. Clair, CPAs, P.C., the plaintiff allegedly advised the 
defendant CPA that during 2007 he owned residential properties in four 
states: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio.
663
 Instead of 
discussing the indicia of residency in each state, the defendant advised the 
plaintiff to file as a resident of Pennsylvania and a nonresident of New 
York, allegedly because that would result in the smallest tax liability.
664
 
New York subsequently instituted an audit.
665
 This suit was instituted for 
the initial advice, for errors made in connection with the New York audit, 
for failing to file amended Pennsylvania returns and for failing to advise the 
plaintiff of the statute of limitations for filing amended returns in 
 
653
See id. at *2. 
654
Id. 
655
Id. The court indicated that the defendant prepared Indiana state tax returns for the 
defendant from 1990 until 2007. Id. at *1. The court never focused on this discrepancy. 
656
See, e.g., Morgan, 2010 WL 5057418, at *2; Choina v. Albanese, No. 12–CV–3241, 2013 
WL 1316747, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013). 
657
See Morgan, 2010 WL 5057418, at *6; Choina, 2013 WL 1316747, at *2. 
658
Choina, 2013 WL 1316747, at *1. 
659
Id. 
660
See id. 
661
Id. 
662
Id. at *2. 
663
No. 12-5996, 2013 WL 1007330, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2013). 
664
Id. 
665
Id. The case does not indicate what resulted from the audit. 
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Pennsylvania.
666
 The case revolved primarily around statute of limitations 
issues.
667
 The court held the statute was open and denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.
668
 
2. Negligent Preparation 
This section focuses on errors involved in the return preparation 
process. Several cases simply assert that defective or erroneous returns were 
prepared without specifying the underlying facts in enough detail to enable 
any useful analysis.
669
 These cases, by and large, are ignored. Cases that 
result from the misapplication of a specific tax code provision, deduction or 
tax concept will be discussed subsequently.
670
 It is interesting to note that 
most of the cases in this section involve motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment and often involve claims that the statute of limitations has run. It 
is likely that a reasonably thorough review of the current state of the law 
concerning when the statute of limitations commences to run and when it is 
tolled can be gleaned just from these cases. As a preliminary matter, 
Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop held that a taxpayer who was criminally 
convicted of filing a false tax return and tax evasion was precluded from 
seeking damages from the accountant who prepared the return.
671
 Collateral 
estoppel bars the subsequent malpractice suit since the criminal conviction 
necessarily determines that the taxpayer acted intentionally or willfully.
672
 
The court also held that Texas public policy prohibits the taxpayer from 
recovering damages from his own illegal acts.
673
 
Weiss v. Deloitte & Touch, LLP, one of the cases that does not specify 
the underlying negligence with enough detail to enable analysis, is 
noteworthy because it also involves a cause of action against the accountant 
defendants for negligently reviewing tax returns prepared by the plaintiffs’ 
 
666
Id. at *1–2. 
667
See id. at *3. 
668
See id. at *4. 
669
See, e.g., Beane v. Dana S. Beane & Co., 7 A.3d 1284, 1287 (N.H. 2010); Hickey v. 
O’Connor & Drew, P.C., No. CIV–09–349–C, 2009 WL 2163499, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 
2009); Weiss v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 882 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 (App. Div. 2009); Lally v. 
Winkler & Co., No. 4478/11, 2010 WL 8356958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2010); Kennedy v. 
Goffstein, 815 N.E.2d 646, 647 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
670
Admittedly, the categorization process is very imprecise, and certain cases could just as 
logically be placed elsewhere. 
671
429 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). 
672
Id. at 648. 
673
Id. 
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prior accountants.
674
 The substance of this cause of action was not 
addressed since New York’s Appellate Division for the Second Department 
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this cause of action on statute of 
limitations grounds.
675
 
In Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger, the plaintiff sought to 
recover fees he paid to accountants in connection with audits of his 1994-
1996 tax returns on the theory that the audits of these years were caused by 
the defendant accountants “taking improper losses and deductions in his 
1994 tax return.”676 New York’s First Department had little trouble 
affirming the lower court’s dismissal of this cause of action because the 
court did not believe the asserted facts.
677
 Instead, the court found that the 
plaintiff likely was targeted for IRS tax scrutiny because of errors in, and 
the audit of, the 1994 tax return of an “S” corporation in which the plaintiff 
was a shareholder, which return was prepared by different accountants.
678
 
The court in Penner nevertheless proceeded to address the substance of 
the asserted cause of action.
679
 The court stated that the plaintiff’s 
expenditures in defending the audits were not recoverable, even if the 
alleged malpractice did cause the audits, where there was no evidence that 
the error caused a tax liability that otherwise would not have existed.
680
 
“Plaintiff is not entitled to the cost of trying to convince the tax authorities 
that he should not have to pay taxes he legitimately owed but would have 
avoided had the 1994 return been prepared in a way that did not red-flag the 
potential for abuse.”681 
The court here is answering in the negative the often-asked question 
whether any damages may be recovered when some tax malpractice triggers 
an audit that uncovers other, non-related, taxes to be due.
682
 The court 
emphatically answers that neither the other taxes nor the costs of defending 
the audit are recoverable.
683
 
 
674
882 N.Y.S.2d 229, 231 (App. Div. 2009). 
675
Id. at 231–32. 
676
844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007). Other portions of plaintiff’s asserted causes of 
action were also dismissed. See 755 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (App. Div. 2003). 
677
See Penner, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 230. 
678
Id. 
679
See id. 
680
Id. 
681
Id. 
682
See generally, Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 756–58. 
683
Penner, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 230. 
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In Penner, the First Department also held the plaintiff may not recover 
the fees he paid the defendants for preparation of the returns that were 
audited.
684
 The court found that the plaintiff received something of value in 
return for the fees—tax returns, whether or not correct, that were accepted 
by the IRS, though subject to adjustment.
685
 
Shaiman v. Carpet One of the Hamptons, Inc. stands in partial contrast 
to Penner.
686
 In Shaiman, the plaintiff was the defendant’s accountant for 
more than ten years until 2007.
687
 During this time, the plaintiff prepared 
the defendant’s income tax returns and New York State sales tax returns.688 
With respect to the sales tax returns, the plaintiff simply reported the 
amounts given him by the defendant’s bookkeeper without any independent 
verification.
689
 For the year 2000, the sales reported on the sales tax returns 
differed from the sales reported on the income tax returns by $1.3 
million.
690
 As a result, the defendant was subjected to a sales tax audit for 
March 1, 2000 to November 30, 2002.
691
 This initial audit was later 
followed by a compliance audit for December 1, 2002 through February 28, 
2006.
692
 As a result of the audits, the defendant ended up paying 
approximately $500,000 in additional sales taxes and $134,000 in 
interest.
693
 The plaintiff spent a total of over 150 hours working on both 
audits and brought this action to collect his fees of $15,000.
694
 The 
defendant counterclaimed for damages flowing from the plaintiff’s 
negligence in preparing the 2000 tax returns in failing to discover the $1.3 
million discrepancy between the sales figures reported on the federal 
income tax return and the sales tax return.
695
 
The damages sought by the defendant are very interesting.
696
 During 
closing argument, defendant’s counsel withdrew the defendant’s claim for 
 
684
Id. at 231. 
685
Id. 
686
See No. BRC 208–08, 2010 WL 2305549, at *5, *9 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Co. June 9, 2010). 
687
Id. at *1. 
688
Id. at *1, *3. 
689
Id. at *1. 
690
Id. at *3. 
691
Id. The auditor on the initial audit testified that the $1.3 million discrepancy probably 
caused the sales tax audit. 
692
Id. 
693
See id. at *3–4. 
694
Id. at *2. 
695
Id. at *5–6. 
696
See id. at *8. 
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the additional taxes since the defendant actually owed the taxes.
697
 This is 
consistent with Penner and with New York law that taxes owed are not 
recoverable from a negligent tax advisor.
698
 As to the interest on the 
underpayment of the sales taxes, the court followed established New York 
law that refuses to award interest in tax underpayment situations.
699
 
Although the defendant fired the plaintiff in the midst of the second 
compliance audit and hired a replacement accountant, the plaintiff never 
introduced any evidence concerning the cost of the replacement accountant, 
so the court dismissed this counterclaim.
700
 Therefore, the only damages 
asserted were the very same fees the plaintiff was seeking to recover in this 
suit.
701
 The court in Shaiman awarded the plaintiff his audit fees of $15,000 
and awarded this same amount as damages to the defendant for the 
plaintiff’s negligence in preparing and not detecting the conflicting sales 
numbers on the income and sales tax returns and then offset the amounts.
702
 
Awarding the defendant damages for the negligent return preparation is 
inconsistent with Penner, in which the court held the taxpayer was not 
entitled to recover either the cost of the negligent return preparation or the 
audit defense costs.
703
 Initially, Shaiman is consistent with Penner in 
awarding the plaintiff CPA compensation for his work on the two audits his 
negligence caused.
704
 But when Shaiman awarded the defendant client the 
same amount as damages flowing from the plaintiff’s negligence in 
submitting tax returns with inconsistent sales numbers, Shaiman seems 
inconsistent with Penner.
705
 In Shaiman, contrary to Penner, the audit fees 
were still unpaid.
706
 It may be that the judge in Shaiman ultimately did not 
want the plaintiff CPA, who was quite blameworthy, to obtain any net 
recovery from the litigation: “Plaintiff should not be compensated for work 
that it in essence created due to its negligence or could have been altogether 
avoided had Plaintiff discovered and communicated the discrepancy to 
 
697
Id. 
698
See 844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007); NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 
149. 
699
Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *8; See also NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 
149. 
700
Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *4, *8. 
701
Id. at *9. 
702
Id. at *5, *9. 
703
844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007). 
704
Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *5, *9. 
705
Id. at *9. 
706
See id. at *2. 
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Defendant.”707 It should be emphasized that Penner was decided by the 
First Department, one of New York’s four intermediate appellate courts, 
while Shaiman was decided in Suffolk County District Court, a lower court 
of very limited jurisdiction.
708
 
Several cases revolving about statute of limitations issues illustrate 
potential negligent return preparation scenarios. In SK Partners I, LP v. 
Metro Consultants, Inc., the plaintiffs’ cause of action asserted that the 
defendant accountants, who had prepared income tax returns for a group of 
related entities, caused the plaintiffs to overpay their taxes by claiming 
depreciation deductions that were too low.
709
 The accountants’ depreciation 
was calculated on an understated cost basis for the assets to be 
depreciated.
710
 At least part of the overpaid taxes were recovered when new 
accountants filed amended returns.
711
 The damages asserted by the plaintiffs 
included being required to file amended returns and suffering “‘a loss of the 
depreciation deductions, excess attorney’s fees and accountant fees,’ as well 
as ‘a loss of the interest and economic value of the money’ overpaid to the 
IRS.”712 
In Iacurci v. Sax, the defendant CPA and his firm had prepared the 
plaintiff’s tax returns from 1989 to 2006.713 For tax years 1999 through 
2002, the returns prepared by the defendants portrayed the plaintiff as a real 
estate investor.
714
 For tax years 2003 through 2005, without informing the 
plaintiff, the defendant changed this and portrayed the defendant as being 
“engaged in the business of real estate.”715 According to the plaintiff’s 
expert, this change caused the plaintiff to overpay his taxes by $177,000.
716
 
The precise makeup of the additional taxes and the amount recovered upon 
 
707
Id. at *9. 
708
See Penner 844 N.Y.S.2d at 229; Shaiman, 2010 WL 2305549, at *1. It was suggested that 
the plaintiff reduced the amount of fees he sought to recover so as to fall within the $15,000 limit 
of the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at *2 
709
944 N.E.2d 414, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
710
Id. at 415 n.1. 
711
Id. at 415, 417. 
712
Id. at 418. 
713
No. CV095028505S, 2011 WL 1470005, at *1, *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011), aff’d, 
57 A.3d 736 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
714
Id. at *1. 
715
Id. 
716
Id. at *3. 
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the filing of an amended return is not specified in the opinion.
717
 However, 
in both Iacurci and in SK Partners I, the causes of action were held to be 
barred by the statute of limitations, and the substance of the asserted claims 
was never reached.
718
 
In Sahadi v. Schaeffer, the case centered on when the California two-
year statute of limitations commenced to run for a case of negligent 
preparation of tax returns that were later audited by the IRS.
719
 Here, the 
taxpayer was more fortunate than the two previous taxpayers, as the 
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held the plaintiff’s 
suit was timely.
720
 The tax returns primarily at issue in Sahadi were their 
1991 California and federal income tax returns.
721
 The returns were 
prepared by the defendant accountant and filed on April 15, 1992.
722
  
Within one year, two amended returns were prepared by the defendants and 
filed by the plaintiffs.
723
 Eventually, the California tax authorities and the 
IRS audited the returns.
724
 Large tax deficiencies of over $35 million were 
asserted initially by both tax authorities.
725
 After more than five years of 
negotiation, the deficiencies were reversed by both the IRS and the 
California authorities.
726
 The primary negligence of the defendant involved 
failing to properly document positions taken on the 1991 tax returns.
727
 In 
January of 1991, the taxpayers transferred ownership in a real estate 
complex consisting of a high rise office building, shopping center and 
hotels to their lender by deed in lieu of foreclosure.
728
 The taxability of the 
transfer turned on the insolvency of taxpayers at that time, which was 
 
717
The filing of amended returns for tax years 2003–2005 is mentioned. Id. at *1. As to the 
nature of the damages, they presumably result from the difference in being able to utilize long 
term capital gains tax rates on investment income (typically reported on Schedule D to the federal 
income tax return) versus having to pay tax at regular tax rates on ordinary business income 
(typically reported on Schedule C to the federal income tax return). The plaintiff’s expert stated 
the errors discovered were caused by filing a Schedule C rather than a Schedule D. Id. at *3. 
718
Id. at *7; SK Partners I, 944 N.E.2d at 415. 
719
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 520–21 (Ct. App. 2007). 
720
Id. at 542–43. 
721
Id. at 521. 
722
Id. 
723
Id. 
724
Id. at 521–22. 
725
Id. at 522. 
726
See id. at 522–23. While the key transactions occurred in 1991, the asserted tax 
deficiencies were for 1990 through 1995. Id. at 522. 
727
Id. at 523. 
728
Id. at 521. 
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largely dependent on the value of this and their other property, as well as on 
the precise amount of their indebtedness.
729
 Apparently, the defendants did 
not have any of the necessary supporting documentation prepared.
730
 
Similarly, there was no documentation for a net operating loss deduction 
claimed on the tax return.
731
 
Sahadi also involved allegations that the defendant accountant was 
negligent in representing the plaintiffs on the audit.
732
 IRS audit reports 
issued in 1997 criticized the defendant “for failing to (1) provide 
information the IRS had requested, and (2) offer support for tax positions he 
had asserted during the audit process.”733 
The damages asserted by the plaintiffs included almost $2.3 million in 
out-of-pocket costs, which seem quite appropriate, but also included 
emotional distress and economic loss caused by the tax liens needlessly 
filed against them.
734
 The plaintiffs claimed that they lost $2 million when 
tax liens filed by the California tax authorities against their thoroughbred 
horse breeding farm caused them to lose it from a “fire-sale” through 
foreclosure.
735
 Whether this type of loss is recoverable as proximately 
caused by the negligent tax return preparation is most interesting. Alas, 
there is no published report of the subsequent disposition of this case, and 
this issue must await determination by another court. 
In SG Industries, Inc. v. RSM McGladrey, Inc., the plaintiff retained the 
defendant accounting firm for tax consulting services and to prepare its tax 
returns for 2007 and 2008.
736
 In September 2009, a different accounting 
firm reviewed these tax returns and identified a number of errors that were 
made both on the federal and state returns which caused the plaintiff to 
 
729
Id. Normally, when a taxpayer’s debt is discharged without full payment, the amount of 
the unpaid discharged debt is taxable gross income. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012). An exception 
exists if the taxpayer is insolvent when the discharge occurs. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
However, the exception is strictly limited and may not exceed the amount of the insolvency. 
I.R.C. § 108(a)(3) (2012). It is thus a certainty that establishing and proving the amount of a 
taxpayer’s insolvency will always be necessary whenever this exception to including discharged 
debt in income is claimed. 
730
See Sahadi, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 522. 
731
Id. at n.4. 
732
Id. at 523–24. 
733
Id. at 522. 
734
Id. at 524. 
735
Id. 
736
No. 10–cv–11119, 2011 WL 6090247, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2011). 
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overpay its taxes.
737
 The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action for 
malpractice, seeking to recover its losses.
738
 While a resolution of certain of 
the potential substantive issues raised would have been quite informative, it 
was not to be. The plaintiff’s suit was dismissed because the plaintiff never 
offered any expert testimony, nor even identified expert witnesses, to 
establish the standard of care, breach of the standard and causation, all of 
which were necessary elements to establish the cause of action.
739
 The 
plaintiff had hoped to establish its cause of action through defendant’s 
experts.
740
 After missing many deadlines to file an expert report, the 
plaintiff’s counsel unsuccessfully sought leave from the court to remedy 
this defect by filing a rebuttal expert report.
741
 When this proved 
unsuccessful, the plaintiff changed counsel and new counsel attempted to 
obtain leave to name an expert and provide an expert report.
742
 The court, 
however, would not grant leave.
743
 There was evidence that the parties 
“were engaged in a lengthy and extensive settlement dialogue” and the 
court viewed the plaintiff’s failure to comply as being deliberate, and an 
attempt to save expert fees.
744
 
Goodman v. Hanson, discussed previously,
745
 involved a claim that the 
defendant accountant negligently prepared an estate tax return when he 
failed to claim certain deductions on the estate tax return, and instead 
claimed the deductions on a related trust’s income tax return despite the fact 
that marginal tax rate for the estate tax return was higher.
746
 Taking the 
deductions on the estate tax return would have saved more taxes than 
claiming the deductions on the trust’s returns.747 This issue was not 
addressed by the court since it held the issue was precluded by a general 
release signed by the litigants in a related case.
748
 
 
737
See id. 
738
Id. at *2. 
739
Id. at *4, *9, *11. 
740
Id. at *5. 
741
Id. at *8. 
742
Id. 
743
Id. 
744
Id. at *9. 
745
See supra, text accompanying notes 617–625. 
746
 945 N.E. 2d 1255, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
747
See id. 
748
Id. at 1270. 
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Somewhat similar to Goodman is Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust.
749
 Here, 
the underlying tax negligence involved failing to amend a federal estate tax 
return to claim relatively nominal deductions that had been overlooked and 
also failing to keep the statute of limitations open to enable the filing of an 
amended return for additional administrative expenses being incurred in 
litigation related to which of decedent’s wills was governing.750 The case, 
however, deals solely with statute of limitations and certain other 
procedural issues.
751
 
In Allmen v. Fox Rothschild LLP, one of the allegations was that the 
defendant attorneys were negligent in preparing the decedent’s estate tax 
returns by treating certain bank and brokerage accounts of the decedent as 
being joint accounts rather than including the accounts as part of the 
estate.
752
 Excluding these funds from the estate, together with the operation 
of the tax allocation clauses of the will, which were also alleged to be 
negligently drafted, forced the estate to pay certain debts and expenses with 
funds that otherwise would have gone to a charitable lead trust, thereby 
reducing the estate’s charitable contribution deduction and increasing the 
estate’s tax liability.753 The court, however, did not focus on the substance 
of the claims but on statute of limitations issues.
754
 
In Hall v. Crittendon and Assocs. LTD, the plaintiff taxpayers seem to 
have retained a tax preparer that was shady and unscrupulous.
755
 Before 
2004, the plaintiffs’ tax returns were prepared by a CPA.756 To save on fees, 
the plaintiffs decided to have their 2003 tax return prepared at an office 
doing business as EZ E-File.
757
 When they met with the return preparer he 
told them their prior returns were not prepared correctly and that many 
deductions to which they were entitled were not claimed.
758
 They not only 
 
749
See Nos. A093450, A094395, 2006 WL 952578, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2006). 
750
Id. at *1–3. The gross estate was over $1.8 million. The omitted deductions totaled over 
$1,000. Id. at *2. 
751
Id. at *1, *3. 
752
101964/11, 2012 WL 470451, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2012). The case is discussed 
in somewhat more detail infra at text accompanying notes 1089–1094. 
753
Id. at *2. 
754
Id. The case arose on the defendant attorney’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds. 
755
See A133235, 2013 WL 1810593, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013). 
756
Id. at *1. 
757
Id. 
758
Id. 
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had the 2003 return prepared, but also amended returns back to 1998.
759
 The 
amended returns reduced the earlier reported adjusted gross income very 
dramatically.
760
 The changes were obviously fabricated since the return 
preparer did not even request to see any business records for the prior tax 
years.
761
 In June of 2004, the IRS denied the plaintiffs’ refund claims for 
1998–2000 on statute of limitations grounds and opted to audit the amended 
2001 to 2003 tax returns.
762
 While the defendant was retained to represent 
the plaintiffs on the audit, the representation was unsatisfactory.
763
 They 
later learned the audit had not gone well.
764
 Their refund claims were 
denied, the IRS asserted they owed over $23,000 in additional taxes, 
interest and penalties for 2002 and 2003 and they could have been 
prosecuted for fraud.
765
 They subsequently retained a tax attorney who 
favorably resolved their tax situation.
766
 This suit against the defendants 
ensued.
767
 
This suit went to trial and the plaintiffs received a judgment for over 
$39,000.
768
 On this appeal the judgment was reversed on statute of 
limitations grounds.
769
 In its opinion, the court adhered to established 
California precedent that damages for emotional distress are not available 
where, such as here, the loss is purely economic.
770
 
The following three cases are worthy of brief mention. Although each 
case, at some level, involves inaccurate tax returns, in each this issue is 
essentially engulfed and overshadowed by other concerns or issues. 
Estate of Erich Heinz involves a contested proceeding in New York’s 
Surrogate’s Court brought by the preparer of an estate tax return in order to 
collect his fees.
771
 The estate tax return involved was negligently prepared 
and overstated the amount of tax due.
772
 The case, however, really revolves 
 
759
Id. 
760
Id. at *2. 
761
See id. 
762
Id. 
763
Id. 
764
Id. 
765
Id. 
766
Id. 
767
Id. at *3. 
768
Id. 
769
Id. at *4–5. 
770
Id. at *6. 
771
2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4230, at *1, *10 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006). 
772
Id. at *6–7. 
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about the astonishingly shocking activities of the preparer and will be 
discussed subsequently.
773
 Wooley v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.,
774
 previously 
discussed,
775
 alleged the return preparer made up deductions and thus 
created an inaccurate return.
776
 
Nathel v. Siegal involved motions to dismiss a securities law action 
brought against the sellers of an allegedly fraudulent oil and gas investment 
scheme.
777
 The defendants allegedly misrepresented the investments to be 
valid interests in oil and gas drilling partnerships that were expected to 
produce revenue from operations as well as certain tax deductions.
778
 In 
fact, most of the wells were already dug and were dry, so the promised tax 
deductions were impossible to obtain.
779
 Among the defendants were the 
taxpayers’ accountant who vouched for the investments and other 
accountants who prepared certain of the partnership’s tax forms which 
included deductions that were obviously unavailable and that were in the 
process of being disallowed.
780
 The court refused to dismiss plaintiffs’ 
declaratory judgment claims against one set of defendants solely on the 
ground that the damages claimed were not yet final and therefore 
hypothetical.
781
 The court did dismiss the cause of action against the second 
set of accountants who only prepared one of the partnerships’ tax returns 
since they were not otherwise involved in selling the fraudulent investment 
and any action for only tax malpractice belonged in state court, not in 
federal court.
782
 
In RTR Technologies, Inc. v. Helming, an accountant was sued—albeit 
unsuccessfully—for giving correct and ethical advice.783 The underlying 
flavor of the case is evident from the first paragraph of the district court’s 
opinion: 
The background of this case is unusual and, to some extent, 
disturbing. Plaintiffs managed for many years to enjoy over 
 
773
See text accompanying notes 831–863, infra. 
774
540 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
775
See text accompanying notes 499–507, supra. 
776
Id. at 968. 
777
592 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
778
Id. 
779
Id. at 459. 
780
Id. 
781
Id. at 472–73. 
782
Id. at 474. 
783
815 F. Supp. 2d 411, 424 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 707 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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$1,000,000, tax-free, by claiming on their tax returns that 
this money was a “loan” from a Subchapter S corporation 
they controlled, rather than income. When Defendants, an 
accounting firm, advised them to amend the return to 
recognize these funds as income, Plaintiffs followed the 
advice and incurred a tax liability. Now Defendants find 
themselves sued for this allegedly negligent advice.
784
 
RTR Technologies was a subchapter S corporation.
785
 Its president and 
sole shareholder was Ms. Berger.
786
 Evidently, from 1994 until 2003, Ms. 
Berger withdrew varying sums of money from RTR which were recorded as 
loans to officer on RTR’s books.787 These loans totaled over $1 million.788 
These loans drew criticism in 2002 and 2003 when RTR attempted to 
obtain loans from the Small Business Administration.
789
 In 2003, the 
defendant and his firm were hired as a turnaround manager for RTR.
790
 In 
2005, the defendant was also retained to provide tax preparation services for 
RTR.
791
 The defendant was convinced that these loans were not really loans 
but “surreptitious advances.”792 The loans had no documentation, nor 
“attributes of loans,” which presumably means no interest was ever paid on 
the loans.
793
 In addition, Ms. Berger did not have the means to repay these 
loans.
794
 In light of this, the defendant advised Ms. Berger to amend her 
personal and RTR’s tax returns for 2002 to reclassify the loans as income to 
Ms. Berger.
795
 After consulting with counsel, who also expressed concern 
about the loans, Ms. Berger reluctantly agreed to file amended returns for 
2002 through 2005 for herself and RTR.
796
 While the additional income 
resulted in Ms. Berger owing additional federal income tax of over 
 
784
Id. at 414. 
785
Id. at 415. An S-corporation is a special type of corporation that generally is not subject to 
the income tax imposed on corporations. See IRC § 1363(a) (2012). 
786
815 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
787
Id. at 416. 
788
Id. There were also advances made to other companies owned by Ms. Berger and/or her 
husband. But these will be ignored in the discussion. 
789
Id. 
790
Id. at 417. 
791
Id. 
792
Id. 
793
Id. 
794
Id. 
795
Id. 
796
Id. at 418 
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$525,000, the corresponding effect on RTR (additional compensation paid 
of over $1 million plus other additional deductions) caused RTR to go from 
a small profit for these years to cumulative loss of over $1.475 million.
797
 
In 2008, the defendants ceased all business dealings with RTR and Ms. 
Berger.
798
 Pursuant to advice from an in-house accountant for RTR, Ms. 
Berger then re-amended her 2002 income tax return to reverse the change 
made by the defendants’ amended return by eliminating the $1 million of 
income and resurrecting the loan to officers account.
799
 This suit against the 
defendant and his accounting firm ensued asserting damages of over $4.5 
million for various purported additional costs and lost profits.
800
 
While the court rather easily granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds
801
 and could have 
ended its analysis with that ruling, it went on to address the plaintiffs’ 
substantive claims and to laud the defendants and lambast Ms. Berger.
802
 
Apparently, the court was annoyed not only with Ms. Berger’s original tax 
evasion of treating money taken from RTR as loans, but also because the 
court caught the plaintiff red-handed in further tax cheating.
803
 The court 
rather astutely observed that while Ms. Berger in 2008 re-amended her 
personal 2002 income tax return to eliminate the $1 million in income and 
to re-characterize it as a loan, she never re-amended RTR’s income tax 
returns for 2003 through 2007 to reflect the corresponding elimination of 
the extra $1 million of compensation deduction created by the original 
amendment of the 2002 income tax returns.
804
 
As a result, amending only the [personal] 2002 tax returns 
eliminated the estimated $500,000 tax liability caused by 
Defendants’ actions and allowed Plaintiffs to reap the 
benefits of the million-dollar loss carried forward by RTR 
in the years that followed. Defying logic and IRS 
 
797
Id. 
798
Id. at 418–19 
799
Id. at 419. 
800
Id. 
801
Id. at 424. 
802
Id.at 424, 434. The court also lambasted the plaintiffs’ attorney/CPA expert witness. The 
court perceived the expert’s testimony that the loan need not have been re-characterized as income 
but could have been paid down over time as simply a ruse to snooker the IRS until the statute of 
limitations expired on the 2002 tax return. Id. at 428. 
803
See id. at 414, 434. 
804
Id. at 419. 
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regulations, Plaintiffs are at the present time, in essence, 
having their cake and eating it too—and trying to get an 
extra dollop of whipped cream by reaping damages from 
Defendants.
805
 
The district court’s annoyance with Ms. Berger, and its sympathy for the 
defendants, is aptly illustrated by the court’s concluding paragraphs of the 
opinion: 
It is surprising that Plaintiffs had the temerity to bring this 
lawsuit. The complaint was clearly filed too late. The 
record, mainly as a result of Plaintiffs’ failure to file long-
overdue tax returns, is utterly insufficient to demonstrate 
damages. Most importantly, it is clear that Plaintiffs for 
many years enjoyed over $1,000,000 in income without 
paying any taxes on it, and they accomplished this by filing 
a tax return that improperly characterized the monies they 
received as a loan. It is close to ludicrous to claim that, by 
advising Plaintiffs to amend the 2002 tax return to conform 
with what the law and good accounting practice required, 
Defendants were being negligent. On the contrary, they 
were serving their clients ethically and well. 
As a result of behaving professionally, Defendants have 
found themselves slapped with this expensive lawsuit. That 
undeserved headache, at least, is now over. The court can 
only hope that the IRS and the state authorities will make 
sure that Plaintiffs now proceed to do what everyone who 
enjoys the privilege of living in our beloved country is 
required to do: pay their fair share of taxes.
806
 
The moral, perhaps, is that a plaintiff bringing this type of tax 
malpractice case should have clean hands as concerns tax compliance. If 
not, the judge may very well notice. 
C. Taxpayer Representation Before IRS and Courts 
In contemplating possible malpractice scenarios involving tax, one of 
the most basic to come to mind would undoubtedly be negligent 
representation before the IRS or some other taxing authority or before a 
 
805
Id. at 425. 
806
Id. at 434. 
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court. Two recent cases demonstrate these situations. A third case 
demonstrates an extremely unusual situation that could have come from a 
Hollywood script writer—probably one who specializes in horror films. 
In Sahadi v. Scheaffer, which was previously discussed,
807
 one of the 
allegations against the defendant accountant/return preparer was that he 
negligently represented the plaintiffs before the IRS.
808
 In fact, the reports 
of the IRS agents which proposed tax deficiencies of approximately $35 
million explicitly criticized the defendant.
809
 The reports asserted that he 
failed “to (1) provide information the IRS had requested, and (2) offer 
support for tax positions he had asserted during the audit process.”810 While 
Sahadi held the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations, there is no 
reported case indicating the outcome of the litigation.
811
 
Guerrero v. McDonald involved a claim for negligent representation in 
a Tax Court litigation.
812
 During the 1990s the IRS conducted multiple 
audits of tax returns of corporations owned by the plaintiff and asserted 
additional taxes due.
813
 The plaintiff then hired the defendant to represent 
him at the IRS appeals process and subsequently to file suit in Tax Court to 
contest the proposed adjustments.
814
 The defendant was a CPA who had a 
law degree, but was not licensed to practice law in Georgia.
815
 After losing 
in Tax Court, the plaintiff hired a law firm to appeal the decision.
816
 The 
judgment of the Tax Court was ultimately upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.
817
 
Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming that he was 
negligent in how he handled the trial in Tax Court.
818
 Alternatively, the 
plaintiff argued that if the defendant’s initial advice that the plaintiff’s tax 
claims were meritorious was incorrect, then he sought to recover all fees 
paid to plaintiff and the other attorneys who represented him in post-trial 
 
807
See supra Part III.B.2. 
808
66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 523–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
809
Id. at 520–22. 
810
Id. at 522. 
811
Id. at 542–43. 
812
690 S.E.2d 486, 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
813
Id. 
814
Id. 
815
Id. at 487, n.4. 
816
Id. at 487. 
817
Id. 
818
Id. 
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proceedings.
819
 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.
820
 
As to the initial claim, the court held the plaintiff failed to establish a 
prima facia cause of action because he never established proximate 
causation.
821
 The plaintiff never established that but for the defendant’s 
negligence a different result would have been obtained.
822
 He was simply 
second guessing what the defendant did.
823
 As to the alternative cause of 
action, the court went back to very basic doctrine affirming the error in 
judgment rule.
824
 So long as an attorney honestly exercises his judgment in 
the conduct of litigation, he cannot be held liable for malpractice.
825
 
Professionals are not insurers who guarantee outcomes.
826
 
Interestingly, the lower court applied the legal malpractice standard here 
even though the defendant was not a licensed attorney.
827
 The court did this 
because both parties cited legal malpractice precedent and neither objected 
to the use of such precedent.
828
 Also, the asserted malpractice concerned 
actions taken in connection with a trial.
829
 The appellate court approved the 
holding of the lower court and also applied the legal malpractice 
standard.
830
 
Estate of Erich Heinz involves a situation in which the representation—
or actually, misrepresentation—of the executor of an estate is so extremely 
diabolical, that it almost could be imagined to be the fictional creation of 
some horror novelist.
831
 In Heinz, the decedent had property in the United 
States and Germany.
832
 The estate was divided equally between his three 
children, one of whom, Bettina, resided in California, while the other two 
 
819
Id. at 487–88. 
820
Id. at 488. 
821
Id. 
822
Id. at 488. 
823
Id. at 489. 
824
Id.; See text accompanying notes 281–282, supra. 
825
Guerrero, 690 S.E.2d at 489. 
826
Id. 
827
Id. at 488. 
828
Id. 
829
Id. 
830
Id. The court was careful to note that the “application was limited to the facts of this case.”  
Id. at footnote 7. 
831
See 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4230, at *1–3 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006). 
832
Id. at *1. 
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resided overseas.
833
 Bettina was named executor of the will and in June 
1999, was duly qualified in New York.
834
 She also received ancillary letters 
in Germany.
835
 She hired Ervin Sommer to prepare the estate’s federal 
estate tax return.
836
 Sommer was an enrolled agent who could practice 
before the IRS, but was neither an attorney nor an accountant.
837
 In 
connection with the retainer, Bettina executed a power of attorney and a 
declaration of representation in favor of Sommer.
838
 These enabled Sommer 
to receive confidential financial information and to execute documents on 
behalf of the estate.
839
 Sommer filed the estate’s tax return in October of 
1999.
840
 
Bettina became dissatisfied with Sommer’s work and revoked his power 
of attorney on August 24, 2000, before an IRS estate tax advisor.
841
 
Sommer was notified of the termination by phone and in writing.
842
 Without 
Bettina’s knowledge, Sommer contacted the IRS claiming that he still 
represented the estate and that his power of attorney was revoked by 
mistake.
843
 He then urged the IRS to audit the estate’s tax return, which it 
did.
844
 He never notified Bettina of the audit.
845
 He represented the estate on 
the audit and the IRS determined that additional taxes of over $70,000 were 
due.
846
 Without any authority, he then filed an amended return on behalf of 
the estate.
847
 All of this occurred despite the fact that Bettina again informed 
the IRS that Sommer’s original power of attorney was revoked and that she 
again informed him, by phone and in writing, that he should refrain from 
any contact with the IRS on behalf of the estate.
848
 Sommer ignored 
 
833
Id. 
834
Id. 
835
Id. 
836
See id. at *1, *3. 
837
Id. at *1–2. 
838
Id. at *3. 
839
Id. 
840
Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. at *3–4. 
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Id. at *4, *5. 
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Id. at *4. 
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Id. at *5. 
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Id. at *5–6. 
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Bettina’s instructions and filed an amended return for the estate.849 While 
the details of this case are not specific, some of these events occurred up to 
three years after the power of attorney was revoked.
850
 
While this was transpiring, Sommer flooded the German court and 
Bettina’s siblings with letters and documents accusing her of criminal 
activity and of committing numerous breaches of her fiduciary duties.
851
 
This resulted in a revocation of Bettina’s ancillary letters in Germany.852 
She had to retain German counsel to seek reinstatement of her letters.
853
 
In October 2003, Bettina commenced an action in California for 
damages and an injunction against Sommer.
854
 The CPA she hired to review 
the estate’s records testified that Sommer made numerous errors on the 
estate tax return, including failing to claim a tax credit for foreign estate 
taxes, failing to deduct administration expenses, and overstating the value 
of the German property of the estate.
855
 A corrected tax return was filed, 
and a tax abatement of $94,000 was obtained.
856
 
While the California litigation was pending, Sommer claimed to be a 
creditor of the estate and filed this petition in New York Surrogate’s Court 
seeking an accounting from Bettina.
857
 When she failed to timely account, 
he brought a petition to hold her in contempt.
858
 Upon a hearing of what 
essentially became a suit for fees, Sommer admitted he had no authority to 
act on behalf of the estate or Bettina.
859
 He was ordered to refrain from 
contacting the IRS on behalf of the estate.
860
 Without getting into similar 
details about his claimed fees, the court held Sommer was not entitled to 
recover any fees.
861
 
At the end of the opinion, the court indicated that Sommer had recently 
filed complaints with the IRS against Bettina and her California attorney 
 
849
Id. at *6. It is not clear from the opinion whether he filed one or two amended returns. See 
id. 
850
See id. 
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Id. at *4–5. 
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Id. at *5. 
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Id. 
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Id. at *6. 
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Id. at *6. 
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694 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3 
and accountant.
862
 The little bit of light at the end of the tunnel was that a 
possibility of obtaining sanctions against Sommer did remain open.
863
 
D. Personal Tax Planning 
1. Income Tax 
a. Litigation Settlement Advice  
In Kerbein v. Hutchison, the defendant attorney represented the plaintiff 
in a worker’s compensation discrimination claim against her former 
employer.
864
 The plaintiff agreed to settle her claim for $37,500 based on 
her belief that this amount was not taxable.
865
 At the settlement hearing, the 
plaintiff accepted the $37,500 with the express condition that she had ten 
days to investigate the tax consequences of the settlement.
866
 Five days 
later, the defendant advised the plaintiff that the $37,500 would not be 
subject to tax, so she allowed the settlement to become final.
867
 It was later 
determined that the $37,500 was taxable.
868
 The issue before the court was 
whether the statute of limitations had expired before this suit was 
instituted.
869
 The Third Department held the statute of limitations began to 
run when the settlement became final and that the suit was timely.
870
 
Delahaye v. Plaisance also involved an allegation that the defendant 
attorney incorrectly advised the plaintiff that an amount received in the 
settlement of litigation would not be subject to federal or state income 
tax.
871
 The case, however, focuses on the statute of limitations and affirms 
the trial court’s dismissal of the action as untimely.872 
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Id. 
863
Id. at *14. 
864
816 N.Y.S.2d 591, 591 (App. Div. 2006). 
865
Id. 
866
Id. 
867
Id. 
868
Id. 
869
See id. at 592. 
870
Id. at 592–93. 
871
No. 2007 CA 1697, 2008 WL 2065927, at *1 (La. Ct. App. May 2, 2008). 
872
See id. at *3. A noteworthy aspect of this case is that the plaintiff initially brought a similar 
action that seemed timely. See id. at *1. That action was dismissed by the plaintiff because he had 
not yet filed his tax return and could not quantify his damages. Id. But inability to precisely 
quantify damages was held not to delay the accrual of the cause of action for statute of limitations 
purposes. See id. at *3. 
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In Ortiz v. Allyn, Hausner & Montanile, LLP, the defendant attorney 
represented the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action that was 
settled in June 2000.
873
 The settlement agreement failed to specify whether 
any of the proceeds were attributable to personal physical injuries or 
physical sickness.
874
 From August 2002 until January 20, 2003, the 
defendant represented the plaintiff before the IRS and/or the Tax Court 
concerning the taxability of the proceeds.
875
 The Tax Court ultimately ruled 
adversely to the plaintiff.
876
 The plaintiff instituted this suit in December 
2003, which was within three years of the defendant’s representation on the 
tax issue, but was later than three years from the settlement of the 
underlying discrimination action in June 2000.
877
 The majority of the First 
Department held the continuous representation doctrine applied, the suit 
was timely, and affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss.
878
 
b. Long Term Capital Gains   
In Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., the ultimate error asserted 
involved incorrect advice by an attorney stating that if a taxpayer sold a 
series of anticipated annual lottery payments for a discounted lump sum 
payment, the lump sum would be subject to the lower tax rates imposed on 
long term capital gains.
879
 The case, however, involves a much more 
nefarious scheme surrounding the advice.
880
 In Flannery, the defendant was 
in the business of purchasing the installment payments of lottery winners 
for a lump sum amount.
881
 The plaintiff had won an Iowa state lottery in 
1988.
882
 The defendant, on a number of occasions, had unsuccessfully 
attempted to purchase the plaintiff’s lottery payments for a lump sum 
 
873
852 N.Y.S.2d 555, 555–56 (App. Term 2007). 
874
Id. at 555. 
875
Id. at 556. The exact nature of the representation is unclear. The majority opinion indicates 
the representation was before the IRS, but the dissent indicates the representation was before the 
Tax Court. Id. 
876
Id. 
877
See id. 
878
Id. The dissent believed the continuous representation doctrine did not apply and would 
have dismissed the complaint as time-barred. Id. at 557. 
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17 A.3d 509, 511 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). 
880
See id. 
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Id. 
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price.
883
 The defendant, it was alleged, entered into a business relationship 
with an attorney, whose role was to offer lottery winners purportedly 
“independent” advice stating that by selling their lottery payments they 
would gain significant tax advantages—presumably the long term capital 
gains tax rates.
884
 This advice was false.
885
 The plaintiff ended up retaining 
the attorney’s law firm, thereby receiving the intentionally false advice.886 
This suit was then instituted against the attorney, his law firm, and the 
defendant.
887
 After the cause of action was dismissed against the attorney 
and the law firm, the lower court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant on statute of limitations grounds, which was affirmed by the 
Connecticut Appellate Court.
888
 
In Camico Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rogozinski, an accounting firm had 
incorrectly reported long term capital gains income as ordinary royalty 
income for tax years from 1989 to 2006.
889
 The ensuing extra taxes were 
incurred by three brothers who were partners in patents they licensed to 
others.
890
 The parties in this case were the taxpayers and the accounting 
firm’s professional liability insurance carrier.891 The issue was whether 
under the policy there was one claim, with a $1 million policy limit, or 
several claims, with a $2 million policy limit.
892
 The court held there was 
only one claim involved.
893
 
c. Divorce Related  
In Fielding v. Kupferman, the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against 
the attorney who represented him in a divorce action.
894
 In the divorce 
action, the defendant attorney advised the plaintiff to enter into a 
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Id. 
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See id. 
885
Id. 
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Id. 
887
Id. at 510 n.2, 512. 
888
Id. at 510 n.2, 515. The court does not disclose the reason for the dismissal of the claims 
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them. See id. at 510 n.2. 
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885 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (App. Div. 2009). 
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stipulation, subsequently incorporated into the judgment of divorce, that he 
would pay his wife $1.2 million in immediately available funds.
895
 The 
plaintiff’s total liquid assets at that time were around $1.26 million, almost 
$895,000 of which was in a Keogh account.
896
 As assets in a Keogh 
retirement account, these funds were available before retirement only upon 
the incurrence of a substantial tax cost.
897
 Notwithstanding the defendant’s 
knowledge of the facts, she advised him to agree to the stipulation and 
never informed him of the tax costs involved in withdrawing money from 
the Keogh account.
898
 After entering into the stipulation and being unable to 
mortgage his apartment that he still co-owned with his soon-to-be ex-wife, 
the plaintiff was forced to withdraw the money from the Keogh account to 
meet his payment obligation to his wife.
899
 Although the lower court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state 
a cause of action, the First Department unanimously reversed and reinstated 
the cause of action.
900
 
d. Offshore Trusts  
There are several cases involving the creation and utilization of offshore 
trusts as a tax savings device. In DeMay v. Moore & Bruce, LLP, the 
defendant attorneys and the plaintiff established an ongoing relationship in 
1995.
901
 Defendant, Bruce, became a board member of the plaintiff’s 
corporation, DeMay, and a legal advisor to Mr. DeMay.
902
 Defendant 
Moore became chief counsel for the corporation.
903
 In 1996, the defendants 
advised DeMay to create four foreign trusts in order to reduce the taxes that 
he might incur in the event of the sale of his company.
904
 The four trusts 
were established and shares of DeMay’s company were transferred to the 
trusts.
905
 Over the ensuing years, the defendant attorneys were extensively 
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involved with the trusts.
906
 Bruce was a fiduciary of all the trusts.
907
  Moore 
and their law firm did legal work for the trusts.
908
 Over the years, in 
addition to assisting in the operation of the trusts, they also amended the 
trust agreements, appointed a trustee for a trust, moved the location of one 
of the trusts, were involved in trust litigation, and reviewed tax returns of 
the trusts.
909
 
In 1999, the IRS began an audit of DeMay’s taxes for 1996 through 
1998.
910
 While other counsel was hired as primary counsel in connection 
with the audits and ensuing Tax Court litigation, the defendants also 
participated and assisted.
911
 The IRS ultimately asserted deficiencies of over 
$12 million for unpaid income taxes and penalties, as well as nearly $3 
million for gift taxes.
912
 All of the deficiencies arose out of various 
transactions the defendants advised DeMay to undertake.
913
 In 2005, 
DeMay settled the income tax deficiency for $6 million.
914
 The following 
year, DeMay settled his gift tax liability.
915
 While he acknowledged gift tax 
liability, no immediate tax was payable since the lifetime exclusion was 
greater than the gift tax and offset the liability.
916
 
This suit ensued, alleging malpractice for all of the incorrect tax advice 
given over the years.
917
 Other claims were also asserted, primarily for 
damages due to various breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the 
defendants’ administration of the trusts.918 The primary focus of the case 
was whether the statute of limitations was suspended by the continuous 
representation doctrine.
919
 The court held the statute of limitations was 
 
906
See id. at 175. 
907
Id. 
908
Id. 
909
Id. at 174–75. 
910
Id. at 173. 
911
See id. at 176. 
912
Id. at 177. 
913
See id. at 177–78. 
914
Id. at 178. While the court stated that DeMay agreed to pay $6 million for past due income 
taxes, it went on to note the current balance at trial had grown to $7.5 million including interest. 
Id. 
915
Id. 
916
Id. 
917
See id. 
918
Id. at 178–79. 
919
Id. at 173. 
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suspended, and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 
these causes of action.
920
 
With respect to the damages to be addressed at the jury trial, the court 
endorsed the general proposition that the plaintiff could recover the 
difference between the taxes paid (i.e., the settlement amount with the IRS) 
and what he would have paid with correct tax advice.
921
 Unfortunately, the 
court did not address the most intriguing aspect of the damages sought by 
the plaintiff—whether the settlement of the asserted gift tax deficiency 
resulted in recoverable damages—since it did reduce the plaintiff’s lifetime 
estate and gift tax exemption, but required no immediate payment.
922
 
Grace v. Allen also involved tax planning through the creation and 
utilization of three levels of trusts in Belize.
923
 In 1997, the defendant 
attorney advised the plaintiff to establish the trusts to minimize her tax 
liability.
924
 Securities were transferred to, and sold by, the middle-level 
trust.
925
 While a non-resident tax return was filed for the middle trust for 
1997, no tax was due since the proceeds from the sale were purportedly 
distributed to the third level trust—a foreign entity.926 The plaintiff never 
reported the sale of the securities nor paid taxes on the sale, saving 
approximately $556,000.
927
 While the IRS investigated the plaintiff 
between 2001 and 2003 and the Department of Justice subsequently 
determined the Belize trust structure to be illegal, no taxing authority ever 
assessed any taxes, interest or penalties in connection with this 
transaction.
928
 Nevertheless, the plaintiff instituted this action against the 
defendant attorney seeking rescission and various damages.
929
 The lower 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that the 
damages sought were speculative.
930
 The appellate court affirmed, giving 
 
920
Id. at 173, 181, 186. 
921
Id. at 186. 
922
See id. at 178–79. 
923
No. 1 CA–CV 11–0695, 2012 WL 5893493, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2012). 
924
Id. 
925
Id. 
926
See id. 
927
Id. 
928
Id. 
929
Id. 
930
Id. 
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short shrift to the plaintiff’s argument that she would always be at risk for 
paying the back taxes since there was no statute of limitations.
931
 
e. Miscellaneous  
In Solin v. Domino, the plaintiff sued his insurance agent/financial 
advisor for professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation.
932
 The 
crux of the complaint was that the defendant understated the tax that would 
be incurred if the plaintiff were to cash in his annuity policy.
933
 The plaintiff 
had an annuity worth approximately $3.2 million.
934
 The plaintiff was 
contemplating one of two courses of action: (1) to surrender the annuity, 
pay the taxes and invest the balance in a taxable account; or (2) to roll over 
the annuity tax-free into another annuity.
935
 If the second option was 
selected, no taxes would be currently incurred, but would be deferred until 
the new annuity was surrendered.
936
 Based on the defendant’s advice that 
approximately $200,000 of taxes would be incurred currently if option one 
were chosen and the annuity cashed, the plaintiff chose option one.
937
 It was 
later determined that the actual tax liability was over $600,000 rather than 
the advised $200,000.
938
 When confronted about the discrepancy, the 
defendant admitted that he had made a mistake.
939
 The suit was commenced 
because the plaintiff asserted he would have selected the second option if he 
had been given accurate advice.
940
 
 
931
See id. at *5. Other damages sought such as for the loss in value of the securities (some 
appreciated after the sale) were likewise speculative and not recoverable. Id. 
932
08 Civ. 2837 (SCR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). 
Portions of the discussion of Solin are taken from NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 173–
76. There were actually two plaintiffs in Solin; Daniel Solin, individually and as trustee of the 
Daniel R. Solin Trust. Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *1. For ease of presentation they 
are treated as one plaintiff since the issues for both were identical and the court also treated them 
as one. See id. In the final footnote of the opinion, the court noted that since the plaintiff’s cause 
of action was defective because it failed to assert any recoverable damages, the court did not need 
to address the defendant’s alternative argument that New York law does not recognize a 
professional malpractice cause of action against financial advisors. Id. at *11–12 n.7. The 
discussion herein also does not address this contention. 
933
See id. at *1. 
934
Id. 
935
Id. at *2. See I.R.C. § 1035 (2012). 
936
Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *4. 
937
See id. at *2. 
938
Id. at *4. 
939
Id. 
940
Id. 
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In New York, the elements of a cause of action for attorney malpractice 
are negligence, proximate causation, and damages.
941
 In Solin, the court 
dismissed the cause of action because it found the plaintiff did not establish 
the existence of any recoverable damages.
942
 The taxes incurred by the 
plaintiff as a result of the negligent advice were held not to be recoverable 
for two reasons.
943
 First, the tax liability was caused by the plaintiff’s 
having recognized taxable gain, not because of any misrepresentation by the 
defendant.
944
 And second, any recovery of taxes would put the plaintiff in a 
better position than he held prior to the misrepresentation, and hence were 
not recoverable under New York law.
945
 
Solin also gave short shrift to the plaintiff’s alternative argument that he 
ought to be able to recover as damages the difference between the taxes 
incurred on cashing the annuity and what he would have incurred by 
utilizing the other option of deferring the tax by exchanging the annuity for 
another annuity.
946
 According to the court, such damages were speculative 
and not recoverable.
947
 They were speculative because the amount of taxes 
ultimately incurred is not knowable, they will depend upon such factors as 
when the future tax liability will be incurred, what the plaintiff’s tax rate 
will be at that time, and whether there will have been any changes in—
perhaps even elimination of—the tax law.948 The court also rejected the 
plaintiff’s attempt to shift the speculative problem to the defendant by 
stating that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full $600,000 of taxes 
currently paid, and if the defendant wanted to reduce this amount by any 
taxes that would be saved in the future as a result of the present tax 
payment, the defendant had the burden of proof on this offset.
949
 Since the 
defendant certainly could not prove the amount of any offset due to its 
inherent speculativeness, the plaintiff argued that he should be able to 
recover all the taxes paid currently.
950
 
 
941
Id. at *5–6. 
942
Id. at *11. 
943
See id. at *7–8. 
944
Id. For this proposition, the court relied on Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 
N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (N.Y. 1996). 
945
Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *8. For this, the court relied on Alpert v. Shea 
Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314–15 (App. Div. 1990). 
946
See Solin, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51405, at *9. 
947
Id. at *10. 
948
Id. at *9–10. 
949
See id. at *10–11. 
950
Id. 
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While, arguably, Solin may have correctly followed current New York 
legal principles, I have argued elsewhere that the principles are misguided 
and that they are really fraud-damage principles that have been 
inappropriately transplanted into the negligence area.
951
 In any event, if 
Solin is followed, damages in this very basic and simple scenario (let’s get 
tax advice before doing anything) may never be recoverable, nor may 
damages arising from timing differences ever be recoverable in a 
negligence cause of action.
952
 
2. Estate, Gift and GST Tax Planning 
a. Introductory—Privity   
Generally, in situations involving claims of tax malpractice, the defense 
of the expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations is frequently 
encountered and often successfully prevents consideration of the 
substantive claim.
953
 In the estate, gift, and generation skipping tax context, 
another defense that is also frequently encountered is lack of privity 
between the plaintiff and the attorney or accountant who prepared the estate 
plan. The professional tax advisor normally is retained by a taxpayer to 
prepare an estate plan which can include the preparation of wills, trusts, 
perhaps other documents, and may involve transfers of property. Often, any 
error is discovered only after the death of the taxpayer by either the 
fiduciary of the estate or by an heir. If strict rules of privity are followed, 
neither of these parties have standing to sue since they are not in privity 
with the attorney or accountant who rendered the advice, drafted the 
documents, or effectuated the property transfers.
954
 This means the tax 
advisors are impervious to any responsibility for any malpractice.
955
 
In Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of Texas noted that in 2006 this strict privity rule was a minority 
 
951
See NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 160. 
952
See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 758. 
953
See, e.g., DeMay v. Moore & Bruce, LLP, 584 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (D.D.C. 2008); 
Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., 17 A.3d 509, 511 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Ortiz v. Allyn, 
Hausner & Montanile, LLP, 852 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (App. Term 2007). 
954
See, e.g., Lutz v. Balch, Nos. 06AP-247, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 
2006); Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, No. 05 CA 10, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
26, 2006); Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, No. 05 CA 11, 2006 WL 3783544, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 26, 2006). 
955
See Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4; Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783544, at *3. 
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view followed in Texas and only eight other states.
956
 The court then 
reviewed and changed the position of Texas.
957
 Upon a careful analysis of 
Texas precedent, and, perhaps, a bit of fancy footwork, the court held that a 
malpractice claim in the estate planning context survives the decedent’s 
death and passes to the estate.
958
 The estate’s fiduciary may pursue such 
claims free from any lack of privity objection.
959
 Others, such as heirs or 
beneficiaries, still may not assert such claims since they are not in privity 
with the tax practitioner.
960
 
In Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, the New York Court of Appeals 
followed in Belt’s footsteps and changed the New York law.961 The court 
held that the personal representative of the estate has privity, or a 
relationship sufficiently approaching privity, with the estate planning 
attorney of the decedent to maintain a malpractice claim on behalf of the 
estate.
962
 The court emphasized however, that, absent fraud, strict privity 
still bars any beneficiary and other third parties from asserting a claim for 
estate planning malpractice.
963
 
In Ohio, in Lutz v. Balch, decided by the Ohio intermediate Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth District in August 2006, the court simply applied 
Ohio’s strict privity rule and affirmed the dismissal of a claim asserted by 
the child of the decedents against the attorney who drafted the decedents’ 
wills and trusts.
964
 However, in Schlegel v. Gindlesberger, two related cases 
with the same name, the Ohio intermediate Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
District, in December 2006, also applied Ohio’s strict privity rule, but the 
court ended both opinions with a plea to the Ohio Supreme Court to revisit 
this issue.
965
 The court was very troubled by the fact that under strict 
privity, negligence in the estate planning area has no remedy.
966
 On appeal, 
 
956
192 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. 2006). The other states are Alabama, Arkansas, Maine, 
Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. Id. at 783 n.1. 
957
See id. at 785. 
958
Id. 
959
Id. at 787, 789. 
960
See id. at 788–89. 
961
15 N.Y.3d 306, 309 (2010). 
962
Id. 
963
Id. at 310. 
964
Nos. 06AP-247, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2006). 
965
No. 05 CA 10, 2006 WL 3783537, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006); No. 05 CA 11, 
2006 WL 3783544, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2006). 
966
Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783544, at *4; Schlegel, 2006 WL 3783544, at *3. 
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the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the strict privity rule.
967
  
However, the majority opinion, by four members of the seven-member 
court, did leave open the possibility that, in an appropriate case, they might 
be receptive to relaxing the strict privity rule to allow the personal 
representative of the estate, but not the beneficiaries, to sue for 
malpractice.
968
 
The concurring opinion in Gindlesberger, joined by three members of 
the Ohio Supreme Court, is quite significant.
969
 In it, the judges indicate 
they would be willing to change the strict privity rule to even allow 
beneficiaries to sue for malpractice in the preparation of a will.
970
 However, 
the facts of this case were not appropriate for making the change.
971
 In 
Gindlesberger, the defendant attorney had prepared the decedent’s will in 
1986 and later prepared two codicils.
972
 In 1990, the decedent desired to 
transfer a farm she owned to one of her three children, while maintaining a 
life estate in the farm.
973
 The attorney drafted a deed that retained a life 
estate for the decedent and gave a joint life estate to the decedent’s son and 
his wife, with the remainder going to the survivor.
974
 It was this later 
transfer that the other heirs claimed was incorrect, since it took the property 
out of the estate while leaving the estate with insufficient assets to pay the 
estate taxes resulting from the transfer.
975
 This case, therefore, according to 
the concurrence, did not involve any negligence in the preparation of a will 
but, instead, simply involved negligence “in a financial transaction 
independent of the will.”976 It was therefore not an appropriate vehicle in 
which to change the strict privity rule for negligence in preparing wills.
977
 It 
appears that even the Ohio Supreme Court might be receptive to changing 
the strict privity rule if an appropriate opportunity presented itself to the 
court.
978
 
 
967
Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 887 N.E.2d 1167, 1172 (Ohio 2008). 
968
See id. at 1171–72. 
969
See id. at 1172–75. 
970
Id. at 1174. 
971
See id. at 1172–73. 
972
Id. at 1168. 
973
Id. 
974
Id. 
975
Id. at 1169, 1172. 
976
Id. at 1173. 
977
See id. at 1172–73. 
978
See id. at 1174. 
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b. Planning Errors   
The most general observation about the cases that have arisen in this 
area is that many, but not all, focus on some procedural matter and do not 
specify the underlying malpractice claim in any meaningful detail. In Lutz 
v. Balch, there was simply an assertion that the attorney who drafted the 
decedents’ wills and trust was negligent by failing to minimize estate 
taxes.
979
 Similarly, in Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 
the allegation was simply that the defendant attorneys “were negligent in 
drafting their father’s will and in advising him on asset management[,]” 
causing $1.5 million in tax liability that could have been avoided.
980
 Both of 
these cases focused on privity issues.
981
 Steffen v. Gray, Harris & Robinson, 
P.A. contains a very brief, passing reference that the plaintiffs employed the 
defendant attorneys for estate planning purposes.
982
 However, the case is 
exclusively focused on the ineffective asset protection planning done by the 
defendants for the plaintiff, the wife of Paul Bilzerian, a man convicted of 
securities fraud in 1989, and who then attempted to hide assets from the 
authorities.
983
 Similarly, in Gelof v. Prickert, Jones & Ellio, P.A., there is a 
conclusory allegation that the defendant attorneys failed to minimize 
generation skipping transfer taxes.
984
 The entire opinion’s focus, however, 
was on the jurisdictional problem of the case, having been brought in 
Delaware Chancery Court rather than in Delaware Superior Court.
985
 
In the following cases focusing on privity, the underlying negligence is 
somewhat more determinable, but again, without nearly enough detail to 
justify any discussion. In Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, the negligence 
asserted against the defendant attorney was that he failed to advise the 
decedent of the tax consequences of making an inter vivos transfer of a 
property while retaining a life estate.
986
 This seems to suggest a violation of 
I.R.C. § 2036, which addresses inter vivos transfers with the retention of a 
life estate.
987
 In Estate of Schneider v. Finmann, the asserted negligence 
was in advising the plaintiff, or failing to advise the plaintiff, on how to 
 
979
Nos. 06AP-247, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2006). 
980
192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. 2006). 
981
See id.; Lutz, 2006 WL 2575811, at *1. 
982
283 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
983
See id. at 1275–77. 
984
C.A. No. 4930-VCS, 2010 WL 759663, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2010). 
985
See id. at *1, *3. 
986
See 887 N.E.2d 1167, 1168–69 (Ohio 2008). 
987
See I.R.C. § 2036 (2012). 
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own a $1 million life insurance policy.
988
 Over a period of several years 
prior to his death, the decedent purchased the life insurance policy, 
transferred it to an entity of which he was the principal owner, then 
transferred it to another entity of which he was the principal owner, and 
then, in 2005, transferred it back to himself.
989
 The policy was included in 
the gross estate when the decedent died in October 2006.
990
 This would 
obviously implicate I.R.C. § 2042, which addresses whether life insurance 
is included in the gross estate.
991
 
Jones v. Wilt involved a suit by the decedent’s husband, who was also 
the executor of the decedent’s estate, against the attorney who prepared the 
decedent’s will and a trust agreement.992 Among the allegations were that 
the attorney failed to advise the decedent to minimize estate taxes by 
utilizing a qualified terminable interest property (“QTIP”) trust and that the 
tax allocation provision in the will was defective because all of the taxes 
were to be paid by the residuary portion of the trust (which otherwise would 
have gone to the plaintiff’s husband), even those pertaining to property that 
was devised to others.
993
 While these issues are very interesting, the case 
never addressed them.
994
 There was evidence introduced by the defendant’s 
attorney that the decedent was not concerned with whether her husband 
received any property.
995
 Her primary concern was that property she 
received from her father went to her surviving sister.
996
 The opinion focused 
solely on whether the trial court’s exclusion of certain evidence offered by 
an expert was correct.
997
 The court upheld the trial court’s evidentiary 
ruling and its grant of summary judgment to the defendant.
998
 
Coln v. Larson involved an expert’s testimony that was not accepted by 
the trial court.
999
 In Coln, the defendant accountant had represented the 
 
988
See 15 N.Y.3d 306, 308 (2010). 
989
Id. at 308. 
990
Id. 
991
I.R.C. § 2042 (2012). 
992
871 A.2d 210, 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
993
See id. at 212. See generally I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2012). 
994
Jones, 871 A.2d at 214. 
995
Id. at 214–15. 
996
Id. at 215. 
997
Id. at 214. 
998
Id. at 215. 
999
$20B186635, B190358, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9276, at *6 (Ct. App. Nov. 19, 
2007). 
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decedent for a number of years.
1000
 The representation included estate 
planning in addition to accounting services.
1001
 The decedent’s estate plan 
was reasonably intricate, involving several living trusts and a 
conservatorship for the decedent.
1002
 The plaintiff, who was one of the 
decedent’s two children and an heir of the decedent, in the spring of 2001, 
became convinced that utilization of a family limited partnership (“FLP”) 
would minimize estate taxes upon his father’s death.1003 Although the 
father’s conservator, who was the plaintiff’s brother, initially did not agree 
with this, he subsequently changed his mind.
1004
 On September 9, 2001, 
before the living trust could be amended to permit the creation of an FLP, 
the decedent died.
1005
 The plaintiff then instituted a civil suit against the 
defendant accountant for negligence and breach of fiduciary duties for 
failing to advise the decedent to create an FLP.
1006
 The plaintiff also 
instituted a similar action in the probate court.
1007
 The defendant prevailed 
in both litigations.
1008
 In the civil action, a jury found he did not act 
negligently, and the probate court held he did not breach any fiduciary 
duties.
1009
 On this appeal, the only issue before the court was whether the 
plaintiff’s expert witness, who was an attorney with substantial experience 
in estate planning, was qualified to testify as to the standards of the 
accounting profession that applied to the defendant accountant.
1010
 The 
court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony.1011 
In Jeanes v. Bank of America, N.A., the decedent was rather wealthy, 
having a gross estate of almost $39.5 million at her death in 2003.
1012
 Her 
estate paid estate and inheritance taxes equal to approximately half of the 
 
1000
See id. at *3. 
1001
Id. at *3–4. 
1002
Id. at *4. 
1003
Id. at *5. 
1004
Id. at *5–6. 
1005
Id. at *6. 
1006
Id. at *1, *6. 
1007
Id. at *1. 
1008
See id. at *1–2. 
1009
Id. 
1010
Id. at *6. 
1011
Id. at *24. 
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191 P.3d 325, 329 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 295 P.3d 1045 (Kan. 2013). 
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estate.
1013
 The primary negligence asserted was that the defendants failed to 
minimize the decedent’s taxes.1014 The plaintiff alleged that creating a 
family limited partnership would have saved the estate over $6 million in 
taxes.
1015
 The defendants were the bank, the bank’s officer assigned to the 
decedent’s account, and the attorney who had prepared the decedent’s will, 
living trust, unitrust, and amendments thereto.
1016
 The bank was the trustee 
of several small unitrusts of the decedent, the successor trustee of the 
decedent’s living trust, and acted as the decedent’s agent for much of her 
financial dealings.
1017
 The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence, breach of 
contract and fiduciary duty against all defendants and also breach of trust 
against the bank.
1018
 Interestingly, the plaintiff, who was the decedent’s 
niece and inherited the majority of the decedent’s assets, did not sue in her 
own capacity, but solely as the estate’s representative.1019 
The trial court below granted summary judgment on all claims to all 
defendants.
1020
 With respect to the attorney defendant, the Kansas appellate 
court initially held that the plaintiff’s claim sounded only in tort, and not as 
a separate breach of contract claim, since there was no specific term of any 
contract the attorney was alleged to have violated.
1021
 Instead, the alleged 
failing by the attorney was grounded in the law’s general imposition of a 
duty upon attorneys to use reasonable and ordinary care, diligence, and skill 
ordinarily possessed by attorneys in the community.
1022
 It therefore affirmed 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant attorney on 
the breach of contract claim.
1023
 
As to the tort claim of negligence against the attorney, the court also 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant 
 
1013
Jeanes, 191 P.3d at 329. According to the facts in the Supreme Court of Kansas opinion, 
the taxes appear to be approximately fifty-five percent of the gross estate. See Jeanes, 295 P.3d at 
1047. 
1014
Jeanes, 191 P.3d at 329. 
1015
Id. 
1016
Id. at 328–29. The defendants also included the predecessor bank that originally had the 
relationship with the decedent that was later taken over by Bank of America. Id. at 328. 
1017
Id. 
1018
Id. at 329. 
1019
Id. at 328–29. 
1020
Id. at 329. 
1021
Id. at 331. 
1022
Id. 
1023
Id. 
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attorney.
1024
 Under Kansas law, for a tort cause of action to survive the 
death of a decedent, it is necessary that the cause of action accrue while the 
decedent was still alive.
1025
 For a legal malpractice cause of action to 
accrue, the plaintiff must have suffered actual loss or damage.
1026
 Here, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court and held the damages claimed—the 
additional taxes incurred—arose only after the death of the decedent and 
therefore the claim did not survive the death of the decedent.
1027
 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court did not accept the plaintiff’s argument that the 
decedent could have sued the attorney during her lifetime and recovered the 
fees paid to the defendant and the costs incurred to restructure her estate 
plan.
1028
 The direct result of the Court’s holding would seem to be that 
damages for tax malpractice in connection with wills or estate planning may 
never be recoverable by a decedent’s estate in Kansas.  However, the Court 
did note that in Kansas beneficiaries can sue attorneys, so attorneys might 
still be held responsible for such malpractice.
1029
 This raises the question of 
why the plaintiff did not bring this action also on her own behalf, as the 
primary heir of the decedent, rather than solely as the representative of the 
estate. As to the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant 
bank’s officer, the Kansas appellate court reversed in part, holding there 
were several factual issues concerning the scope of the fiduciary duties that 
needed to be developed at trial.
1030
 
In Hodge v. Cichon, five years before his death, the decedent consulted 
with a tax and estate planning specialist, Frank Yong, for estate planning 
advice.
1031
 Mr. Yong advised creating a family limited partnership and 
prepared documents to implement his suggestion.
1032
 The decedent was later 
declared partially incompetent, and three individuals were appointed as his 
guardians.
1033
  At the request of the guardians, the probate court entered an 
order directing the implementation of Mr. Yong’s estate plan to reduce the 
 
1024
Id. at 337. This portion of the appellate court’s holding was affirmed on appeal. Jeanes v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 295 P.3d 1045, 1053 (Kan. 2013). 
1025
Jeanes, 191 P.3d at 337. 
1026
Id. at 331–32, 137. 
1027
Id. at 337. 
1028
Id. at 333–34. 
1029
Id. at 334. 
1030
Id. at 340. 
1031
78 So. 3d 719, 720–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
1032
Id. at 721. 
1033
Id. 
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estate’s tax liability.1034 This plan was still not fully implemented when the 
decedent died two and one-half years later.
1035
 The plaintiffs, alleging they 
were intended beneficiaries of the decedent’s estate, brought this action 
against the guardians’ attorneys seeking to recover the loss caused by the 
higher estate taxes.
1036
 The trial court below granted summary judgment to 
the defendant attorneys on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiffs were not 
intended beneficiaries and therefore lacked standing to assert this cause of 
action; and (2) that the family limited partnership was not viable in the 
current situation.
1037
 The Florida appellate court reversed on both grounds, 
holding that there were factual issues that needed to be determined at trial 
and that summary judgment was not appropriate.
1038
 
In Driftmeyer v. Carlton, the deceased was one of four partners in a 
successful business.
1039
 The business had a pension plan that was funded 
with annuities and insurance policies.
1040
 The plan was arranged so that 
insurance proceeds payable upon the death of a partner could avoid being 
included in the partner’s gross estate, but only if the partner had created an 
intervivos trust to receive the insurance proceeds.
1041
 The decedent had not 
created the intervivos trust, so the insurance proceeds paid upon his death 
($2 million) were paid to his estate, and therefore subject to estate taxes.
1042
 
The plaintiff, the decedent’s sister and heir, as personal representative of the 
estate, sued everyone in sight, claiming they breached their fiduciary duty 
to explain to the decedent the importance of creating the intervivos trust to 
receive the insurance proceeds at death.
1043
 The defendants included the 
accountant who originally suggested the business establish a pension plan, 
the insurance agent who designed and sold the plan to the business, the 
insurance company who sold the insurance policies, the attorney for the 
business who had reviewed the pension plan before it was adopted, and a 
number of others.
1044
 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the evidence 
established that the decedent had been informed of the need to create the 
 
1034
Id. 
1035
Id. 
1036
Id. 
1037
Id. 
1038
Id. at 723. 
1039
No. L-06-1029, 2007 WL 1229305, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2007). 
1040
Id. at *2. 
1041
Id. 
1042
See id. at *2, *5. 
1043
Id. at *2. 
1044
Id. 
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intervivos trust by several of the defendants.
1045
 The evidence also 
established that the decedent did not really care for the life insurance feature 
of the plan and that he was “somewhat flippant” about the need to establish 
the intervivos trust.
1046
 The Ohio appellate court therefore affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the 
complaint.
1047
 
c. Drafting Errors  
Under I.R.C. section 2041(a)(2), if a person has a general power of 
appointment at death, the property subject to the power is included in that 
person’s gross estate for estate tax purposes.1048 A general power of 
appointment includes a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, but does 
not include any power limited by an ascertainable standard relating to the 
health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent.
1049
 The pertinent 
regulations provide that a power to use property for the welfare of the 
holder is not limited by an ascertainable standard.
1050
 
In Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 
the elder Carlsons, in 1988, retained the defendant attorneys to prepare their 
wills.
1051
 One of their goals was to avoid any additional federal and state 
estate taxes when the property was transferred from their children to their 
grandchildren.
1052
 The wills were identical and provided that upon the death 
of Mr. or Mrs. Carlson, their property would go into a trust, with a bank 
acting as trustee.
1053
 The income from the trust initially was payable to the 
surviving spouse.
1054
 Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the income 
was payable to their son and daughter-in-law or the survivor.
1055
 Upon the 
death of the survivor, the property would pass to their grandchildren.
1056
  
 
1045
Id. at *2. 
1046
Id. at *5. 
1047
Id. at *16. 
1048
I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2012). 
1049
I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (2012). 
1050
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1961). 
1051
868 N.E.2d 4, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), vacated, 895 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. 2008). 
1052
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 
(Ind. 2008). 
1053
Id. 
1054
Id. 
1055
Id. 
1056
Id. 
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The trustee had the power to invade principal for the son and daughter-in-
law “as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable . . . for either of their 
medical care, comfortable maintenance and welfare . . . .”1057 The trust also 
contained a provision giving a majority of the current income beneficiaries 
the power to remove the trustee for any reason and to appoint “any person” 
as the successor trustee.
1058
 Upon the death of testators’ son or daughter-in-
law, the survivor would be the sole remaining income beneficiary, and 
hence, would constitute a majority of the current income beneficiaries.
1059
 
As such, the survivor would have the power to remove the current trustee 
and appoint him or herself as trustee.
1060
 In turn, as trustee, the survivor 
would have the power to invade the trust’s principal for the survivor’s own 
“welfare,” a discretionary, not ascertainable, standard.1061 This power would 
require the entire corpus to be included in the survivor’s gross estate since 
the survivor possessed a general power of appointment.
1062
 
In Carlson, both Mr. and Mrs. Carlson died in 1992.
1063
 In 1994, an 
attorney retained to assist with the management of the elder Carlsons’ trust 
brought this problem to the attention of the Carlsons’ son.1064 At the request 
of the beneficiaries under the elder Carlsons’ wills, the defendants brought 
an action to reform the trust to eliminate the problematic language.
1065
 The 
trial court granted the petition to reform the trust.
1066
 The original language 
was reformed to eliminate the ability of the trustee to invade principal for 
the “welfare” of the beneficiaries.1067 The new language provided that the 
principal could be invaded if the trustee deems it necessary “for either of 
 
1057
Id. 
1058
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 868 N.E.2d 4, 10 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2007), vacated, 895 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. 2008). 
1059
Id. at 12. 
1060
Id. 
1061
Id. 
1062
Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1961):  
If under the terms of a trust instrument, the trustee . . . has the power to appoint the 
principal of the trust for the benefit of . . . himself, and the decedent has the unrestricted 
power to remove or discharge the trustee at any time and appoint . . . himself, the 
decedent is considered as having a power of appointment. 
1063
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 
(Ind. 2008). 
1064
Id. at 1193–94. 
1065
Id. at 1194. 
1066
Id. 
1067
See id. 
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their health and maintenance.”1068 This suit was thereafter brought by the 
beneficiaries of the elder Carlsons against the defendants, alleging 
malpractice in the drafting of the wills.
1069
 
In the trial court, the defendant attorneys were granted summary 
judgment on the ground that the reformation of the trust eliminated the 
malpractice.
1070
 The intermediate court reversed, holding the reformation of 
the trust was contrary to Indiana law.
1071
 The intermediate court also noted 
that for federal tax purposes, the decision of a state’s trial court is in any 
event not binding, so the possibility of a second estate tax upon the passage 
of the property to the elder Carlsons’ grandchildren was not eliminated.1072 
The Supreme Court of Indiana held the reformation of the trust was valid 
since they held avoiding adverse tax consequences was one of the main 
purposes of the testators.
1073
 The Court seems to have broken new ground in 
holding that reformation of testamentary trusts was also available to correct 
for a mistake of law, not just a mistake of fact.
1074
 Although upholding the 
validity of the reformation, the Supreme Court reversed the summary 
judgment awarded the defendant attorneys for two reasons.
1075
 First, if the 
defendants were negligent, the costs incurred by the plaintiffs in addressing 
the original drafting error may be recoverable damages regardless of 
whether additional estate taxes are incurred.
1076
 Also, although the Court 
was certain that its decision upholding the reformation of the trust was 
binding on the IRS since it was the highest court in Indiana, it was still 
uncertain whether the IRS might nevertheless attempt to avoid the effect of 
the reformation, and the Court refused to speculate on this point.
1077
 
In Pace v. Raisman & Assocs., Esqs., the defendant attorney amended a 
trust in 2001.
1078
  He assured the plaintiff’s decedent that any property in the 
 
1068
Id. 
1069
Id. at 1195. 
1070
Id. 
1071
Id. at 1198. 
1072
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes & Pagos, 868 N.E.2d 4, 17 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2007), vacated, 895 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. 2008). 
1073
See Carlson, 895 N.E.2d at 1199. 
1074
Id. at 1199–1201. 
1075
Id. at 1201. 
1076
Id. 
1077
Id. It is interesting to note that the court suggested the parties attempt to obtain a private 
letter ruling on this latter issue. Id. at 1201 n.11. 
1078
945 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (App. Div. 2012). 
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trust at the decedent’s death would not be included in his gross estate.1079 It 
was later determined that the amendment provided the decedent with too 
much authority to borrow trust corpus or income without adequate 
consideration, and all property conveyed to the trust after the amendment 
was includible in the decedent’s gross estate.1080 The Appellate Court held 
the suit was not timely filed and reversed the lower court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss.1081 
Although deciding only the procedural issue to remand a litigation back 
to Pennsylvania state courts, the asserted negligence in Booth v. Baldwin 
also concerned the defective drafting of a trust.
1082
 In Booth, the defendant 
attorney drafted an irrevocable trust as part of the estate planning for the 
plaintiff.
1083
 After the death of the attorney, the plaintiff retained a new 
attorney and accountants.
1084
 After reviewing the trust, they informed the 
plaintiff that the trust was a revocable trust and the property that had been 
gifted to the trust would be included in his gross estate.
1085
 The plaintiff 
then obtained a local court order changing the trust language.
1086
 The IRS 
refused to issue a private letter ruling accepting the change.
1087
 The plaintiff 
then instituted this action seeking damages for the anticipated additional 
taxes to be incurred and the cost of correcting the defendant’s negligent 
drafting.
1088
 
In Allmen v. Fox Rothschild LLP, the plaintiffs alleged the defendant 
attorneys were negligent both in drafting the tax allocation clauses in the 
decedent’s will and subsequently in preparing the estate’s federal and state 
estate tax returns.
1089
 Allegedly, certain bank and brokerage accounts owned 
by the decedent were reported by the defendants as joint accounts on the 
estate tax returns, rather than as part of the estate.
1090
 As a result, the funds 
in these accounts could not be used to pay debts and expenses of the 
 
1079
Id. 
1080
Id. 
1081
Id. at 121. 
1082
No. 2:09-cv-1361, 2009 WL 3756676, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2009). 
1083
Id. 
1084
Id. 
1085
Id. 
1086
Id. 
1087
Id. 
1088
Id. 
1089
101964/11, 2012 WL 470451, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
1090
Id. at *1–2. 
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estate.
1091
 Instead, funds that otherwise would have gone to a charitable lead 
trust were utilized to pay the debts and expenses, thereby reducing the 
estate’s charitable tax deduction.1092 The case, however, addressed only the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, not the substance of the claim.1093 The court 
held that the statute of limitations had expired regarding work done by the 
defendant attorneys on drafting the decedent’s will, but was still open on 
work done in connection with filing the estate’s tax returns.1094 
E. Business Related Tax Planning 
1. Benefit Plans 
In the employee benefit area, the tax benefit that is normally obtained by 
utilizing a qualified plan is for the employer to be able to obtain a current 
deduction for amounts spent to provide some type of future benefits to 
employees. The employees are taxed in the future as the benefits are 
received. To achieve this tax magic of an immediate deduction coupled with 
future income recognition, the I.R.C. normally requires a trust be utilized as 
an intermediary. The employer pays the cost currently to the trust, thus 
putting the money beyond its control. The trust then has the obligation to 
invest, maintain and manage the funds to enable it to provide the benefits 
promised the employees.
1095
 As an overlay in this area, there are a number 
of requirements imposed by ERISA
1096
 designed to assure the safety of the 
funds and the fairness of the benefits and procedures. As a result, in this 
area many professionals are involved in addition to the attorney (or benefit 
consultant) who drafts (and updates) the original plan and the accountant 
who prepares the annual tax return. A plan administrator, actuary, custodian 
of assets, insurance company, and various other consultants are often 
encountered. It should be noted that some of these individuals, as well as 
the promoters, financial planners and other consultants may not be 
 
1091
Id. at *2. 
1092
Id. The court noted that the reduction of the estate’s charitable contribution deduction 
further increased the estate’s taxes, thereby necessitating the use of funds that otherwise would 
have gone to the charitable lead trust, thereby further reducing the charitable deduction. Id. 
1093
Id. at *1. 
1094
Id. at *4. 
1095
See generally, Finston and Jewett, 351-5
th
 T.M., Plan Qualification—Pension and Profit – 
Sharing Plans at A-1 to A-3. 
1096
Id. at A-1. 
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“professionals” under the tort or other laws of a particular state.1097 One of 
the tax policy concerns in the benefit area is to assure that the benefit plan 
or arrangement actually benefits a broad range of employees, not just the 
owners.
1098
 
Although all the cases examined in this section involve some type of 
benefit plan connection, in several of the cases the underlying facts are 
rather sparse or not clearly presented. For instance, Gertler, M.D., P.C. v. 
Sol Masch & Co. discloses only that the malpractice alleged against an 
accounting firm involved trading securities on margin within a pension plan 
trust.
1099
 No additional details are offered.
1100
 The case affirms the trial 
court’s dismissal of the action upon the defendant’s motion for a directed 
verdict due to insufficient evidence presented by the plaintiff.
1101
 The court 
did note summarily that under New York law, taxes and interest on 
underpaid taxes are not recoverable as damages.
1102
 Similarly, at the heart 
of the cause of action in Trico Bancshares & Subsidiaries v. Rothgerber 
Johnson & Lyons LLP is the claim the plaintiffs incurred $440,000 in 
additional federal and California income taxes because the defendant law 
firm drafted a defective stock option plan for the plaintiffs.
1103
 However, the 
case never mentions or cites any relevant income tax provision.
1104
 Instead, 
the focus is on the fact the defendant law firm was retained “to handle all 
phases of SEC compliance” for plaintiffs.1105 The case mostly addresses, 
and denies, defendant’s motion to change venue.1106 
In Schafer v. Johanson, the malpractice asserted occurred in connection 
with the creation and operation of an employee stock ownership plan 
(“ESOP”).1107 However, there are so many different allegations of fault 
against the attorneys and law firm that drafted the plan, and against a 
number of others involved with the establishment and/or operation of the 
plan over several years, that the precise nature of the malpractice and, 
 
1097
Id. 
1098
Id. at A-18. 
1099
835 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (App. Div. 2007). 
1100
See id. 
1101
Id. at 178–79. 
1102
Id. at 179. 
1103
No. 2:09-CV-01700 GEB JFM, 2009 WL 3365855, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2009). 
1104
See id. at *1–4. 
1105
Id. at *1, *3. 
1106
Id. at *3–4. 
1107
No. 09-10349-BC, 2009 WL 2496943, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2009). 
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perhaps, fraud is difficult to fathom.
1108
 Boiled down to its essence, it seems 
the defendant attorneys convinced the plaintiffs to establish the ESOP.
1109
 
The individual plaintiffs also attempted to utilize I.R.C. section 1042 which 
permits the sale of shares of stock in the employer corporation sponsoring 
the ESOP to the ESOP without immediate recognition of gain by the sellers 
if a number of conditions are met.
1110
 One of these conditions is the 
requirement to purchase qualified replacement property with the proceeds 
of the sale of the employer stock to the ESOP.
1111
 The attorneys were 
apparently orchestrating all of the required activities.
1112
 They also 
instructed plaintiffs to deal with various parties the attorneys selected.
1113
 
The attorneys apparently also represented the plaintiffs in connection with 
IRS filings, IRS challenges to the efficacy of the ESOP, and compliance 
with I.R.C. section 1042.
1114
 There were also allegations of money being 
wasted or stolen and attorney conflicts of interest.
1115
 In addition, there is 
some issue of whether the attorney defendants were representing only the 
corporate plaintiffs or the individual plaintiffs also.
1116
 The bulk of the 
court’s opinion focused on whether the dispute was subject to 
arbitration.
1117
 The court denied motions by the plaintiffs and the defendants 
concerning arbitration and sent the case back for additional discovery to 
clarify the facts.
1118
 The court also seems to have been unable to unravel the 
precise nature of the dispute from the confused pleadings.
1119
 
Both Vig v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co. and Finderne Management. 
Co. v. Barrett involved invalid welfare benefit plans under I.R.C. section 
 
1108
Id. at *1–2. 
1109
See id. at *2. 
1110
See id. at *1; I.R.C. § 1042 (2012). 
1111
See Schafer, 2009 WL 2496943, at *1; I.R.C. § 1042(a)(2) (2012). 
1112
See Schafer, 2009 WL 2496943, at *2. 
1113
Id. at *5. 
1114
Id. 
1115
Id. at *6. 
1116
Id. at *8. 
1117
The defendant attorneys and law firms moved to dismiss the action or compel arbitration. 
Id. at *1. There was also a motion to dismiss another defendant. Id. at *1, *12. 
1118
Id. at *12. 
1119 “At this juncture, the structure of the transactions and the portions of the transactions, 
conduct or advice challenged by Plaintiffs is sufficiently vague such that the court is unable to 
determine the scope of the arbitration agreements entered by the corporations of which the 
Plaintiffs were shareholders or entered by Plaintiffs themselves and whether Plaintiffs’ claims fall 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Id. at *11. 
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419 (e)(1).
1120
 Although Vig does not explore the underlying facts in nearly 
as much detail as Finderne, it seems very likely that in both the basic flaws 
with the plans were quite similar. In both cases the plaintiffs were 
convinced to adopt and participate in section 419(e)(1) welfare benefit 
plans.
1121
 The major benefit was that these plans provided an immediate tax 
deduction for the annual contributions, while benefits would be taxed later, 
when received.
1122
 In Finderne the plan covered only the two brothers who 
operated the trucking businesses involved and their sister.
1123
 While the 
sister received some group term insurance under the plan, only the brothers 
would be able to convert their insurance to receive retirement benefits at 
age sixty-five.
1124
 In addition, the court indicated that the annual premiums 
paid were inflated so as to have a larger benefit at retirement.
1125
 In effect, 
there was no real welfare plan for employees, just a scheme to enable the 
primary business owners to purchase retirement benefits and currently 
deduct the premiums.
1126
 
In Vig the plaintiffs invested $150,000 in the benefit plan, known as the 
Xelan 419 Welfare Benefit Trust, on the understanding that the plan was a 
legitimate tax shelter, rather than an improper tax avoidance scheme.
1127
 
When new IRS regulations were promulgated and it became obvious the 
plan was invalid, the plan was terminated.
1128
 The plaintiffs lost virtually 
their entire investment in the plan ($143,000) and they expected to owe 
additional taxes, interest and penalties to the IRS.
1129
 They brought this 
action to recover these amounts.
1130
 Since the Xelan Plan was in 
bankruptcy, they did not sue the Plan.
1131
 They sued the person who was the 
plan’s chairman, founder and trustee, the insurance company that marketed 
the plan and provided the plan’s insurance policy, the insurance company’s 
agent and the attorneys who, on behalf of the other defendants, provided a 
 
1120
Vig, 336 B.R. 279, 280 (S.D. Miss. 2005); Finderne, 955 A.2d 940, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2008); I.R.C. § 419(e)(1) (2012). 
1121
Vig, 336 B.R. at 280–81; Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946. 
1122
Vig, 336 B.R. at 282; Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946. 
1123
Finderne, 955 A.2d at 946 n.2. 
1124
Id. 
1125
Id. at 946. 
1126
See id. 
1127
Vig, 336 B.R. at 280–81. 
1128
Id. at 281. 
1129
Id. 
1130
Id. 
1131
Id. 
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legal opinion that the plan was a valid section 419 welfare benefit plan.
1132
 
Unfortunately, Vig did not address the merits of the claim, but only decided 
the case would be remanded to state court.
1133
 
Although differing in a number of details,
1134
 the basic claim in 
Finderne is the same as in Vig. The plaintiffs were convinced they were 
obtaining a legitimate tax shelter in the form of a valid section 419 welfare 
plan, here known as an “EPIC” plan, when, in reality, the plan was 
invalid.
1135
 The plaintiffs adopted the plan in 1991 and participated in it for 
six years, contributing over $336,000 to the plan.
1136
 The plan was later 
challenged by the IRS, and the plaintiffs were audited for 1994 and 
1995.
1137
 As a result of the audit, the plaintiffs paid additional taxes and 
interest of approximately $50,000 for these two years.
1138
 The IRS waived 
penalties and did not seek additional taxes for the prior four years.
1139
 The 
plaintiffs also had to terminate their participation in the plan.
1140
 They lost 
most of their investment in the plan because the plan’s insurance policies 
lapsed.
1141
 The plaintiffs subsequently brought suit against all the parties 
involved with the plan and against the two financial planners who 
convinced them to adopt the plan.
1142
 After a jury trial, the plaintiffs were 
awarded damages of almost $37,000 from each of the financial planners.
1143
 
 
1132
Id. 
1133
Id. at 286. 
1134
The Finderne court very meticulously presents the relevant tax provisions. Finderne 
Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 948–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). The primary 
difference from the plan in Vig is that the EPIC plan was promoted as being a valid multiple 
employer plan pursuant to I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6). Id. at 948. As such, some of the funding 
restrictions on single employer plans were not applicable. Id. However, the plan did not qualify as 
a valid multiple employer plan. Id. at 949. 
1135
Id. at 948–49. 
1136
Id. at 946. 
1137
Id. at 947. 
1138
Id. 
1139
Id. 
1140
Id. 
1141
Id. 
1142 One of the financial planners, Barrett, was the plaintiffs’ financial advisor and insurance 
salesman since 1977. Id. at 945. The other advisor, Papetti, was also a CPA. Id. at 953. However, 
the court indicated that he was being sued only in his role of financial planner and not as a CPA. 
Id. 
1143
Id. at 947. 
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Finderne is the appeal by both plaintiffs and defendants from the trial 
judgment.
1144
 
In addition to holding the rendition of the complex tax avoidance advice 
by the financial planner defendants was not subject to New Jersey’s 
Consumer Fraud Act,
1145
 Finderne addressed two important aspects of 
damages recoverable in such situations: (1) the basic theory underlying 
recoverable damages; and (2) whether income tax benefits recognized by a 
plaintiff reduce recoverable damages.
1146
 
With regard to the basic theory of damages, in connection with the trial 
below, a motion judge decided the plaintiffs could only collect out-of-
pocket damages and not expectancy, benefit-of-the-bargain, damages.
1147
 
The judge held that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were not appropriate 
because they would result in an inappropriate windfall to the plaintiffs.
1148
 
In effect, such damages would result in the plaintiffs receiving the tax 
benefits promised by the promoters of the EPIC plan even though those 
benefits were clearly not available under the I.R.C.
1149
 On appeal, the court 
agreed with this reasoning.
1150
 Finderne acknowledged that the appropriate 
measure of damages in fraud cases was a “perplexing problem.”1151 While 
New Jersey does recognize benefit-of-the-bargain damages in fraud 
situations, the court ultimately agreed with the motion judge that the effect 
of awarding such damages would be to enforce the EPIC contract and give 
the plaintiffs unwarranted tax benefits.
1152
 The court seemed to view the 
promised EPIC benefits as an illegal contract, which the court refused to 
enforce.
1153
 To buttress its conclusion, Finderne also noted that to obtain a 
benefits-of-the-bargain recovery would require the damages claimed to be 
established with “sufficient certainty.”1154 Here, the court held, the 
plaintiffs’ damages did not meet this threshold because: “[t]he projected 
retirement benefits analysis given to plaintiffs were estimates, contingent on 
issues including the amount of the conversion credits as allowed by the 
 
1144
Id. at 947–48. 
1145
Id. at 956. 
1146
Id. 
1147
Id. 
1148
Id. 
1149
Id. 
1150
Id. at 957. 
1151
Id. 
1152
Id. 
1153
See id. at 958. 
1154
Id. at 957. 
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insurance company, . . . [plaintiffs’] experience rating, or possible future 
changes in the tax laws.”1155 Interestingly, the court also noted the 
plaintiffs’ dirty hands in that they knew their EPIC participation involved 
taking advantage of a very narrow tax exclusion and that they were 
significantly overpaying for the insurance and claiming a tax deduction for 
the inflated amount.
1156
 One may wonder whether this influenced the 
court’s holding. 
Concerning whether any income tax benefits obtained by the plaintiff as 
a result of the losses caused by the defendants may reduce the recoverable 
damages, the trial judge below dealt with this issue in a very Solomonic 
fashion.  At trial the plaintiffs argued for a jury instruction telling the jury to 
ignore any tax savings.
1157
 The defendants maintained that any damages 
should be reduced by the tax deductions taken by the plaintiffs for the four 
years the IRS did not challenge.
1158
 Not wishing to resolve this issue, the 
trial judge included both positions in his charge to the jury and left this 
issue entirely to the jury.
1159
 
With such a wise disposition, on appeal Finderne affirmed the trial 
judge, finding no legal error present.
1160
 In analyzing the issue, Finderne did 
hold that Randall v. Loftsgaarden, in which the United States Supreme 
Court held a tax benefit flowing from an investment did not reduce 
damages recoverable under federal securities laws based on fraud in a 
prospectus, did not apply to situations such as the present one.
1161
 The court 
also noted that in Burdett v. Miller, the Seventh Circuit held that tax 
benefits received must be considered in determining damages.
1162
 Finally, 
Finderne strongly suggested that New Jersey’s strong public policy against 
permitting double recoveries might apply and thereby require the reduction 
of damages for tax benefits received.
1163
 
Unlike Vig and Finderne, which involved bad I.R.C. § 419 welfare 
benefit plans, Kelter v. Hartstein involved a bad pension plan under IRC 
 
1155
Id. at 957. 
1156
Id. 
1157
Id. at 959. 
1158
Id. 
1159
Id. 
1160
Id. at 961. 
1161
Id. at 960 (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 659–60 (8th Cir. 1986)). 
1162
Id. (citing Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1383 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
1163
Id. at 960–61. 
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section 412(i).
1164
 Although Vig and Finderne each used the term tax shelter 
to describe the arrangements involved in those cases, in Kelter the tax 
shelter aspect seems more pronounced. It reminds one of the abusive 
generic shelters, and perhaps, may belong in the same category.
1165
 
Under I.R.C. section 412(i) plans, an employer holds in a trust an 
insurance policy on the life of each plan participant.
1166
 Each year the 
employer funds the trust to pay the insurance premiums and receives a tax 
deduction for the amount paid.
1167
 When a plan participant retires, the 
insurance policy on the participant’s life is sold and the proceeds used to 
purchase an annuity to pay the participant her or his retirement benefits.
1168
 
Because all the premiums paid under the plan are deductible, taxpayers 
have attempted to shelter large amounts of income in such plans.
1169
 The 
IRS responded by identifying certain plans as abusive tax shelters not 
entitled to any tax benefits.
1170
 The abusive plans are ones funded solely 
with life insurance policies that (a) provide death benefits above the level 
permitted by section 412(i); (b) pay extremely high compensation to the 
salespeople; and (c) carry exorbitant surrender charges that essentially 
prevent an employer from terminating the insurance early.
1171
 
An insurance company, the defendant ECI GROUP, a pension planner, 
and defendant attorney Bryan Cave developed the Pendulum Plan involved 
in Kelter, which contained each of these characteristics, in the late 
1990s.
1172
 In 1999, defendant ECI was warned about the possibility its plan 
was abusive.
1173
 In June, 2003, ECI announced it would stop marketing the 
plan in December, 2003.
1174
 Nevertheless, ECI sold this plan to plaintiffs in 
December, 2003.
1175
  The plaintiffs were reassured by those involved with 
 
1164
No. G042753, 2011 WL 2556033, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2011); I.R.C. § 412(i) 
(2006). 
1165
Part II supra. 
1166
I.R.C. § 412(i) (2006). 
1167
Id. 
1168
Id. 
1169
Kelter, 2011 WL 2556033, at *1. 
1170
Id. 
1171
Id. 
1172
Id. at *2. 
1173
Id. 
1174
Id. 
1175
Id. 
2014] BAD TAX SHELTERS 723 
selling the plan that the plan was valid for income tax purposes.
1176
 They 
were never warned about the tax risks associated with the plan.
1177
 
In February, 2004, the IRS issued two revenue rulings and proposed 
regulations further defining abusive section 412(i) plans.
1178
 Although ECI 
informed plaintiffs of the proposed regulations, both ECI and Bryan Cave 
assured the plaintiffs the plan was valid and urged them to continue paying 
the insurance premiums.
1179
 In April, 2004, plaintiffs retained defendant 
attorney Bryan Cave to obtain an IRS determination letter that plaintiffs’ 
plan seemed valid.
1180
 The favorable letter was obtained in March, 2005.
1181
 
In early 2006, the IRS notified the plaintiffs that the plan would be audited 
to determine whether it was qualified.
1182
 The audit resulted in a final 
determination by the IRS in June, 2007, that the plan was abusive and not 
qualified under section 412(i).
1183
 Bryan Cave represented plaintiffs on this 
audit.
1184
 This suit was commenced in September, 2008.
1185
 At that time the 
plaintiffs and the IRS were still negotiating how much back taxes, interest 
and penalties plaintiffs would be required to pay.
1186
 
This suit was brought against the insurance companies, pension 
planners, financial advisors, accountants, attorneys, and other professionals 
who developed and sold plaintiffs the plan.
1187
 The damages sought were to 
recover all contributions to the plan, all back taxes, interest and penalties to 
be assessed by the IRS, and the cost incurred during the IRS audit.
1188
 
Unfortunately, Kelter does not address the substance of the asserted 
claims. The trial court dismissed the complaint against ECI and Bryan Cave 
on statute of limitations grounds and, alternatively, also dismissed one 
cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty) against ECI and all causes of 
action against attorney Bryan Cave on other grounds.
1189
 On appeal, the 
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Id. 
1177
Id. 
1178
Id. 
1179
Id. 
1180
Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. at *3. 
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Id. 
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Id. 
1185
Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. 
1188
Id. at *1. 
1189
Id. 
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court reversed the dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.
1190
 The lower 
court held the statute of limitations began to run in December, 2003, when 
plaintiffs adopted the plan and paid the first premium.
1191
 However, the 
appellate court held the statute of limitations did not begin to run until June, 
2007, when the IRS issued its final determination that the plan was abusive 
and disallowed plaintiffs’ tax deductions.1192 The court did affirm the lower 
court’s alternative holding, dismissing one count against defendant ECI 
because the plaintiffs never established the existence of any fiduciary 
relationship between them and ECI,
1193
 and all counts against defendant 
Bryan Cave because of various pleading defects.
1194
 
Denenberg v. Rosen also involved a Pendulum Plan and certain of the 
same defendants as in Kelter,
1195
 such as Hartstein, ECI, and, for the tax 
malpractice focus, the law firm of Bryan Cave.
1196
 The crux of the 
complaint was that the defendants induced the plaintiff to establish a 
pension plan funded with life insurance policies that guaranteed tax benefits 
that were later disallowed by the IRS, resulting in the loss of deductions and 
the imposition of excise taxes.
1197
 The plaintiff adopted the plan in 
December, 2002, but it was effective as of October 1, 2001.
1198
 
The claim of malpractice against Bryan Cave and the individual attorney 
who did the work was based primarily on the fact that the marketing 
materials contained a September, 1999, opinion from Bryan Cave that the 
plan was legal.
1199
 The opinion, however, contained a caveat that it was 
issued only to the promoter and advised that each employer considering 
participation in the plan should obtain their own advice relating to tax 
matters.
1200
 The plaintiff also signed an acknowledgment in connection with 
his adoption of the plan, that it was his responsibility to obtain legal and tax 
advice concerning the plan and that he disclaimed relying on any tax 
information provided by the promoters.
1201
 The plaintiff also retained Bryan 
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Id. 
1191
Id. 
1192
Id. at *4. 
1193
Id. at *1. 
1194
Id. 
1195
Id. 
1196
897 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392–93 (App. Div. 2010). 
1197
Id. at 392. 
1198
Id. at 394. 
1199
Id. at 393. 
1200
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Id. at 394. 
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Cave to submit the form of the plan for IRS approval, which was obtained 
in April, 2002,
1202
 and for representation at the IRS audit of the plan in 
2004–2005.1203 
The First Department reversed the lower court’s order denying Bryan 
Cave’s motion to dismiss, because there was no attorney-client relationship 
between the plaintiff and Bryan Cave in 2002 when the plan was 
adopted.
1204
 Also, there was no proof of any malpractice by Bryan Cave.
1205
 
The form of the Pendulum Plan was valid.
1206
 It was the plaintiff’s 
operation of the plan that was not acceptable, since the plan used life 
insurance as a tax shelter “in amounts that greatly exceeded both IRS 
imposed limits and the terms of the plan document prepared by Bryan Cave 
and approved by the IRS.”1207 The other work performed by Bryan Cave—
submitting the plan form for IRS approval and representation before the 
IRS—was performed competently.1208 
Bhatia v. Dischino is similar to Kelter. In Bhatia, the plaintiffs were a 
married couple who were advised by their accountant in October, 2004, to 
establish a § 412(i) retirement plan for the wife’s private psychology 
practice.
1209
 After consulting with their accountant’s boss (defendant 
Dischino), a financial advisor, an executive benefit planning company 
(defendant ECI), a company that administers and manages retirement plans, 
and an insurance company (defendant Indianapolis Life), they decided to 
proceed and established their plan on March 30, 2005.
1210
 According to the 
complaint, none of the advisors or defendants ever mentioned the 
possibility that the § 412(i) plan might be considered an abusive tax shelter 
or that certain forms were required by the IRS to be filed for such plans, 
despite the fact the IRS had issued two rulings addressing such plans in 
February, 2004, and had apparently been cautioning against the potential 
illegal use of such plans since 1989.
1211
 The plaintiffs’ plan received a 
 
1202
Id. 
1203
Id. at 397. 
1204
Id. at 396. 
1205
See id. at 397. 
1206
See id. at 396. 
1207
Id. 
1208
See id. at 397. 
1209
No. 3:09-CV-1086-B, 2011 WL 3820825, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2011). 
1210
Id. at *1–2. 
1211
Id. The plaintiffs apparently received a disclosure form from the insurance company when 
they purchased their policy disclosing the IRS guidance and the risks with using a life insurance 
policy to fund a section 412(i) plan. Id. at *2 n.3. 
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favorable IRS determination in October, 2005.
1212
 However in June, 2006, a 
Notice of Summons was served upon ECI regarding the plan and the IRS 
subsequently audited the plan.
1213
 
As a result of the IRS audit, the following problems with the plan were 
uncovered: first, the plan was operating as an abusive and impermissible tax 
shelter, allegedly caused by misfeasance of the actuary;
1214
 second, the 
accountant had failed to file the required tax shelter Disclosure Form 8886 
for the prior two years;
1215
 finally, the accountant had regularly misfiled 
forms and had been forced to re-file, incurring penalties for the plaintiffs 
without their knowledge.
1216
 Upon receiving the audit letter from the IRS, 
the plaintiffs dissolved the plan.
1217
 
The damages suffered by the plaintiffs included over $50,000 in under-
reporting penalties and $900,000 in penalties for failing to file Form 8886, 
as well as other back taxes and interest.
1218
 When the plaintiffs cashed out 
their plan’s insurance policy they lost almost $267,000, the difference 
between their contributions to the plan ($496,500) and the cash value 
($229,500).
1219
 Finally, in order to cash out the original insurance policy, 
the plaintiffs were forced to accept another policy in exchange.
1220
 The 
terms of the new policy allegedly were misrepresented to the plaintiffs, 
ultimately causing an additional $270,000 in further losses.
1221
 
As in Kelter, the court in Bhatia also never reached the substantive 
issues. In Bhatia, defendants Indianapolis Life and ECI each moved for 
judgment on the pleadings.
1222
 The court granted Indianapolis Life’s motion 
since the plaintiffs’ pleadings were deficient in setting forth the asserted 
causes of action.
1223
 With respect to ECI, the court granted the defendant’s 
motion with respect to plaintiffs’ fraud, ERISA and rescission claims.1224 
However, the court denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ claim 
 
1212
Id. at *2. 
1213
Id. 
1214
Id. 
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Id. 
1216
Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. 
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Id. at *3. 
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Id. at *11. 
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for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence/malpractice and 
negligence.
1225
 
MCNC v. Aon Consulting, Inc. did not involve any tax shelters, but 
simply incorrect tax advice given by defendant, a benefit consulting 
firm.
1226
 The plaintiff was a tax exempt nonprofit organization.
1227
 It had 
maintained a pension plan for its employees since 1983.
1228
 In 1995, it 
sought to enhance its plan and retained the defendant for advice.
1229
 Based 
on defendant’s advice, the plaintiff amended its plan as of April 1, 1996, to 
provide for mandatory contributions from its employees, which, based on 
defendant’s advice, would not be subject to federal income or social 
security taxes.
1230
 
In addition to the advice in 1995–96 concerning the plan amendment, 
the defendant provided various plan related services until January, 2002.
1231
 
These services included preparing the plan’s annual report (IRS Form 5500) 
filed with the Department of Labor, and summary annual reports given to 
plan participants, as well as other services.
1232
 In 2002, the plaintiff 
terminated its relationship with the defendant and retained outside counsel 
to prepare its annual reports.
1233
 
In 2003, the plaintiff was informed by its outside counsel that the 
defendant’s advice concerning the mandatory contributions was wrong and 
that taxes might be owed on past contributions.
1234
 In addition to changing 
its plan to eliminate the mandatory contributions, it voluntarily notified the 
IRS and Social Security Administration of its error.
1235
 The plaintiff worked 
out a settlement with the IRS that required no payment of back taxes.
1236
 It 
did pay social security taxes for 2002–2004, the open tax years.1237 Neither 
agency ever issued a formal assessment against the plaintiff.
1238
 Plaintiff 
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Id. at *15, *17–18. 
1226
No. 1:05CV00194, 2006 WL 3733267, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 2006). 
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also incurred attorneys’ fees and a $5,000 fee to IRS in connection with 
these settlements.
1239
 It then instituted this action against the defendant for 
negligent misrepresentation and professional malpractice.
1240
 This case 
resulted in a denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1241 
As an initial matter, the court in MCNC decided that the defendant was 
acting as a “professional” in giving tax advice to the plaintiff and treated 
this as a professional malpractice claim under North Carolina law.
1242
 The 
main focus of the case was on the statute of limitations. The defendant 
argued both that the statute of limitations never commenced running and 
that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
1243
 
The more interesting issue concerned the defendant’s argument that the 
statute of limitations never commenced because the plaintiff voluntarily 
worked out settlements with the IRS and the Social Security Administration 
and neither ever issued an assessment against the plaintiff. This argument 
was based on a North Carolina case that held the statute of limitations 
against an attorney and accountant for wrong tax advice commenced to run 
when the IRS assessed additional tax.
1244
 Limiting Snipes to its facts, the 
MCNC court held that as a matter of public policy, taxpayers need to be 
encouraged to voluntarily come forth and settle tax mistakes.
1245
 To lose 
one’s malpractice claim because one voluntarily reports and settles tax 
problems prior to an IRS assessment makes no sense. According to the 
court, any contrary holding would force taxpayers to choose between 
(1) losing their malpractice claim by voluntarily addressing it prior to an 
IRS assessment, or (2) keeping silent and hoping the error is never 
discovered, but if it is, to salvage their malpractice claim.
1246
 The court also 
indicated other public policy reasons to hold that a plaintiff’s claim accrues 
when it voluntarily notifies the IRS.
1247
 First, by voluntarily notifying the 
IRS, plaintiff may avoid greater damages, thus mitigating damages for itself 
 
1239
Id. 
1240
Id. 
1241
Id. at *1. The court adopted the Recommendation and Order of the Magistrate Judge to 
whom the case was referred. Id. 
1242
Id. at *3. 
1243
Id. at *1. 
1244
Id. at *4. The North Carolina case is Snipes v. Jackson, 316 S.E.2d 657, 659 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
1245
MCNC, 2006 WL 3733267, at *4. 
1246
Id. 
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Id. at *4, n.2. 
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and the defendant.
1248
 And second, as a fiduciary, plaintiff had a duty to the 
plan and its participants to protect them from the consequences of any 
mistakes that had been made.
1249
 
As to the defendant’s argument that the statute of limitations had 
already expired on the theory that it commenced to run in 1995 or 1996, 
when the plan was amended to include the mandatory contributions, the 
court held the statute commenced running in 2002 when the defendant 
prepared its last plan report.
1250
 Until then, the statute was suspended due to 
the ongoing relationship between the parties and the defendant’s obligation 
to prepare an accurate annual report.
1251
 
Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. also involved incorrect 
tax advice concerning a benefit plan.
1252
 In March 2000, with the assistance 
of the defendants, the plaintiff established an employee death benefit plan 
that was to be funded with life insurance policies.
1253
 In May 2003, the 
managers of the plan notified the plaintiff that the plan did not comply with 
IRS regulations and that the plaintiff would need to terminate participation 
in the plan by the end of 2003.
1254
 The plaintiff consulted with the 
defendants concerning its options.
1255
 In October 2003, the plaintiff was 
advised by defendant Chase’s vice president of its insurance brokerage and 
advisory services to terminate its participation in the plan and to transfer the 
insurance policies to a welfare benefit trust.
1256
 The plaintiff was advised 
the transfer should be nontaxable and that further premiums would be 
deductible.
1257
 After the plaintiff’s accountant, defendant Grant Thornton, 
concurred with Chase’s advice, the plaintiff followed the advice.1258 On its 
tax return for 2003, the amount of the policies transferred to the new plan 
was not included in gross income.
1259
 In March 2007, the IRS notified the 
plaintiff that terminating their participation in the original plan was a 
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No. 603012/09, 2010 WL 5782547, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2010), aff’d, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Div. 2012). The benefit plan was under I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6) (2012). 
1253
Fownes, 2010 WL 5782547, at *2. 
1254
Id. 
1255
Id. 
1256
Id. 
1257
Id. 
1258
Id. 
1259
Id. 
730 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3 
taxable event, for which they incurred back-taxes and penalties of over 
$900,000.
1260
 This suit was commenced in September 2009 by the plaintiff 
to recover its damages.
1261
 
The court dismissed all but one of the plaintiff’s causes of action on 
statute of limitations grounds
1262
 and because there were no allegations the 
defendants knowingly made false statements.
1263
 The only claim that 
survived was a claim for unjust enrichment against the accountant 
defendant, since there was a possibility the plaintiff might be able to 
recover the fees paid the accountant.
1264
 The plaintiff was given leave to 
replead this cause of action with greater specificity.
1265
 
Although the plaintiff’s fraud cause of action was dismissed essentially 
because there was no allegation that either defendant knowingly made false 
statements, it is noteworthy that the trial court and the First Department also 
proceeded to indicate that under New York’s out-of-pocket measure of 
damages for fraud, taxes paid are not recoverable and the plaintiff therefore 
failed to allege recoverable damages:
1266
 
Plaintiffs’ tax liability did not flow naturally from the 
alleged misrepresentations by defendants, but rather from 
the taxable event created when plaintiffs switched from one 
employee benefit plan to another . . . The fact that plaintiffs 
may have performed the transfer pursuant to advice from 
defendants does not convert plaintiffs’ tax liability into 
consequential damages . . . .
1267
 
It seems almost incomprehensible that if a professional were to give 
fraudulent advice to another who follows the advice and thereby incurs 
 
1260
Id. 
1261
Id. The amount of damages sought is not clear. After presenting the basic facts the 
opinion states the plaintiff sought to recover as damages “the additional taxes assessed against 
them by the IRS.” Id. It is unclear whether all taxes paid or only some lesser amount was sought. 
Similarly, the court never separates the penalties from the taxes. From a jurisprudential 
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Fownes Bros. & Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 939 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (App. Div. 
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additional taxes, no remedy would be available under New York fraud law. 
In addition, it seems to me, that regardless of the logic of the basic rule, any 
penalties incurred are recoverable damages.
1268
 
Although pertaining to a pension plan, a rather complex area of tax law, 
In-Line Suspension, Inc. v. Weinberg & Weinberg, P.C. illustrates the need 
to adhere to basics to document important decisions. In In-Line, the plaintiff 
was a corporation that had a pension and profit sharing plan and the 
defendant was the attorney who did work for the plan.
1269
 The plaintiff had 
both salaried and commissioned employees.
1270
 The plan was to cover only 
the salaried employees.
1271
 In 1997, the plan was amended, and under the 
amendment the plan was extended to all employees.
1272
 The plaintiff and 
defendant disagreed as to whether this change was authorized by the 
plaintiff.
1273
 In early 2000, the plaintiff first learned of the extension of the 
plan to the commissioned employees.
1274
 In addition to revising the plan, 
the plaintiff then needed to make contributions for 1997 and 1998 for the 
commissioned employees, pay interest on the late contributions and pay 
IRS imposed fees.
1275
 The plaintiff also elected not to make contributions 
for any employees for 1999 in order to avoid making contributions for the 
commissioned employees for that year.
1276
 
The plaintiff then instituted this malpractice action to recover the 
additional contributions paid for the commissioned employees, the 
additional interest, fees and costs, and also for over $10,000 for the “loss of 
value” to the plaintiff and the owner for the omitted 1999 contributions.1277 
Presumably, this latter item was the additional income taxes the plaintiff 
incurred for 1999 because there was no pension contribution made for that 
year.
1278
 
 
1268
See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 38, at 731. 
1269
687 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004). 
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At trial, the plaintiffs received a jury verdict of over $46,000.
1279
 The 
appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because testimony by 
the defendant’s expert was erroneously excluded at the trial.1280 
Although not addressed by the court due to the remand, one of the errors 
asserted by the defendant was that the damages awarded by the jury did not 
reflect tax consequences and were therefore excessive.
1281
 Alas, another 
opportunity to visit this issue was lost. 
2. S-Corporations 
An S-corporation is a special type of corporation that generally is not 
subject to the income tax imposed on corporations.
1282
 Instead, it is treated 
as a conduit.
1283
 It files a tax return and reports its financial results,
1284
 but 
its income and deductions flow through and are taxed to the shareholders on 
their tax returns.
1285
 To qualify for S-corporation treatment, a corporation 
must meet certain conditions and must elect such treatment.
1286
 All four 
recent cases involving S-corporations focus on procedural issues and not on 
the merits of the asserted claims. 
In Boerger v. Heiman, the plaintiff had owned two apartment complexes 
since the 1980s.
1287
 In 1997, the plaintiff needed to refinance the mortgages 
on the complexes and instructed his attorney to work out the details.
1288
 The 
complexes were transferred to a limited liability company, and eventually 
the plaintiff, Boerger, became the sole owner of two corporations, which 
owned, respectively, 99 percent and 1 percent of the limited liability 
company.
1289
 Boerger was aware that if he owned property through a 
corporation double taxation would result.
1290
 When he asked his attorney 
whether this restructuring had any adverse tax consequences, the attorney 
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assured him there would be no adverse tax consequences.
1291
 The court 
indicated the attorney’s reassurance might have been accurate if S-
corporation status had been timely elected for the two corporations.
1292
 
However, neither Boerger’s attorney nor his accountant at that time made 
the election.
1293
 
In 1999, Boerger hired a new accountant to prepare his and his 
corporations’ tax returns.1294 The accountant told Boerger that because the 
corporations were not S-corporations he would be subject to double tax if 
the corporations were ever profitable, but since the corporations had losses, 
Boerger could wait until the corporations became profitable before electing 
S-corporation status.
1295
 In 2004, Boerger received an offer to buy one of 
the apartment complexes.
1296
 When inquiring about the tax implications of 
selling, he was advised by his accountant that there would be double 
taxation because the corporations were not S-corporations.
1297
 As a 
consequence, Boerger did not sell the complex.
1298
 He then instituted this 
action against his attorney, his former accountant, and his present 
accountant, each for not electing S-corporation status either initially or in 
1999.
1299
 The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
1300
 In Boerger, the Delaware 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the action for trial.
1301
 
Under certain circumstances, an S-corporation that previously was a 
regular C Corporation will incur tax when its passive investment income 
exceeds twenty-five percent of its gross receipts.
1302
 If this situation persists 
for three consecutive taxable years, the corporation’s S election is 
terminated.
1303
 In Federated Industries, Inc. v. Reisin, the plaintiffs were an 
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S-corporation and its owners who found themselves in this situation.
1304
 The 
defendants were the S-corporation’s accountant and his firm who were 
hired to prepare the corporation’s tax returns and to advise when passive 
income was likely to exceed the twenty-five percent threshold.
1305
 If 
advised properly, the corporation could have shifted its investments to yield 
non-passive income.
1306
 The defendants under-calculated the plaintiff’s 
passive investment income for 2002, 2003 and 2004.
1307
 As a result, the 
plaintiffs incurred additional taxes and penalties and its S-corporation status 
was jeopardized.
1308
 This suit was then commenced. The court affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal of the case on statute of limitations grounds,1309 and 
never addressed any substantive issues. 
In Berg v. Hirschy, the plaintiffs were the shareholders of an S-
corporation who had converted their S-corporation to a limited liability 
company on the advice of the defendant attorney.
1310
 The plaintiffs alleged 
the defendant negligently failed to advise them that there could be 
additional adverse tax consequences if a tax authority were to ascribe some 
goodwill or going concern value to the corporation.
1311
 The tax returns were 
filed without reference to any such value, and no tax authority had yet 
asserted any claim for additional taxes when this suit was commenced.
1312
 
This suit was commenced seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant 
would be liable for any taxes that might be incurred in the future, or, 
alternatively, that for statute of limitations purposes, no malpractice claim 
had yet occurred.
1313
 Berg affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action 
at the pleading stage because there was no justiciable controversy.
1314
 In the 
absence of any claim for additional taxes from any taxing authority, the 
 
1304
927 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
1305
Id. 
1306
Id. 
1307
Id. at 1255. There was also a finding by the IRS that plaintiff also had excessive passive 
investment income in 2000 and 2001. Id. at 1256. 
1308
Id. at 1254–55. 
1309
Id. at 1255. 
1310
136 P.3d 1182, 1183 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
1311
Id. at 1184. It is interesting to note that the court refused to explain the nature of the 
alleged tax consequences. Id. at 1184 n.1. 
1312
Id. at 1184. 
1313
Id. 
1314
Id. at 1183. 
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court held the claim was entirely speculative since there might never be any 
claim.
1315
 
In the tax malpractice area, a plaintiff often must traverse a very fine 
line. If suit is commenced too soon—before there are any cognizable 
damages—the suit is dismissed for being premature, since damages are 
normally an element of the cause of action. If a plaintiff waits until there 
definitely have been damages, the suit may be dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds if the judge decides the cause of action accrued much 
earlier.
1316
 In Berg, the plaintiffs attempted to resolve this dilemma by 
seeking alternative declaratory judgments. The Oregon Court of Appeals, 
however, refused to assist the plaintiffs because of considerations of 
justiciability. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are thus left to their own devices to make 
a correct determination. 
In Berkowitz, Dick, Pollack & Bryant v. Smith, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of the defendant accountant’s motion to compel 
arbitration.
1317
 The plaintiff owned an S-corporation and a foreign 
corporation.
1318
 The accountant was retained to prepare the plaintiff’s 
personal tax returns and to give the plaintiff tax advice.
1319
 The alleged 
malpractice was defendant’s failure to warn plaintiff of the adverse tax 
consequences that would result from an intercompany loan from the 
plaintiff’s foreign corporation to his S-corporation.1320 Berkowitz does not 
explain the underlying tax issue. However, it seems to be a general foreign 
tax issue not dependent on the S-corporation status of the borrower.
1321
 
3. Tax Benefits and Elections 
In Skyline Duplication and Document Management. Corp. v. David 
Gronsbell & Co., a taxpayer sued its long-time accountants for failing to 
inform it that it qualified for federal Work Opportunity Tax Credits for 
hiring certain targeted classes of employees.
1322
 While the defendants 
asserted a statute of limitations claim in this motion for summary judgment, 
 
1315
Id. at 1184. 
1316
See Malpractice II, supra note 1 at 1067–70. 
1317
49 So. 3d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
1318
Id. 
1319
Id. 
1320
Id. 
1321
See I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (2012). 
1322
See I.R.C. § 51(a)–(d) (2012); No. 604201/2005, 2010 WL 5621157, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Dec. 23, 2010). 
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the court sidestepped it.
1323
 Instead, the court granted the defendants’ 
summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that it 
had met all of the requirements needed to obtain the credit.
1324
 Without 
evidence of damages, a cause of action was not stated.
1325
 The plaintiff 
claimed it did not obtain or retain the required information because it was 
never informed by the defendant that it needed the information.
1326
 
In reaching its decision, the court noted there was no clear evidence that 
the plaintiff either asked the defendant whether it qualified for the credit or 
directly inquired about this particular credit.
1327
 This begs the question of 
whether the accountant had a duty to know of such tax provisions and to 
raise them with the client, especially where, as here, the accountant had a 
longstanding relationship with the client.
1328
 
In Bachand Estates LLP v. Hanft Fride, P.A., the plaintiffs purchased a 
senior retirement complex in Wisconsin in 2006.
1329
 They desired to 
redevelop the property and qualify for federal tax credits for developing 
affordable multifamily rental housing.
1330
 Relying in part on an opinion by 
the defendant attorney that the property qualified for four-percent credit on 
its acquisition cost, the plaintiffs decided to apply for a program under 
which four-percent credits were available for both the acquisition and 
rehabilitation costs.
1331
 These credits were available to all applicants.
1332
 
Alternatively, a 9 percent credit could be obtained on only rehabilitation 
costs, but this program was competitive and not all applicants obtained the 
credit.
1333
 On December 11, 2006, the plaintiffs learned that the defendant’s 
opinion was incorrect and the property did not qualify for the four-percent 
credit on acquisition costs.
1334
 The deadline for filing for the nine-percent 
 
1323
Skyline, 2010 WL 5621157, at *4. 
1324
Id. at *5. 
1325
Id. at *2. 
1326
Id. at *4. 
1327
Id. 
1328 The defendant accountants prepared the plaintiff’s tax returns from 1994 until 2004. Id. at 
*2. The dispute apparently concerns employees hired from 1997 to 2006. Id. 
1329
No. 07-cv-334-JCS, 2008 WL 220285, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2008). 
1330
Id. 
1331
Id. 
1332
Id. 
1333
Id. 
1334
Id. 
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credit was February 2, 2007.
1335
 The plaintiff did not apply for the nine-
percent credit.
1336
 This action for damages ensued.
1337
 
In this action the defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that 
the incorrect opinion did not cause any damages because the plaintiff’s 
failure to seek the nine-percent credit was based on other business 
reasons.
1338
 Since there were many disputed factual issues, the court denied 
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.1339 
Under I.R.C. § 754, an election is available to a partnership to adjust the 
basis of its assets with respect to a partner that acquires an interest in a 
partnership by purchase or by inheritance.
1340
 This election is very desirable 
when the present value of the partnership’s assets exceeds its basis for tax 
purposes. In Ames & Fischer Co., II v. McDonald, events occurred in 2000 
and 2001 that would have allowed the plaintiff partnerships to make 
favorable § 754 elections.
1341
 However, the accountants who prepared the 
tax returns did not make the elections, and the attorneys who rendered 
business and estate planning advice to plaintiffs did not advise that the 
elections should be made.
1342
 As a result, the plaintiffs lost a number of 
immediate and future tax benefits.
1343
 This action against the accountants 
and attorneys ensued.
1344
 This case, on a certified question from the trial 
court, only addressed the issue regarding when the statute of limitations 
commenced to run.
1345
 
Mention should be made of Nagle v. Cohen, which simply contains a 
conclusory allegation that the defendant attorneys improperly advised the 
plaintiff not to elect “trader” status under the I.R.C.1346 None of the facts 
 
1335
Id. at *1–2. 
1336
Id. at *2. 
1337
Id. 
1338
Id. 
1339
Id. at *3. 
1340
I.R.C. § 754 (2012). 
1341
798 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The death of a partner in 2000 and the sale 
of partnership interests in 2001 would have qualified plaintiffs for section 754 elections. Id. 
1342
Id. 
1343
Id. at 559–60. 
1344
Id. at 560. 
1345
Id. at 564. 
1346
No.2009-098902-NM, 2010 WL 5129813, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010). There 
is also an equally cryptic and unexplained allegation that defendants provided incorrect tax advice. 
Id. at *2. The reference to not electing trader status presumably applies to IRC § 475(f) pursuant 
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relevant to this claim are presented. The case affirms, on statute of 
limitations grounds, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant attorneys.
1347
 
Similarly, in Berg v. Eisner LLP, there is a conclusory allegation the 
defendant accounting firm committed malpractice by failing to inform the 
plaintiff of a possible tax election that would have allowed the plaintiff to 
write off a portion of his securities trading losses.
1348
 Presumably, this was 
the same election as was involved in Nagle.
1349
 Here, the First Department 
reversed the trial court, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint.
1350
 
It should also be recalled that in Goodman v. Hanson, a case discussed 
previously, one of the asserted causes of action was that the defendant 
attorney deducted certain estate administration fees on a trust’s income tax 
return rather than on the estate tax return, which was in a higher marginal 
tax bracket.
1351
 The court did not address the substance of the complaint, but 
held that an earlier release signed by the parties prevented this claim from 
proceeding.
1352
 
4. Tax-Free Exchanges 
Under I.R.C. § 1031, gain or loss is not recognized when certain 
property is exchanged for like-kind property.
1353
 Instead, the tax 
consequences from the disposition of the initial property are deferred until 
the disposal of the replacement property.
1354
 Where a direct exchange of 
properties is not possible, § 1031 is still available if a qualified intermediary 
 
to which a person in the trade or business of being a trader in securities may elect the mark-to-
market method of accounting for this business. I.R.C. § 475(f) (2012). 
1347
Nagle, 2010 WL 5129813, at *4–5. 
1348
941 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617 (App. Div. 2012). 
1349
See Nagle, 2010 WL 5129813, at *1–2. 
1350
Berg, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 617. 
1351
945 N.E.2d 1255, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); See supra text accompanying notes 617–631, 
and notes 745–748. 
1352
Goodman, 945 N.E.2d at 1270. 
1353
I.R.C. § 1031 (2012). To be eligible for section 1031 treatment both the initial and the 
replacement properties must be held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment. 
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2012). Inventory, certain intangibles and interest in partnerships are not eligible 
for section 1031 treatment. Id. 
1354
Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern, No. 115517/07, 2011 WL 892757, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 10, 2011), aff’d, 99 A.D.3d 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). This deferral is obtained by the 
basis provisions in I.R.C. section 1031(d). 
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is utilized to receive the sales proceeds from the sale of the initial property, 
the taxpayer never receives the sales proceeds (or any other non-like kind 
property), the taxpayer identifies the replacement property within 45 days 
of the disposition of the old property, and the taxpayer actually receives the 
replacement property within 180 days of the disposition of the old 
property.
1355
 
As discussed previously, in Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Stern, a § 1031 
exchange would have saved the taxpayer a substantial amount of immediate 
taxes—allegedly $5.1 million.1356 There was neither a written retainer 
agreement nor any other written evidence to establish who—the defendant 
attorney or the seller—had agreed to be responsible for complying with the 
§ 1031 exchange requirements.
1357
 Each party testified the other had 
undertaken this responsibility.
1358
 While the parties focused on the fact that 
§ 1031 treatment was unavailable because the plaintiff actually received the 
sales proceeds at the time of sale,
1359
 the court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant attorney because the plaintiff failed to establish that all the 
other requirements for § 1031 treatment were met.
1360
 Without such 
evidence, even if the defendant, arguendo, were negligent, there was still no 
proximate causation of any harm to the plaintiff since § 1031 would 
nevertheless have been unavailable.
1361
 
In Rashti v. Gadoshian, the defendant CPA advised the plaintiffs, in 
connection with their sale of property in 2008, that substantial tax savings 
could be realized if they engaged in a § 1031 exchange.
1362
 The defendant 
then recommended an intermediary to receive the proceeds of the sale and 
to facilitate the § 1031 exchange.
1363
 Unfortunately, the intermediary stole 
most of the proceeds.
1364
 Even after issues concerning the intermediary 
arose, the defendant allegedly continued to reassure the plaintiffs that their 
funds were safe, that the § 1031 requirements were being met, and not to 
take any legal action.
1365
 This suit ensued, alleging professional negligence 
 
1355
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b) (2014). 
1356
Wo Yee, 2011 WL 892757, at *3; See supra text accompanying notes 428–443. 
1357
See Wo Yee, 2011 WL 892757, at *1–2. 
1358
Id. 
1359
Id. at *2. 
1360
Id. at *5. 
1361
Id. 
1362
No. B221198, 2010 WL 4679594, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010). 
1363
Id. 
1364
See id. at *2. 
1365
See id. at *1–2. 
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and breach of fiduciary duties.
1366
 The lower court held there was no duty 
owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs and sustained the defendant’s 
demurer, dismissing the complaint.
1367
 
On appeal, the California intermediate appellate court reversed the 
lower court and held the defendant did owe a duty to the plaintiffs.
1368
 The 
tax advice rendered by the defendant CPA concerning the § 1031exchange 
clearly was within the scope of the defendant’s professional services to the 
plaintiffs.
1369
 Also, the court held the recommendation of an intermediary 
qualified to effectuate the § 1031 exchange was within the scope of the tax 
advice rendered.
1370
 
It should be noted that the court explicitly distinguished this situation 
from a “simple referral.”1371 In this case, the referral was part and parcel of 
the tax advice.
1372
 Also, while perhaps not directly relevant, it should be 
noted that there was an allegation that the defendant CPA was “a knowing 
participant in the criminal act” of the intermediary.1373 
While the result in Rashti seems correct, a line may need to be drawn 
between “simple referrals” and situations such as this one in which the 
referral is central to the professional services rendered. Exactly where the 
line should be drawn may not be easy to articulate. 
Similar to Rashiti, in Winters v. Dowdall, the defendant attorney 
represented the plaintiff in connection with an exchange of properties under 
I.R.C. § 1031 in which a qualified intermediary was involved and this 
intermediary stole money deposited with it.
1374
 The trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and on this appeal the First Department 
unanimously affirmed.
1375
 The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was 
retained to advise him in connection with the § 1031 transaction and with 
the selection of a qualified intermediary.
1376
 The complaint also asserted the 
defendant failed to: (1) properly investigate the intermediary before 
selecting it; (2) ensure the intermediary was adequately bonded; (3) ensure 
 
1366
Id. at *2. 
1367
Id. at *3. 
1368
Id. 
1369
Id. at *3–4. 
1370
Id. 
1371
Id. at *4. 
1372
Id. 
1373
Id. at *5. 
1374
882 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (App. Div. 2009). 
1375
Id. 
1376
Id. 
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the funds received by the intermediary were deposited into an account for 
the plaintiff’s sole benefit; and (4) that these failures caused damages of 
over $600,000.
1377
 The First Department held the plaintiff’s pleadings stated 
a valid malpractice cause of action.
1378
 
In Frank v. Lockwood, the crux of the dispute between the parties was 
the allegedly incorrect advice given by the defendant accountant to the 
plaintiffs concerning the taxes to be incurred by the plaintiffs in connection 
with a § 1031 transaction.
1379
 The opinion, however, focused solely on the 
recoverability of interest and penalties awarded by the jury to the plaintiffs 
as a result of the late payment of their taxes and the late filing of their tax 
returns for 2001.
1380
 Especially noteworthy is the fact that the Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that interest incurred upon the late payment of taxes 
due to a tax advisor’s negligence is recoverable in a tax malpractice action, 
though the burden of proving such damages is upon the plaintiff.
1381
 
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that Sanders v. 
Bressler, Amery & Ross, P.C., a case noted briefly at the end of this article, 
involved a failed § 1031 exchange.
1382
 
5. Disposition/Acquisition of Property 
In Leggiadro, Ltd. v. Winston & Strawn, LLP, the plaintiffs were an S-
corporation and its two shareholders.
1383
 The corporation had a lease for its 
flagship store that had approximately seven years remaining.
1384
 In 2010, 
the landlord of the premises notified the plaintiffs that it wished to negotiate 
an early termination and buy-out of the lease.
1385
 The defendant law firm 
was retained to negotiate a buy-out so that the after-tax proceeds to the 
plaintiff would cover the costs of moving the store to a new location.
1386
 
The defendant was specifically requested to advise the plaintiffs “of any 
 
1377
Id. 
1378
Id. 
1379
749 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Neb. 2008). The defendant accountant allegedly told the plaintiff 
that any taxes on the sale of their property not avoided by means of a section 1031 exchange could 
be offset by tax credits available to the plaintiffs. Id. 
1380
See id. at 451–53. 
1381
Id. at 453; See Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 11–12. 
1382
No. 03CV5283DRHWDW, 2006 WL 319303, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006); See infra 
text accompanying notes 1482–1486. 
1383
No. 154749/2012, 2013 WL 856559, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2013). 
1384
Id. 
1385
Id. 
1386
Id. 
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and all tax liabilities arising from the buy-out.”1387 The plaintiffs incurred 
unexpected New York State and New York City tax liabilities due to 
differences in how the state, the city, and the federal government tax S-
corporations.
1388
 The defendant allegedly failed to inform the plaintiffs of 
these tax liabilities and the plaintiffs brought this action seeking to recover 
the shortfall caused by the defendant’s error in not negotiating a higher buy-
out price that would take these costs into account.
1389
 
The defendant’s motion to dismiss the cause of action by the 
shareholders of the S-Corporation was granted because the retainer clearly 
provided that the sole client represented was the corporation.
1390
 The fact 
that it was an S-Corporation and its income and expenses flowed through to 
its shareholders did not matter.
1391
 The defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
corporation’s cause of action was denied.1392 The court held it was a viable 
cause of action and the damages sought were not speculative.
1393
 
Delanno, Inc. v. Peace involved a suit by the purchaser of a business 
against the attorney who represented him in the purchase transaction.
1394
 
Under the purchase agreement, the purchaser was not to be responsible for 
any taxes owed by the acquired business for any time before the date of 
purchase.
1395
 To effectuate this result, the defendant attorney was 
responsible for obtaining a tax clearance letter from the state, thereby 
absolving the purchaser of any such tax liability that otherwise would have 
resulted from the purchase.
1396
 The defendant advised the plaintiff that he 
had obtained the tax clearance letter.
1397
 It later came to light that an 
incorrect tax identification number was used in connection with the tax 
clearance letter and the purchaser was responsible for pre-sale taxes of the 
business.
1398
 Despite the error, the defendant attorney avoided liability on 
statute of limitations grounds.
1399
 
 
1387
Id. 
1388
Id. 
1389
Id. 
1390
Id. at *4. 
1391
Id. at *3. 
1392
Id. 
1393
Id. 
1394
237 S.W.3d 81, 83 (Ark. 2006). 
1395
Id. 
1396
Id. 
1397
Id. 
1398
Id. 
1399
Id. at 87. 
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6. Method of Accounting 
O’Bryan v. Ashland involved an accounting error made by the defendant 
accountant in preparing the plaintiff’s tax return for 1995.1400 The defendant 
had provided services to the plaintiff since 1987–1988.1401 In 1995, the 
plaintiff incorporated his business, following the advice of the defendant, 
who had recommended this on several occasions over the years.
1402
 The 
business was incorporated on April 1, 1995.
1403
 Prior to incorporation, the 
business utilized the cash method of accounting for tax purposes.
1404
 Upon 
incorporation, the business changed to the accrual method of accounting.
1405
 
In preparing the business’s tax return for 1995, the defendant erroneously 
used the accrual method of accounting for the first quarter of 1995.
1406
 This 
resulted in a substantial understatement of the business’s tax liability.1407 
When the error was discovered several years later, an amended return was 
filed.
1408
 In addition to the extra taxes, approximately $50,000 of interest 
was paid.
1409
 The plaintiff brought this suit to recover the interest and other 
expenses incurred to rectify the error.
1410
 The defendant conceded his 
negligence, and the amount of damages was left to the jury.
1411
 The jury 
awarded the plaintiff approximately $39,000 for interest.
1412
 This award of 
interest was appealed by the defendant.
1413
 
On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court indicated that the issue of 
whether such interest is recoverable was a matter of first impression in 
South Dakota.
1414
 The Court ultimately held such interest was recoverable 
in appropriate circumstances and upheld the jury award.
1415
 
 
1400
717 N.W.2d 632, 633 (S.D. 2006). 
1401
Id. at 634. 
1402
Id. 
1403
Id. 
1404
Id. 
1405
Id. 
1406
Id. 
1407
Id. 
1408
Id. 
1409
Id. 
1410
Id. 
1411
Id. 
1412
Id. at 636. 
1413
Id. 
1414
Id. at 633. 
1415
Id. at 634. 
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In the United States, there are three views concerning the recovery of 
such interest. There are two extreme, opposite views and an intermediate, 
more nuanced view. The majority view is the traditional view that simply 
permits the recovery of interest as a normal incident of the tort measure of 
damages.
1416
 But for the negligence, the interest would not have been 
incurred, so it was caused by the negligence and is recoverable.
1417
 The 
opposite view, the minority view, absolutely refuses to permit the recovery 
of such interest.
1418
 According to this view, a plaintiff who incurs this 
interest had, for some period of time, use of the government’s tax money to 
which he was not entitled.
1419
 The interest charge is simply an appropriate 
charge for this use.
1420
 Any recovery of the interest would be a windfall, 
giving the plaintiff free use of the government’s tax money.1421 The 
intermediate, and most modern view, permits the recovery of interest when 
appropriate, which would normally occur when the interest paid the 
government exceeds the earnings realized by the plaintiff on the tax 
underpayment.
1422
 In O’Bryan, the Court emphatically refused to join the 
minority no-interest-recovery view and instead joined the modern, 
intermediate view.
1423
 
7. Stock Redemption 
Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP ultimately is 
simply a situation in which the New York intermediate Appellate Court 
reversed the trial court and held the statute of limitations barred the asserted 
cause of action.
1424
 Unlike the trial court, the reviewing court held the 
continuous representation doctrine did not apply to toll the statute of 
limitations.
1425
 The case is worthy of brief focus, however, because the 
asserted tax error is unusual, involving the interplay of the federal tax 
provisions governing a bank’s bad debt deduction and the stock redemption 
 
1416
Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 3. 
1417
Id. at 17. 
1418
Id. at 4. 
1419
Id. at 23. 
1420
Id. 
1421
Id. at 4, 23. 
1422
Id. at 7–8. 
1423 O’Bryan v. Ashland, 717 N.W.2d 632, 639–40 (S.D. 2006). 
1424
895 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (App. Div. 2010). 
1425
Id.; See No. 603492/06, 2009 WL 1363026, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2009), rev’d, 
895 N.Y.S.2d 361 (App. Div. 2010). 
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rules, and because of certain perceptive analysis in the lower court’s 
unreported, but available, opinion. 
In late 1999 or early 2000, the plaintiff, Apple Bank, consulted with the 
defendant accounting firm as to whether there would be any negative tax 
consequences under I.R.C. § 593, the provision governing the bank’s bad 
debt deduction, if it entered into a stock redemption agreement with the 
estate of the bank’s deceased sole shareholder.1426 Apparently, based on the 
assumption that § 302 of the I.R.C. applied and would treat the redemption 
as a dividend, the bank was advised there would be no negative tax 
consequences.
1427
 The bank then redeemed additional shares in 2001, 2002, 
2003, and 2004.
1428
 In 2005, it was discovered that the redemption was not 
treated as a dividend under I.R.C. § 302, but was treated as a sale by the 
estate under I.R.C. § 303.
1429
 As a consequence, the advice was incorrect, 
and the redemptions caused the bank to lose a portion of its bad debt 
deductions for each of the years in which a redemption occurred.
1430
 This 
required filing amended returns, paying over $12 million in back taxes and 
interest, and also resulted in the defendant’s withdrawing its audit reports 
for the bank’s 2003 and 2004 financial statements.1431 This suit for damages 
ensued. 
As argued by the defendant in Apple Bank, New York law is frequently 
characterized as not permitting the recovery of back taxes or interest in tax 
malpractice situations based upon Alpert v. Shea Gould Clemenko & Casey 
and its progeny.
1432
 I have argued that Alpert is wrong in part, and should be 
overturned in part.
1433
 In the lower court, the judge, rather perceptively in 
my view, attempted to limit Alpert and its progeny so that back taxes and 
interest may be recoverable where the underlying tax liability could have 
 
1426
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1. 
1427
See id. I.R.C. § 302 is the provision governing the tax treatment of corporate redemptions 
of its outstanding stock. See I.R.C. § 302 (2012). Under this provision, assuming the redeeming 
corporation has adequate earnings and profits, the redemption of stock from a sole shareholder 
would always be treated as a dividend. Id. 
1428
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1. 
1429
Id.; I.R.C. § 303 is an exception to I.R.C. § 302. See I.R.C. § 303 (2012); I.R.C. § 302 
(2012). It permits non-dividend, sale or exchange treatment under certain circumstances when 
stock of a decedent is redeemed. I.R.C. § 303 (2012). 
1430
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *1. 
1431
Id. at *2. 
1432
Id. at *5. See Alpert v. Shea Gould Clemenko & Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314–15 (App. 
Div. 1990). See generally NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42. 
1433
See NY: Balanced or Biased, supra note 42, at 181–82. 
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been avoided but for the negligently erroneous advice.
1434
 The court also 
cited, with seeming approval, an earlier case, which did allow the recovery 
of interest on an erroneously caused tax underpayment,
1435
 even though that 
other case seems to have been otherwise invisible, as far as being followed 
by subsequent cases.
1436
 
8. Tax Exempt Bonds 
In Coilplus-Alabama, Inc. v. Vann, the defendant attorney and his law 
firm were retained in 1998 to advise the plaintiff about the issuance of $8 
million in tax exempt bonds to expand the plaintiff’s steel-manufacturing 
plant.
1437
 The bonds were issued in 1999 upon defendant’s advice that the 
bonds qualified for tax exempt status as a small issue under I.R.C. § 144.
1438
 
Under I.R.C. § 144, the maximum amount of tax exempt bonds that could 
be issued was $10 million.
1439
 In determining the $10 million cap, other 
similar tax exempt bonds that were previously issued and still outstanding 
had to be included in the cap.
1440
 Since the plaintiff had $5 million of 
similar previously issued bonds outstanding, the current issue did not 
qualify for tax exempt status.
1441
 When the IRS learned of this in 2001, the 
plaintiff refunded and retired these bonds as of their date of issue.
1442
 On 
appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to 
the defendant on statute of limitations grounds.
1443
 
9. REMICs 
A real estate mortgage investment conduit, or “REMIC,” is a type of 
special purpose tax vehicle utilized for the pooling of mortgage loans and 
the issuance of securities backed by these loans, (i.e., mortgage-backed 
 
1434
Apple Bank, 2009 WL 1363026, at *7. 
1435
Id. (citing Jamie Towers Hous. Co. v. Lucas, 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div. 2002)). Jamie 
Towers involved the underpayment of real estate tax rather than income tax. Id. at 533. 
1436
NY: Balanced on Biased, supra note 42, at 151. 
1437
53 So. 3d 898, 899 (Ala. 2010). 
1438
Id. 
1439
I.R.C. § 144(a)(4) (2012). 
1440
Id. 
1441
Coilplus, 53 So. 3d at 899. 
1442
Id. at 901. 
1443
Id. at 909. 
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securities).
1444
 The REMIC itself is not subject to federal income tax.
1445
 
The type of assets permitted to be owned by a REMIC is limited by the 
I.R.C.
1446
 One type of asset that may be owned is a qualified mortgage 
which is secured by an interest in real property, the value of which is equal 
to at least eighty percent of the amount of the mortgage loan.
1447
 As a 
consequence, any transfer of a mortgage loan to a REMIC requires a careful 
focus on the value of the real property securing the loan to be certain it is 
adequate to make the loan a qualified mortgage for REMIC purposes.
1448
 
The plaintiff in Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v. Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft, LLP had hired the defendant law firm to advise it on an 
ongoing basis concerning how to comply with the REMIC requirements.
1449
 
On one pool of loans, the defendant law firm issued an opinion that the 
package was REMIC-qualified for federal income tax purposes, and 
included language in the underlying agreement signed by the plaintiff 
warrantying that each loan was a qualified mortgage loan for REMIC 
purposes.
1450
 
One of the loans in this mortgage pool became worthless within three 
years of the date of an appraisal valuing it at $68 million.
1451
 After 
litigation, the plaintiff was forced to repurchase this worthless loan for over 
$67 million pursuant to its warranty.
1452
 It seems the real property securing 
the loan was not worth near eighty percent of the amount of the loan.
1453
 
The appraisal of the property securing this loan was questionable on its 
face, since approximately $37 million of the $68 million appraised value 
was attributable to equipment and intangibles—not real property.1454 In 
addition, another relatively contemporaneous appraisal was later discovered 
that valued the underlying real property for property tax assessment 
purposes at under $3 million.
1455
 
 
1444
See generally Marshall D. Feiring, 741-2d T.M., REMICs, FASITs and Other Mortgage-
Backed Securities. A-1. 
1445
I.R.C. § 860A (2012). 
1446
I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4) (2012). 
1447
Id.; I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
1448
See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
1449
No. 116147/06, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2161, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2012). 
1450
Id. at *6. 
1451
Id. at *7. 
1452
Id. at *12. 
1453
See id. 
1454
Id. at *5. 
1455
Id. at *8–9. 
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This action ensued, in which the plaintiff asserted the defendant was to 
blame for the loss because (1) it did not properly advise the plaintiff 
concerning the requirements for appraisals that were necessary to establish 
that a mortgage loan was qualified property for a REMIC; and (2) because 
it did not properly perform the necessary due diligence requisite to issuing 
its opinion that this pool of mortgage loans was REMIC-qualified since it 
did not review the appraisal for this loan.
1456
 In response, the defendant 
asserted it relied on the expertise of the plaintiff’s mortgage bankers 
concerning property valuations.
1457
 In Nomura, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because many factual issues 
remained to be decided.
1458
 
10.  Miscellaneous 
There are several cases that mention seemingly viable tax malpractice 
claims, but which do not explore the underlying facts in meaningful detail 
and which were decided on non-substantive grounds. These cases are 
presented in tabular form. 
 
Case Name Tax Malpractice Claim Disposition 
Burtoff v. 
Faris
1459
 
Defendant negligently drafted and 
implemented a disclaimer of an 
inheritance.
1460
 
Claim barred by statute of 
limitations.
1461
 
Diamond 
Island 
Marina, 
Inc.v. Grabel, 
Schnieders, 
Hollman & 
Co.
1462
 
Incorrect advice by accountant that 
transfer of property to the mortgagee 
bank would not have negative tax 
consequences.
1463
 This apparently 
implicates cancellation of 
indebtedness income and I.R.C. 
§ 108.
1464
 
Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment 
denied.
1465
 There are 
triable issues of fact.
1466
 
 
1456
Id. at *13. 
1457
Id. at *36. 
1458
Id. at *65–66. 
1459
935 A.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
1460
Id. at 1088. 
1461
Id. at 1090. 
1462
No. 08–0025–DRH, 2009 WL 3769775 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2009). 
1463
Id. at *1. 
1464
I.R.C. § 108 (2012). 
1465
Diamond Island, 2009 WL 3769775, at *2. 
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GUS 
Consulting 
GMBH v. 
Chadbourne 
& Parke, 
LLP
1467
 
 
Defendant attorneys failed to advise 
plaintiff it was illegal under Russian 
law to invest in a Russian natural gas 
company by means of a simple 
partnership structure.
1468
 
Summary judgment for 
defendant affirmed because 
of a prior arbitration and 
because no admissible 
evidence about proximate 
cause was introduced.
1469
 
Kay v. 
McGuire 
Woods, 
LLP
1470
 
Incorrect advice from attorney as to 
structure of sale of stock in a 
business,
1471
 and failing to give 
adequate information to allow 
plaintiff to make an informed 
decision.
1472
 
Case remanded back to 
state court.
1473
 
Morrow Cash 
Heating & 
Air, Inc. v. 
Jackson
1474
 
Accountant sued client for unpaid 
fees.
1475
 Client countersued asserting 
accountant gave wrong advice not to 
collect sales tax on equipment 
installed in new construction.
1476
 
Directed verdict for 
accountant on counterclaim 
reversed.
1477
 There was a 
bona fide issue whether the 
statute of limitations had 
run.
1478
 
Osowski v. 
Howard
1479
 
Defendant accountant who acted only 
as a return preparer for plaintiff and 
her business failed to inform her that 
her sons had taken the business from 
her when they incorporated the 
Court affirmed summary 
judgment for defendant 
since defendant owed no 
duty to inform plaintiff and 
also on statute of limitation 
 
1466
Id. 
1467
905 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2010). 
1468
Id. at 159. 
1469
Id. at 159–60. 
1470
No. 2:11–cv–00341, 2012 WL 1067555 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2012). 
1471
Id. at *1. 
1472
Id. at *3. 
1473
Id. at *5. 
1474
239 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. 2006). 
1475
Id. at 9. 
1476
Id. 
1477
Id. at 9–10. 
1478
Id. at 10. 
1479
No. 2010AP2260, 2011 WI App 155 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011). 
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business that was previously a 
partnership.
1480
 
grounds.
1481
 
Sanders v. 
Bressler, 
Amery & 
Ross, P.C.
1482
 
Defendant attorney failed to timely 
obtain an agreement with the 
Environmental Protection Agency 
thereby preventing the tax free sale of 
a property/purchase of another 
property to qualify for tax free 
treatment under I.R.C. § 1031.
1483
 
Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss granted.
1484
 As 
spouses and children of the 
owners of the property 
involved, they had no 
privity to bring malpractice 
cause of action.
1485
 They 
also were not third party 
beneficiaries entitled to 
bring a breach of contract 
action.
1486
 
Sonicblue, 
Inc. v. 
Pillsbury 
Winthrop 
Shaw 
Pittman, 
LLP
1487
 
Counsel for bankrupt corporation 
failed to inform bankrupt corporation 
that it need to file timely tax 
returns.
1488
 
Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss denied.
1489
 
Trolly Corp. 
v. 
Boohaker
1490
 
Adverse tax consequences resulted 
from how the defendant attorney 
structured a transaction in which two 
investors bought into plaintiff and an 
earlier investor was bought out.
1491
 
Affirms summary judgment 
to defendant on statute of 
limitations grounds.
1492
 
 
 
1480
Id. at *2. 
1481
Id. at *5, *7. 
1482
No. 03CV5283DRHWDW, 2006 WL 319303 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006). 
1483
Id. at *1. The basic mechanics of I.R.C. § 1031 are described supra text accompanying 
notes 1292–1294. 
1484
Sanders, 2006 WL 319303, at *6. 
1485
Id. 
1486
Id. at *7. 
1487
Bankruptcy No. 03–51775–MM, 2008 WL 2875407 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 23, 2008). 
1488
Id. at *8. 
1489
Id. at *13. 
1490
938 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
1491
Id. at 159. 
1492
Id. at 161. 
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 Before concluding this section, I wish to take note of two cases that I 
think of as “oddball” but that may be worth brief mention. Holtkamp v. 
Parklex Associates is part of an extended dispute between the limited 
partners and the general partner in a partnership that owned a valuable 
parcel of real property.
1493
 The gist of the dispute is a claim by certain 
partners that the general partner and others colluded to defraud the plaintiffs 
of their rightful portion of the proceeds from the sale of the property.
1494
 
Among the allegations are assertions of fraudulent tax returns prepared by 
certain accountants with assistance or participation of certain attorney 
defendants.
1495
 It is uncertain, though, whether these returns were actually 
filed or whether they were simply shown to or given to the plaintiffs but 
never filed.
1496
 
Sorenson v. H & R Block, Inc. is a case I previously characterized as 
diabolically fascinating
1497
 and it continues to fulfill this description.
1498
 The 
original case involved a suit against defendant H & R Block and one of its 
employees seeking $5 million in damages.
1499
 The gist of the complaint was 
that the employee allegedly contacted the tax authorities before the 
plaintiff’s tax return was filed and notified them the plaintiff would be 
filing incorrect 1993 income tax returns.
1500
 On the ensuing audit, the 
employee also allegedly voluntarily gave the tax auditor internal H & R 
Block documents suggesting the return was fraudulent.
1501
 Subsequently, 
both the IRS and Massachusetts audited the plaintiffs for several tax 
years.
1502
 A criminal investigation by the IRS also ensued.
1503
 Although 
many causes of action were asserted,
1504
 the plaintiffs were successful only 
on a breach of contract claim, and for a rather technical violation of the 
Massachusetts False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
1505
 The total 
 
1493
No. 14514/2006, 2011 WL 621122, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2011). 
1494
See id. at *2. 
1495
Id. at *3. 
1496
See id. at *3, *11, *12. 
1497
Malpractice II, supra note 1 at 1025. 
1498
See generally NO. 99-10268-DPW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18689 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 
2002), aff’d, 107 F. App’x 227 (1st Cir. 2004). 
1499
Id. at *2. 
1500
Id. at *11–12. 
1501
Id. at *12. 
1502
Id. at *8, *10. 
1503
Id. at *11. 
1504
Id. at *3–4. 
1505
Id. at *61. 
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damages recovered by the plaintiffs was $630.
1506
 Under the Massachusetts 
False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the plaintiffs were also entitled to 
attorney’s fees.1507 In the most recent case, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s 
fees and costs totaling over $180,000.
1508
 The court, however, only awarded 
them $18,900.
1509
 Diabolically fascinating indeed! 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The most notable developments in the decade examined occurred in the 
generic tax shelter area. Government data indicates that many thousands of 
tax shelter products were sold.
1510
 However, apart from the several class 
actions that have been settled,
1511
 which did not supply useful substantive 
input for this article, I quickly realized that most of the reported cases dealt 
with procedural matters, which, while interesting and illuminating 
regarding how these products were marketed and effectuated, again did not 
supply useful input. It seems highly probable that redress for many of the 
“victimized” purchasers of ineffective shelters was determined by 
arbitration or unreported decisions. Paradoxically, during most of the rather 
long gestation period for this article, I was left with only a handful of cases 
that even touched on substantive issues.
1512
 Towards the end of the process, 
along came the rather prodigious Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP, which 
finally reached a judgment on the merits.
1513
 
Yung, while very significant, especially as long as it remains the only 
case to reach the merits, may not yet be the final word. First, there is the 
matter of an appeal. Especially in light of the magnitude of the punitive 
damages, an appeal is likely. While the judge spent many pages illustrating 
the egregious conduct of the defendant and justifying the size of the 
punitive damages awarded, $80 million of punitive damages and punitive 
damages equal to four times the compensatory damages, might simply be 
 
1506
NO. 99-10268-DPW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23590, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2005). 
1507
Id. at *3–4. 
1508
Id. at *1. 
1509
Id. 
1510
See supra note 7. 
1511
See supra note 14. 
1512
See supra Part II. D. Apart from Yung v. Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 07-CI-2647 (Ky. Cir. 
Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) available at http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/ Yung.pdf (not 
designated for publication). 
1513
See Yung, No. 07-CI-2647, at *209. 
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too much for an appellate court to accept.
1514
 Similarly, the trial judge’s 
invalidation of the engagement letter’s attempt to limit damages to the 
$900,000 fee paid, while most logical, and seemingly correct, might be a 
weak point on appeal.
1515
 The compensatory damages seem mostly 
noncontroversial, except with respect to the interest of a little over $5 
million awarded.
1516
 As occurred in Amato v. KPMG, LLP, the court treated 
the award of interest as rather mechanical, and failed to appreciate the three 
approaches to awarding interest currently extant.
1517
 But, if challenged on 
appeal, the court could simply be seen as following the traditional majority 
view on this issue,
1518
 though without explicitly focusing on it. 
Yung is totally fascinating both in how meticulously and extensively the 
court recounted the repetitive egregious conduct of the defendant, and in 
how the court responded with its compensatory and punitive damage 
awards. It should be remembered, however, that Yung involved very 
extreme and egregious facts—the defendant was selling a product that was 
not yet fully thought through or developed and which, in fact, was totally 
flawed, while at the very same time promising a very conservative and 
careful taxpayer that the product was 100 percent kosher.
1519
 In addition, the 
existence of the e-mail evidence documenting exactly who did what and 
when is most significant in that the facts were definitively established 
beyond any peradventure.
1520
 Other similar situations very likely may not 
enjoy this level of factual certainty. 
As indicated in Part II, E above, where an attorney or accountant who 
really was part of the group which developed a shelter or who was 
otherwise part of the group selling the shelter and this fact was hidden so 
that he or she was portrayed as an independent professional, liability should 
be reasonably certain to ensue.
1521
 The precise ground for liability—i.e., 
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, perhaps 
 
1514
See id. at *194–209. 
1515
See id. at *191. 
1516
See id. at *210. 
1517
See No. 06cv39, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2006). The 
court’s brief consideration of whether the amount of damages was liquidated so as to support an 
award of interest, seemed, if anything, to be inconsequential. See Yung, No. 07-CI-2647, at *176–
77. 
1518
In my survey of the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment, I did not find any 
explicit precedent in Kentucky. See Recovery of Interest, supra note 43, at 30. 
1519
See generally Yung, No. 07-CI-2647. 
1520
See generally id. 
1521
See supra Part III. E. 
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RICO—may differ depending on the precise facts involved and the 
jurisdiction. It would seem liability is much less certain when the advisor 
functioned in the traditional role of the disinterested advisor. If a taxpayer 
retains such a tax professional to advise about the efficacy of a tax shelter 
product and the advisor errs and issues an opinion that the shelter is more-
likely-than-not-valid, will liability ultimately be imposed on the advisor? 
What about the error in judgment rule?—at least where the error was not 
egregious? What about the intrinsic weakness of a more-likely-than-not 
opinion, the lowest threshold of an acceptable opinion? Hopefully, some 
authority will address these issues soon. 
During this past decade a number of cases have arisen in the benefit 
plan area. These cases really are very similar to the generic tax shelter 
cases. Many benefit plans that were too good to be true were developed and 
sold as valid benefit plans. These situations, like the generic tax shelters, 
were marketed to individual business owners who likely knew or sensed 
they were really shelters rather than legitimate benefit plans. But, being in a 
decade of excesses, where people would try almost anything to avoid taxes 
especially where there was some facially valid imprimatur of legality, these 
plans abounded. While these situations could easily have been characterized 
as a type of generic tax shelter, they were treated separately herein because 
they typically involved a specific IRC section and so could easily be 
categorized by code section. Here, as with the generic tax shelters, many 
players who seemed blameworthy and who should have been found liable, 
avoided responsibility on statute of limitations and other non-substantive 
grounds.
1522
 
As in my past studies, the specific areas that seem to have generated the 
most cases are the estate planning/estate and gift tax area and the late filing/
non-filing and negligent preparation areas.
1523
 There still seems to be a 
rather steady stream of cases involving planning or drafting errors in the 
estate planning area.
1524
 In the late filing/non-filing and negligent 
preparation areas, the errors typically involve a more general type of 
sloppiness or inattentiveness rather than “tax” errors.1525 Beyond these, the 
errors seem to cover many different areas of tax practice, which do not lend 
themselves to ranking. 
 
1522
See supra Part III. E.1. 
1523
Malpractice I, supra note 1, at 641-42; Malpractice II, supra note 1, at 1089-90.  
1524
See supra Part III. D.2. 
1525
See supra Parts III. B.1 and 2. 
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In the generic tax shelter area, the holdings in Carroll v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, 
Greene & MacRae, LLP and Rosenbach v. The Diversified Group, Inc. are 
noteworthy and surprising.
1526
 Carroll held that the purchasers of an 
ineffective generic tax shelter could not prove they suffered any damages 
caused by the promoter of the shelter because they had amended their 
original return on which the shelter deduction was claimed and paid the 
additional taxes and interest.
1527
 This goes against the well-established 
principle of mitigation of damages. It punishes the plaintiffs who acted 
responsibly and sought to limit their damages. 
In Rosenbach, the defendants who sold the plaintiffs an ineffective 
generic tax shelter sought contribution from the plaintiffs’ tax counsel and 
plaintiffs’ accounting firm that prepared the return on which the shelter loss 
was reported.
1528
 The defendants asserted that the tax counsel erred in 
advising the plaintiffs whether to apply for amnesty.
1529
 They also asserted 
that the accounting firm lacked a reasonable basis for reporting the shelter 
loss on the plaintiffs’ tax return.1530 While it seems ludicrous and the height 
of “chutzpah” for the seller of a bad tax shelter who repeatedly vouched for 
the efficacy of the shelter to claim the plaintiffs’ return preparer should 
have known better than to believe him, the court upheld the denial of the 
motions to dismiss the third part claims brought by the plaintiffs’ tax 
counsel and accounting firm.
1531
 
Finally, Penner v. Hoffberg, Oberfest, Burger & Berger answers a 
longstanding question in the tax malpractice area: whether any recovery is 
available when a tax advisor makes an error that triggers an audit that 
uncovers other unrelated tax deficiencies?
1532
 The court answered no!
1533
 It 
held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover the cost of defending an audit 
where there is no evidence that any erroneously reported item created a tax 
liability that would not otherwise have existed.
1534
 
 
 
 
1526
Carroll, 623 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Rosenbach, 926 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 
2011); see supra text accompanying notes 192–199; and notes 186–191. 
1527
Carroll, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 513. 
1528
Rosenbach, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 49. 
1529
Id. at 52. 
1530
Id. 
1531
Id. at 51. 
1532
844 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 2007); see supra text accompanying notes 676–685. 
1533
Id. 
1534
Id. at 554. 
